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ABSTRACT 
This study builds an integrative framework to delineate the process of growing 
entrepreneurial firms in developing countries. Deriving from the existing 
entrepreneurship literature, this thesis uses two notions to delineate the process of growth 
of indigenous firms: entrepreneurial intent and entrepreneurial capability. Then, drawing 
on the literature of economic development, it identifies three key sectors, the state, the 
market and the social sector, that foster entrepreneurial intent and cultivate 
entrepreneurial capability. 
The research setting is the information technology (IT) industries in China and Taiwan, 
each of which has had impressive performance when compared with their counterparts in 
other developing countries. This study differentiates the growth of entrepreneurial firms 
into three stages, getting started, getting there, and staying there, and proceeds to analyze 
the comparative-historie al experiences of six IT firms, three in China and three in Taiwan. 
The firms in China are the Advanced Technology Service Division (ATSD), Lenovo 
Computer, and Great Wall Computer. The firms in Taiwan are United Microelectronics 
Corporation (UMC), Acer, and Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS). 
It is found that at the stage of getting started, the govemment tends to be key among the 
three sectors, and can broadly influence the firms' entrepreneurial intent by building the 
national institution context, and more specifically through industrial policies. At the stage 
of getting there, the domestic social sector becomes more salient, and can transfer 
technology to entrepreneurial finns either from abroad or from their own research; they 
can also help defend entrepreneurial firms in intellectual property disputes with 
multinational firms. At the stage of staying there, due to their advanced technology, 
multinationals as forces in the market become more prevalent, and can enhance or destroy 
the capability of entrepreneurial firms. Overall, the state can act as context builder, 
champion and confronter; the social sector can play the roi es of capability builder and 
capability defender, while the market, via multinational firms, can play the roles of 
capability destroyer and capability enhancer. 
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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette étude construit un cadre intégrateur pour délinéer le processus de croissance des 
entreprises entrepreneurlales dans les pays en voie de développement. À partir de la 
documentation existante en entreprenariat, cette thèse utilise deux notions pour délinéer le 
processus de croissance des entreprises indigènes: l'intention entrepreneuriale et la 
capacité entrepreneuriale. Puis, s'appuyant sur la documentation en matière de 
développement économique, elle identifie trois secteurs clés: l'État, le marché et le 
secteur social, qui stimulent l'intention entrepreneuriale et cultivent la capacité 
entrepreneuriale. 
La recherche porte sur les industries du secteur des technologies de l'information (TI) en 
Chine et à Taïwan, qui ont connu un rendement impressionnant comparativement à leurs 
homologues d'autres pays en voie de développement. Cette étude distingue trois étapes de 
croissance des entreprises entrepreneuriales, le démarrage, le développement et la 
durabilité, puis procède à l'analyse comparative de l'histoire de six entreprises, trois 
chinoises et trois taïwanaises. Les entreprises chinoises sont Advanced Technology 
Service Division (ATSD), Lenovo Computer et Great Wall Computer. Les entreprises 
taïwanaises sont United Microelectronics Company (UMC) , Acer et Vanguard 
International Semiconductor (VIS). 
Il est démontré que, à l'étape du démarrage, le gouvernement tend à être un élément clé 
au sein des trois secteurs et peut largement influencer l'intention entrepreneurlale d'une 
entreprise en créant un contexte institutionnel national, ainsi que directement par ses 
iii 
politiques industrielles. À l'étape du développement, le secteur social intérieur devient 
plus proéminent et peut transférer des technologies aux entreprises entrepreneuriales, de 
l'étranger ou de leur propre service de recherche; il peut également aider à défendre les 
entreprises entrepreneuriales en conflit de propriété intellectuelle avec des entreprises 
multinationales. À l'étape de la durabilité, grâce à leur technologie avancée, les 
multinationales, en tant que forces du marché, deviennent prédominantes et peuvent 
mettre en valeur ou détruire la capacité des entreprises entrepreneuriales. Dans l'ensemble, 
l'État agit en créateur de contexte, en champion et en juge; le secteur social joue le rôle 
de créateur et de défenseur de capacité; tandis que le marché, par l'entremise des 
entreprises multinationales, joue le rôle de destructeur ou de rehausseur de capacité. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
The question ofhow to grow national economies of developing countries has engendered 
much debate since the end of the W orld War II, as the number of the newly independent 
countries has multiplied (Hobsbawm, 1995).1 Coming from different historical, cultural 
and political traditions, those newly founded countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
shared one economic feature: poverty. Worse, the gap in per capita GNP between them 
and the developed countries was widening: in 1970, the latter averaged 14.5 times the per 
capita GNP of the former; while in 1990, the figure rose to 24 (Hobsbawm, 1995: 361). 
AIleviating the poverty in the developing countries has been the goal of economic 
development theory.2 Along the decades, an important aspect ofthis debate has dealt with 
the pros and cons of state intervention and the market mechanism in the process of 
economic catch-up; by the late 1990s, the social sector entered the debate more 
seriously.3 Nevertheless, in theory as weIl as in practice, a tendency remains to argue that 
either the state (e.g., Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995), or the market (e.g., LaI, 2000), or the 
social sector (e.g., Makoba, 2002) is key to economic development. 
1 In Asia, as historian Hobsbawm recorded, "the number of intemationally recognized independent states in 
Asia quintupled"; in Africa, "where there had been one in 1939, there were now about fifty"; in Latin 
America, there came "another dozen" new countries (1995: 344). 
2 Hirschman wrote: "Development economics started out as the spearhead of an effort that was to bring all-
round emancipation from backwardness" (1981: 387). 
3 As indicated by other similar terms used in the relevant literature, such as not- for-profit and 
nongovemmental, the social sector operates between the public and private sectors (Mintzberg et al., 2005). 
Moreover, long ago Schumpeter (1934) shed light on the importance of entrepreneurship 
in the process of economic development. Later, Low and MacMillan (1988: 141) 
maintained that the purpose of entrepreneurship research is to "explain and facilitate the 
role ofnew enterprise in furthering economic progress." However, as Casson (2005: 429) 
pointed out recently, "there is no systematic treatment of entrepreneurship and economic 
development," except limited practice-oriented research by international institutions (e.g., 
United Nations, 2004). 
This thesis attempts to bridge two different yet complementary streams of literature: 
economic development and entrepreneurship. With particular focus on indigenous 
entrepreneurial firms, this thesis brings together the state, the market and the social sector, 
and addresses the following research questions: What is the interplay of the three sectors 
in the growth of firms in developing countries? What is the division of labor among these 
three sectors? Why are some indigenous firms successful while others are not? 
The research setting is the information technology (lT) industries in China and Taiwan. 
Entrepreneurship in both regions has contributed impressive growth. The Economist 
(2003) likened the rapid growth ofIT sector in China's Zhongguancun area to "the 
Renaissance in Europe or the Meiji Restoration in Japan,,,4 and one Western management 
4 According to Cao (2001), IT fmus in the Zhongguancun area in 2000 generated industrial output worth $ 
Il billion with a 40.4 percent growth from 1999. 
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scholar regarded Taiwan's IT industries as "a Silicon Valley of the East" (Mathews, 
1997).5 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 first derives two important concepts, 
entrepreneurial intent and capabilities, from the entrepreneurship literature, and then 
proceeds to provide an overview of the economic development literature. In identifying 
the roles of the market, the state and the social sector, and in linking them specifically to 
the growth of the indigenous entrepreneurial firms, the literature review situates the thesis 
within a body of re1ated theories. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology employed to gather and analyze data, and 
the theoretical and practical reasons behind each decision. Being essentially qualitative, 
this study seeks to provide ''thick descriptions" (Geertz, 1973) of the organizations and 
their context. Given that the organizations studied here are heavily influenced by the 
national culture, economic system and innovation system, such an approach not only 
facilitates understanding of the strategie actions employed by the firms in their growth 
process, but also provides a way to appreciate how the three sectors became involved in 
the deve10pment of the firms. 
From Chapter 4 to Chapter 9, the cases of ATSD, Lenovo, Great Wall of China, and 
UMC, Acer, and VIS of Taiwan will be presented. The cases are kept as descriptive as 
5Take, Taiwan's semiconductor industry, for example. Taiwan was the world's fifth largest semiconductor 
producer, before developed countries France and the U.K. The output of semiconductor industry was $ 3.3 
billion in 1995, accounting for 2.6 percent of the world total of$ 125 billion (Mathews, 1997). 
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possible, and a similar template is used for each case; nevertheless, variations are 
introduced when sorne strategic and contextual issues of a particular case are meaningful 
and different from the others. There will be conclusions at the end of each chapter that 
summarize the roles of the three sectors. The purpose is to offer sorne "middle-range" 
theorizing (Merton, 1968), which leads to the full-blown theoretical discussion in Chapter 
10. 
Chapter 10 first presents the findings of this study in light of the theories reviewed in 
Chapter 2, and then proceeds to construct a model of the growth of indigenous firms, 
which emphasizes how the three sectors complementarily influence the entrepreneurial 
intent and capabilities. The final result is a set of propositions challenging traditional 
views from the economic development literature. At the end of Chapter 10, contributions 
to the literatures of economic development, entrepreneurship, and international 
management along with methodologicallimitations and future directions are provided. 
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CHAPTER2 
CONCEPTUALFOUNDATIONS 
This chapter first derives two key concepts, entrepreneurial intent and capabilities, from 
the entrepreneurship literature to shed light on the growth of indigenous firms. It then 
proceeds to provide an overview of one of the debates in the economic development 
literature: how the market, the state, and the social sector could affect the growth of the 
economy. The purpose of such overview oftwo streams ofliterature is to provide a basis 
to build a theoretical model of the growth of indigenous entrepreneurial firms in the 
context of economic development. At the end ofthis chapter, the research questions are 
presented. 
2.1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH6 
Entrepreneurship has been long regarded as the driving force of economic development in 
developing countries (Leibenstein, 1968; Leff, 1979; Ebner, 2005), and has atlracted 
increasing interest in recent years (e.g., George and Prabhu, 2003; Kodithuwakku and 
Rosa, 2002; Neace, 1999). Y et, as Wright et al. (2005) note, one of the challenges for 
management scholars interested in the emerging economies was its different 
configuration of institutions. For example, weak institutional infrastructure, like social 
and political instabilities as well as relative lack of the market mechanism, may fail to 
provide sufficient incentives for entrepreneurial activities (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Lyles 
6 For extensive reviews of the entrepreneurship field, see Davidsson (2003) and Busenitz et al. (2003). 
Other scholars have also tried to review this field from sociological perspective (Thomton, 1999), cognition 
perspective (Mitchell et al., 2002), and evolutionary perspective (Aldrich and Martinez, 2001). 
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et al., 2004). Thus it would become difficult to adopt wholesale existing entrepreneurship 
theories of the West. 
, 
Major studies of entrepreneurship originated in the developed countries mainly drew on 
three frameworks: personality-traits research, population ecology theories, and the 
opportunity-pursuing approach. The early research on entrepreneurship focused on the 
personality of the entrepreneur, and assumed that "people are different and these 
differences matter" (Venkataraman, 1997:123). With the research question of who is an 
entrepreneur, it tried to differentiate the traits of entrepreneurs from nonentrepreneurs. 
The pioneering work was McClelland's (1961) the Achieving Society. He found that, 
compared to nonentrepreneurs, entrepreneurs had a higher need for achievement and the 
personality of self-confidence. In other words, viewed up close from the perspective of 
personality traits, entrepreneurs were regarded as heroes, who controlled their fate. 
Sorne scholars of entrepreneurship criticized this research because it ignored the 
influences of external environment within which entrepreneurs undertake their venturing. 
They suggested a population-ecology perspective to explore the entrepreneurship 
phenomenon (e.g., Aldrich, 1990). Instead of the traits, population-ecology theoretical 
framework perspective tries to explain the rate of the birth, survival, and death of 
entrepreneurial organizations. Stinchcombe had developed the notion of "liabilities of 
newness" (1965) to explain why most newly founded organizations go into demise. 
Aldrich (1990) also pointed out that new start-ups are highly dependent upon processes 
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both within and between organization populations, which are shaped by institutional 
factors, including government policies, political events, cultural norms, and so on. 
Nonetheless, the ecological perspective on entrepreneurship has drawn criticism for its 
overemphasis on the environmental factors. Accordingly, some scholars directed their 
attention to explore the "entrepreneurial process," defined by Bygrave and Hofer (1991 : 
14) as "the functions, activities, and actions associated with the perceiving of 
opportunities and the creation of organizations to pursue them." Stevenson and Jarillo 
(1990: 23) have emphasized the importance of opportunities in the entrepreneurial 
process, arguing "pursuing opportunity ... constitutes the core of entrepreneurship." This 
research orientation was later advanced by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) who defined 
the field of entrepreneurship as the existence, discovery and exploitation of opportunities, 
accentuating the importance of individuals and opportunities, rather than the 
environmental factors and their consequences. 
2.1.1. Entrepreneurial Intent and Capabilities 
From the three streams of research on entrepreneurship, it is possible to derive 
entrepreneurial intent and entrepreneurial capabilities as two crucial concepts for 
understanding entrepreneurship in the emerging economies (see Figure 2.1). First, both 
personality-trait research and entrepreneurial opportunities perspective regard 
"entrepreneurial activity as an intentional behavior" (Krueger, Reilly and Carsrud, 2000: 
413). With entrepreneurial intent, entrepreneurs are motivated to pursue opportunities that 
require more financial resources than they have at their disposai. It is a case of there being 
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"a substantial misfit between resources and aspirations" (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994: 129). 
In sorne cases, entrepreneurs will even pursue opportunities "regardless of resources 
currently controlled" (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990: 23). In other words, entrepreneurial 
process is "an act ofhuman volition" (Bygrave, 1993: 257). 
Second, the ecological population perspective suggests that to overcome the liabilities of 
the newness, entrepreneurial capabilities are crucial to survival. Third, entrepreneurial 
organizations with strong intent also need the capabilities to pursue the opportunities and 
confront the competition. As Penrose has said: "the survival and growth of ... firm 
depends on superior entrepreneurial ability" (1959: 222). An entrepreneurial 
organization's capabilities may include technological and organizational ones, and the 
latter usually accompany the former (Lall, 1987: 17). 
It is not argued that these two notions are not important for entrepreneurship in developed 
economies. However, entrepreneurial intent and capabilities are particularly salient in 
emerging economies because indigenous entrepreneurial firms are engaging in a David-
Goliath battle in the market with multinational corporations from the developed countries 
(Dawar and Frost; 1999). Moreover, at this point it should be noted that the term 
entrepreneurship in the literature is usually used to refer to individuals or new startups 
(e.g., Gartner, 1988). However, this study, following Schumpeter, especially his later 
work (1942), uses entrepreneurship more broadly to also refer to mature, established 
indigenous enterprises which possess the dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation, 
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including autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness and competitive 
aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). 
2.1.2. Bringing the Institutions Back into Entrepreneurship Literature 
Though existing literature provides important insights into entrepreneurship in emerging 
economies, many scholars have called for rediscovering the roles of the institutions. As 
Uchasaran, Westhead, and Wright (2001) have pointed out, conventional 
entrepreneurship studies have overlooked institutions in the entrepreneurial process. 
Zahra and Dess (2001: 9) suggest that researchers should regard "environmental forces as 
important antecedents to entrepreneurial activities." V an de V en also argues that ''the 
study of entrepreneurship is deficient if it focuses exclusively on the characteristics and 
hehaviors of individual entrepreneurs" and "treats the sociaL .. and political factors 
influencing entrepreneurship as external demographic statistics" (1993 :211). 
It may he argued that the relative neglect of institutions in the literature in part stems from 
Western entrepreneurship scholars' focus on free-market competition and 
entrepreneurship 7 (Baumol, 2002) at the expense of downplaying other supplementary 
non-market institutions, such as govemment and the social sector (Nelson, 2002). 
7 As Baumol noted, "growth in the free-market economy, from its inception (and still today), has served as a 
stimulus to entrepreneurship. But entrepreneurship has returned the favor, making a constant and major 
contribution to capitalist growth" (2002: 72). 
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FIGURE 2.1: ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ENTREPRENEURIAL INTENT AND 
CAP ABILITIES 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
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Taking advice from Tan (2001), who suggests that emerging economies present a setting 
that entrepreneurship scholars could use to refine existing theories and to develop new 
ones, this research aims to identify the roles played by key institutions in society-the 
state, the market, and the social sector-in the process of fostering the entrepreneurial 
intent and cultivating the entrepreneurial capabilities. 
2.2. AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT THEORIES8 
Scholars of economic development have focused on how the market, the state, and the 
social sector could help develop the economy. The following discusses dominant market-
centered economic development theories, including modemization theory, market 
friendly approach, and state-centered economic development theories, including 
dependency theory and developmental state theories, as well as social sector-centered 
economic development theories. 
2.2.1. Market-Centered Economic Development Theories 
2.2.1.1. Modernization Theory 
Market-centered economic development was pioneered by Walt Whitman Rostow, a 
major scholar in modemization theory. In 1960, Rostow published his most famous book, 
The Stages of Economie Growth. The message of the subtitle of the book A Non-
Communist Manifesto indicated that if po or countries intended to develop, they should 
8 An extensive survey of the literature on economic theory and development could be found in Ranis (2004). 
See also Hoff and Stiglitz (2000). A more specifie survey on industrial policy and economic growth is in 
Rodrik (2004). For other surveys of economic development more to institutions in general, trade 
associations and research and development institutes in particular, see Haggard (2004), Doner and 
Schneider (2000), and Mazzoleni and Nelson (2006), respectively. 
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adopt capitalism, not communism, because the market is key to economic development; 
and, as for this, "we can, of course, track our ancestry to Adam Smith" (1960: 335). 
Countries discussed in this 167-page book are numerous: Britain, France, USA, Germany, 
Sweden, Japan, Russia, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, China and India. 
After reviewing the histories ofthose countries from 1780 to 1959, Rostow maintained 
that, based on the level of economic development, it is possible to sort all societies into 
five categories: "the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, take off, the drive 
to maturity, and the age ofhigh mass-consumption" (1960: 4). 
Of the five stages, "take-off' is the most indicative. Those past the stage of "take-off' are 
regarded as developed countries; otherwise, they are developing ones and lack sufficient 
infrastructure that could support an efficient domestic market. To take off, a country 
would need foreign aid because it was quite useful when constructing railways or capital-
intensive projects. Rostow made a strong case for foreign aid: "external assistance must 
be organized on an enlarged and ... on a ~ore stable basis" (1960: 143), and 
modernization should be "initiated by some intrusion from abroad" (1960:62). In this 
sense, instead of encouraging indigenous development, Rostow preferred foreign 
assistance, the W orld Bank, and direct foreign investments brought by multinationals 
(Menzel, 2003). 
Overall, Rostow argued for a one-size-fits-all approach to develop the economy: 
"Modernization in an interconnected world is a single case ofmodernization" (1971 :63, 
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italics added). To modernize was to move oné country from the lower stage to the higher 
one, and every country would follow the same path. In his opinion, modernization equals 
westernization, and deve10ping countries eventually would converge on the stage ofhigh 
mass consumption where deve10ped countries had arrived.9 
2.2.1.2. The Market Friendly Approach 
Later in the 1980s, in line with Rostow's argument, the World Bank's The East Asian 
Miracle (1993) is one ofthe most serious academic endeavors that investigates the rise of 
East Asia in quantitative terms.10 It tries to explain the economic success of seven high-
performing Asian economies (HP AEs), including the four tigers, Hong Kong, South 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, and three newly industrializing economies, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand. Though still advocating a neoliberal view of development, the 
World Bank nevertheless admitted that there was sorne role for government because there 
was need for coordination that the market mechanism could not provide. 
According to the World Bank's report, the role of the government in the economy was to 
"get the fundamentals right." The state was supposed to provide the following 
fundamentals: (1) stable macroeconomy; (2) highly trained human capital; (3) effective 
and secure financial systems; (4) limiting price distortions; (5) openness to foreign 
technology; and (6) agricultural deve10pment policies (1993: 88). Policies that got the 
9 In the words of another modernization theorist Eisenstadt: "Historically, modernization is the process of 
change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that have developed in Western 
Europe and North America from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries" (1966:1). 
10 Other seminal works emphasizing the market mechanism in developing countries include Balassa (1981), 
LaI and Rajapatirana (1987), and Lai (2000). 
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fundamentals right would "pro duce mainly market-conforming results" (1993: 21). The 
World Bank labeled these policies as the "market-friendly approach" (1993: 10). 
Arguably, the World Bank's market-friendly approach was in the spirit of Adam Smith. 
"The sovereign has only three duties to attend to," wrote Adam Smith more than two 
centuries ago in ms The Wealth of Nations. These include "the dut y ofprotecting the 
society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies," "the duty of 
protecting ... every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other 
member of it," and "the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain 
public institutions which it can never be for the interest of any individual. .. to erect and 
maintain" (from Bell, 1973:302). lt seems that the World Bank's market-friendly 
approach was the modem extension of the last dut y of the state prescribed by Adam 
Smith. 
The World Bank noticed that sorne countries went beyond getting the fundamentals right, 
to intervene in the market: "In a few economies, mainly in East Asia ... govemment 
interventions resulted in higher and more equal growth" (1993: 6). Those govemment 
interventions included export push, financial repression, directed credit, and selective 
promotion. As a consequence, sorne industries were promoted successfully while others 
were not. 
However, the World Bank still went on to criticize the state's role in the economy, 
arguing that it is rather difficult to find statistical relations between the growth of 
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industries and some certain government intervention. In addition, it is more difficult to 
build up a causal relationship between the two. Therefore, the World Bank drew two 
conclusions about state interventions. First, state's industrial policy in general were not 
successful; second, even though some industrial policies might have been successful, 
"East Asian success sometimes occurred in spite of rather than because of market 
interventions" (1993: 86, italics original). 
The World Bank proceeded to suggest that developing countries should not emulate 
active interventions undertaken by countries in Northeast Asia. It argued, the fact that 
interventions were an element of East Asian ec~:momic success should not encourage 
selective interventions, and should not become a reason to resist needed market-oriented 
reforms. For other developing countries, it was better not to emulate, because unlike their 
counterparts in East Asia, they did have sound institutions in place. 
According to the World Bank, governments in East Asia developed institutional 
mechanisms that allowed them to establish clear performance criteria for selective 
interventions and to monitor performance (1993:6). Two good institutional mechanisms 
were required. First was public administration that was competent, and insulated from the 
influence of business so as to have a relative lack of corruption. The second was that 
government's policies were pragmatic and flexible. At this point, the World Bank's report 
was ready to address the grand question: What caused East Asia's success? The answer 
from its report was: "In large measure the HP AEs achieved high growth by getting the 
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basics right" and "[p ]rivate domestic investment" in the market was one of "the principal 
engines of growth" (1993: 5). 
In SUIn, the theories ofmarket-centered economic development maintain that the invisible 
hand of the market competition is the most efficient way of allocating resources for 
development of indigenous entrepreneurship. They suggest that the role of the state is 
only to provide the necessary infrastructure. 
2.2.2. State-Centered Economic Development Theories 
2.2.2.1. Dependency Theory 
Drawing on the histories ofChile and Brazil since the eighteenth century, Andre Gunder 
Frank developed dependency theory in the 1970s (1967, 1975) to argue against 
modernization theory and outward-Iooking development. He argued that one should 
regard development and underdevelopment as the product of a single and the same 
process of capitalism. In this single process of capitalism, the developing countries would 
first be forced to be incorporated into and participated in the expansion of the global 
capitalist system. And once incorporation is completed, the global capitalist system would 
be then polarized into the metropolis-satellite structure. 
In the polarized structure, the relation between the metropolis and satellite is an exploitive 
one. On the one hand, the metropolis is dominative, expropriating economic surplus from 
its satellites and appropriating them for its own economic development. The satellites 
thus remain underdeveloped because they did not have access to their own economic 
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surplus. As a consequence, the satellite is submissive, depending on the metropolis to 
provide it with capital goods and other raw materials for its industrial production. 
Frank's conclusion was that the development ofthe global capitalist system in history has 
led to the underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites (1967). According to him, 
"economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite faces of the same coin" 
(1967: 9). It is not the case that underdevelopment is the previous stage of development, 
as argued by Rostow. A corollary of the above analysis is that a loosely coupled 
metropolis-satellite relations may allow for more possibilities of development for the 
satellite. Therefore, the government should step in to set up high tariffs, adopt import 
substitution policies, and reject foreign aid. The developing countries need de-linking and 
building self-reliance to terminate exploitive, dependent relations. 
2.2.2.2. The Developmental State in Japan 
In the 1980s, the theories of developmental states began to surface, and explicitly 
explored how the state could grow indigenous firms to develop economy. Il Chalmers 
Johnson is one of the first scholars to explore the concept of "capitalist developmental 
state" in economic development. In 1982, Johnson, then professor of political science at 
Berkeley, published MITI and the Japanese Miracle; in 1995, he published Japan, Who 
Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State to reinforce his point. 
11 Theoretical discussion about the state'sactive intervention in a developing economy can be traced back 
to Friedrich List's (1885) the National System ofPolitical Economy that made a case for protectionism in . 
Germany's economic catch-up; another classic is Gerschenkron's (1962) work on Russia, arguing that it 
was imperative for the governments of the economically underdeveloped countries to initiate development 
projects. 
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After reviewing the history of Japan from 1925 to 1975, he argued that Japan represented 
a revisionist version of Western orthodox economic theory because Japan has a politicai 
economy that was quite different from that of Anglo-American countries. First, the role of 
the Japanese state was a developmental one. It was not a "capitalist regulatory state" 
(1982: 19), such as that of the USA, which maintains the market competition and protects 
consumer rights. In contrast and by definition, a developmental state took on 
"developmental functions" (1982: 19), and its first priority was economic development. 
Moreover, there was a strong flavor ofnationalism in the Japanese developmental state in 
that the govemment wanted to achieve economic independence from the developed 
countries. The notion of the developmental state as such, Johnson noted, always seems to 
bring theoretical difficulties to the Anglo-American economists. 
Johnson found that the Ministry oflnternational Trade and Industry (MITI) was the most 
important institution in the Japanese economy. It "makes most major decisions, drafts 
virtually alliegisiation, [and] controls the national budget" (1982: 20). Furthermore, it 
was the source ofkey policy formulations in Japan. It was staffed with excellent 
bureaucrats recruited from the best schools of public policy and management, and their 
positions were the most prestigious in Japanese society. 
MITI acted as pilot agency in the Japanese economy. Normally it would first manipulate 
and structure the industry so as to provide incentives for private firms. In doing so, first, it 
would identify and choose the industries to be supported; then it would choose the best 
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ways ofrapidly developing the chosen industries; and along the way, it would "supervise 
competition" (Johnson, 1982: 315) in the target industrial sectors in order to guarantee 
their economic deve1opment. 
The way MITI manipulated and structured the market was called "market-conforming 
methods of state intervention" (Johnson, 1982: 315). It conformed to the market 
mechanism because it "preserves competition to as high a degree as is compatible with its 
priorities" (1982:318). To achieve this, there was immense cooperation between the MITI 
and business. One of catalysts of the cooperative relationships was the MITI officiaIs who 
retire early, no older than age 55. Upon retirement, these bureaucrats moved from 
government to high-ranking positions of private business, and thereby they constructed 
the network between politics and business. In order to avoid corruption due to the strong 
ties between business and the government, the legislative and judicial departments of 
government would play the role of "safety valve," which 'fends off numerous interest 
groups in the society" (1982: 315). 
2.2.2.3. South Korea: Market Augmentation Paradigm 
In 1989, MIT prof essor Alice Amsden published Asia 's Next Giant to describe how South 
Korea developed its economy. Amsden shared the same starting point with Johnson: the 
developmental state, and confirmed the importance of the state of South Korea in 
economic deve1opment: "instead of the market mechanism allocating resources and 
guiding private entrepreneurship, the government made most of the pivotaI investment 
decisions" (1989: 139). 
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Proposing a market-augmenting paradigm, she argued that the relationships between the 
state and business in South Korea were not cooperative, but disciplinary. When the state 
disciplined the firms, there existed a reciprocal relation between the state and the firms. In 
the first place, the state provided firms with subsidies to diversify into new industries. 
After providing the subsidies, the South Korean government set objective and transparent 
performance criteria for firms, pressuring virtual aH firms, regardless of their sizes, to 
meet expûrt targets. 
South Korea was able to do this because mûst of the commercial banks were under the 
control of the government. When firms performed poorly, the state would keep an arms-
length-relationship, and refused to bail out firms that had disappointing performances, 
even if they were well connected to the government. By contrast, other developing 
countries, India and Turkey, for example, failed to discipline business, and as a result, 
subsidies from the government were no more than giveaways. 
Unlike Johnson's framework of developmental state, Amsden argued for much stronger 
state intervention. The purpose of state intervention was to get the market priee wrong, by 
which Amsden meant "relative prices that deviated sharply from free-market equilibria" 
(1989: 145). By using subsidies, the government, rather than the market, "decide[ d] what, 
when, and how much to produce" (1989:143), and its overarching goal of subsidies was 
to create investment opportunities that were profitable for local firms. 
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2.2.2.4. Taiwan: Governing the Market 
Another important work ofthe developmental state is Robert Wade's Governing the 
Market (1990). Based on the history of Taiwan's economic development from the 1930s 
to the 1980s, Wade, a prof essor at London School of Economics and Political Science, 
argued against research that depicts the economic growth of Taiwan as the result of free 
market competition. By goveming the market, Wade meant "the govemment led rather 
than 'followed' the preference ofprivate market agents" (1990:303). Emphasizing 
"dirigisme as a factor" (1990: 112), economic development in Taiwan was a top down 
process in conformity with govemment's policies. 
In governing the market, as Wade observed, the Taiwanese govemment took initiatives to 
encourage the launch ofproduct or development of technologies. For example, the state 
could propose a business project to the business; if declined, the govemment would then 
proceed to carry out that project through public enterprises. Thus, the way the Taiwanese 
state developed its economy was a little bit different from its counterparts in Japan and 
South Korea, each of which supported business without getting directly involved in 
ownership of industrial activities. 
2.2.2.5. South Korea: Embedded Autonomy 
In 1995, Peter Evans, a sociology prof essor at University ofCalifomia, Berkeley, 
published Embedded Autonomy to answer the question: what is the functional relationship 
between the state and the market? This question had received seant attention in previous 
important works. The main concem of Johnson, Amsden and Wade was the question of 
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how the developmental state interacts with business: the state was supportive of business 
either in a cooperative way (Johnson, 1982), or in a disciplinary way (Amsden, 1989); or, 
the state could lead business in the market (Wade, 1990). 
To begin, Evans followed the tradition of research on the developmental state. Turning 
the neoclassical economic theory on its head, he argued that: "It is the scarcity of 
bureaucracy that undermines development, not its prevalence" (Evans, 1995: 40). Based 
on his historical research of South Korea's information technologies during the 1970s and 
the 1980s, Evans proposed the notion of embedded autonomy to depict the healthy 
relations between the state and the economy. In the first place, to develop its economy, a 
nation must have an autonomous government that possesses competent technocrats within 
the state apparatus as well as effective and durable organizational structure. 
However, to be autonomous is not enough: "the ability to effect [economic] 
transformation depends on state-society relations as well" (Evans, 1995: 248). Therefore, 
to avoid being insulated from society, an autonomous state also needs to construct 
relationships to society. At this point, Evans introduced the other key notion: 
embeddedness. He argued that an autonomous state should be "embedded in a concrete 
set of social ties"; thereby the state could have "institutionalized channels for the 
continuaI negotiation and renegotiation of policies" (1995: 12). 
In sum, the theories of state-centered economic development argue that the state should 
take a more active role than just providing infrastructure. They maintain that the 
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developmental state could allocate resources as efficiently as the market does by 
cooperating, disciplining, and governing indigenous entrepreneurial firms, as long as it 
maintains its embedded autonomy in the economy. 
2.2.3. Social Sedor-Centered Economic Development Theories 
Amid the debate between the market-oriented and state-oriented economic development 
theories, one may feel compelled to ask: how is it possible that our society is divided 
between the state and the market and has nothing in between? 12 As Mintzberg et al.'s 
(2005: 1) lament: 
Capitalism versus Socialism, markets versus controls, individualism versus 
collectivism, privatization versus nationalization .... There are no cooperatives, no 
NGOs, no "not-for-profits", no "volunteer" organizations, not because they don't 
exist ... but because they have been forced aside by this simplistic divide. 
According to Salamon, the social sector was ignored because "ideological blinders" (1994: 
110) have prevented a fair appraisal of its true scope and role. As a result, for better or 
worse, for the past decades, the contribution of the social sector was ignored. Furthermore, 
if one follows Streeten's argument (1993) that the state and the market are not the only 
two players in the arena of economic development, one may well expect that the 
institutions engaged in economic development would include the social sector, which 
works along side with the state and the market. 
12 This question triggered the formation of McGill's Social Sector Colloquium founded by Prof. Henry 
Mintzberg. Participants of the colloquium include doctoral students and faculty from four universities in 
Montreal. Meetings have been held regularly since 2000 to explore and debate the role of the social sector 
in developed and developing countries. "The Invisible World of Association" (Mintzberg et al., 2005) is the 
intellectual output oftbis colloquium, and tbis author is one of seven contributors. 
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2.2.3.1. The Neither-Nor of the Social Sector 
The social sector contains many sorts of organizations, including trade associations, 
research and development institutes, advocacy groups, universities, cultural institutions, 
charities and foundations and the like (Roelofs, 1995). One of the characteristic features 
of social sector organizations (SSOs) is that they are neither state nor market. Compared 
to the government which was driven by administrative command and control, SSOs are 
free from bureaucratic control and are infused with the value of autonomous participation 
(Bratton, 1989). And when compared to the market, SSOs are free of mercantile 
calculation and rely on voluntaristic mechanisms, such as bargaining, discussion, 
persuasion, and accommodation (Uphoff, 1993). In conclusion, distinct from the state and 
the market, the SSOs are neither "a compromise," "a residual sector," nor "a subdivision" 
of either the market or the state (Uphoff, 1993: 609, 611). 
2.2.3.2. Categorization of the Social Sector Organizations 
Though Uphoff(1993) argued that the social sector can be described as a sector sui 
generis, in fact it is rather difficult to conceive of it in a concise and clear language. As 
Mintzberg et al. observed (2005:1): 
Say "business" and people have an immediate and comprehensive image, despite 
the immense variety ofbusinesses that exist. Say "government" and much the 
same thing happens ... [However] there is no widely accepted term that does the 
same thing in the social sector. 
Despite the ambiguous nature of the social sector, Mintzberg et al. (2005) tried to provide 
a labeling by using two categorical dimensions. The first dimension, for whom the SSO is 
created to benefit, comprises two sorts ofbeneficiaries: selves or others; and the second 
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dimension, SSO's basic purposes, comprises providing services and engaging in 
advocacy. Any SSO could faH into one of four categories based on these two dimensions 
(see Figure 2.2). The most relevant to this research are two SSOs: mutual associations, 
such as trade associations that provide service to benefit selves, and benefit associations, 
such as research development institutes that provide services to benefit others. 13 
Figure 2.2: Four Categories of the Social Sector Organizations 
BENEFICIARIES 
Dthers Selves 
Activist Associations Protection Associations 
Advocacy 
(advocacy for others) (advocacy for selves) 
PURPOSES 
Benefit Associations Mutual Association 
Services 
(services for others) (services for selves) 
Source: Mintzberg et al. (2005: 39) 
2.2.3.3. Trade Associations 
According to Doner and Schneider (2000), trade associations in numerous developing 
countries can undertake tasks that complement the market. Contrary to the position of 
those economists who argue that trade associations are rent-seeking special interest 
13 The other two kinds of SSOs in the categories of Mintzberg et al. (2005) include protection associations, 
like lobbying organizations that offer advocacy to benefit selves; and activist associations, like Greenpeace, 
Amnesty International that engage in advocacy to bene fit others. 
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groups that have a negative effect on economic deve10pment (e.g., OIson, 1982), Doner 
and Schneider (2000) maintain that trade associations couid promote dynamic efficiency 
and collective welfare in the economy. For example, they can contribute to strengthening 
property rights, advancing worker training, and facilitating coordination among member 
organizations so as to reduce the costs of information exchange. Saxenian and Hsu (2001), 
based on associations formed by Silicon Valley's Taiwanese immigrants, made the same 
argument. They found that associations could complement the market by transferring 
technological knowledge that is difficult to codify, and can only be transferred through 
the oral communications or the movement of individuals among organizations. 
In addition to complementing the market, trade associations can also complement the 
functions of the state. For example, according to Cohen et al. (1981), the emergence of 
the local development associations in Yemen Arab Republic was due to the dysfunctional 
government paralyzed by the civil war. Recognized by the government, trade associations 
received support from Yemen' s Ministry of Social Affairs, Labour and Y outh. However, 
they were not official state organizations, and independent of politics. Local Yemeni 
development associations were engaged in tasks that the central government was unable 
to perform. For example, they built important institutional infrastructure, inc1uding roads, 
schools, village water systems, and hospitals. 
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2.2.3.4. Research and Development Institutes14 
Another important social sector organization is the research and development (R&D) 
institute. It has been crucial to innovation in the developing countries, in that economic 
development in part hinges upon building capabilities at firm-level R&D (Mazzoleni and 
Nelson, 2006). It is worth noting that the connotation of innovation in the context of 
developing countries can be different from that in developed countries. Hobday (1995b) 
once defined innovation of indigenous firms as product or process that is new to the firms 
in particular, or to the regional areas in general, instead ofto the world marketplace. 
Following this definition, Kim and Nelson (2000) have shown that the dynamics and 
success of the newly industrialized economies in Asia, especially South Korea and 
Taiwan, could be attributed to their upgrading from simple assembly and reverse 
engineering capabilities to design capabilities, and finally to product and process 
innovation capabilities, few of which involve frontier technological innovation. 
Theoretically speaking, a firm's decision to innovate or not to innovate is based on 
evaluation of the cost and benefits of each R&D project. The simple economics ofbasic 
scientific research, according to Nelson, is that ''the expected revenue of the invention 
exceeds the expected cost" (1959: 300). Therefore, for firms to engage in building 
technological capabilities, the following two conditions must be met. First, the 
14 Following UNCTAD (1990), this study uses the label "research and development institutes." In addition 
to it, there are numerous similar ones used in the literature, including, "applied research institutes" 
(Utterback, 1975), "govermnent-supported research institutes" (Lee et al., 1991), "govermnent-supported 
industrial research institutes" (Toren and Galni, 1978), "industrial research institutes" (Katrak, 1998), 
"industrial research and service institutes" (UNIDO, 1980), "research and technology institutes" (Arnold et 
al., 1998; Davenport, Carr and Bibby, 2002); "research technology organization" (Leitner et al., 2002) and 
''technology institutes" (World Bank, 1997). 
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expenditures ofR&D must be committed. Nelson and Winter once emphasized that "the 
probability that a firm will come up with an innovation is proportional to its R&D 
spending" (1982: 310). 
Second, to have an incentive to undertake R&D projects, Levin et al. (1987) maintained, 
it is necessary that a firm could appropriate returns to make the investment worthwhile. 
And the appropriation ofR&D profits is not secured whenever innovation externalities of 
innovation occur. Once the profits of innovation spill over the boundary of the firm, it 
thus becomes public and no longer economically appropriable (Nelson, 1992). In a word, 
market failure, as such, will discourage firms from conducting R&D. 
The above theoretical reasoning was supported by numerous empirical research studies in 
the context of developing countries (e.g., Toren and Galni, 1978; Lee et al., 1991; Katrak, 
1998). Constrained by their financial resources, and discouraged by market failures, 
entrepreneurial firms, as a result, in the developing countries usually do not have R&D 
departments to undertake industrial research (Crane, 1977). In order to support a 
country' s economic catch up, R&D institutes were set up with state funds in the hope of 
countering the market failures in the process of creating scientific and technological 
knowledge (David et al., 2000). 
Drawing on both domestic and international knowledge pools, the main goal of R&D 
institutes is to help indigenous entrepreneurial firms, especially those in research-
intensive industries, to upgrade their technological know-how and introduce innovative 
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products and process (Lee et al., 1991; Arnold et al., 1998). Based on the experiences of 
R&D institutes in India, China, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Hungary, Mexico and Canada, a 
report by the W orld Bank concluded that they 
have made a profound difference on industrial technology development where 
there are sufficient imperatives such as a competitive environment or 
manufacturing for an overseas quality-driven market pushing firms to improve 
their technology (1997: 5). 
ln sum, thetheories of social-sector-centered economic development focus on the rise of 
a variety of SSOs, especially trade associations and research and development institutes, 
and highlight the neither-state-nor-market feature of development strategies for growing 
indigenous entrepreneurial firms. 
2.2.3.5. Just another Better Solution? 
With its increasing importance in economic development, the social sector seems to have 
come of age. According to Uphoff s observation (1993), there is a growing recognition of 
the social sector regarding the issues of development. Salamon even described a palpable 
associational revolution at the globallevel: "a striking upsurge is under way around the 
globe in organized voluntary activity and the creation of private, nonprofit or 
nongovernmental organizations" (1994: 109). 
The rise of the SSO, in part, is due to the fact that there were development problems that 
neither the government nor the market has the will and capacity to solve (Garilao, 1987). 
Hence, some scholars started to regard the SSOs as "promoters of alternative 
development strategies" (Drabek, 1987: x), and "facilitators or catalysts oflocal 
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development efforts" (1987: x); others even regarded SSOs as "the 'favorite child' of 
official agencies" (Montague, 1998: 96) that are "good substitutes for weak states and 
markets" (Makoba, 2002: 59). The SSOs were so favored in some countries that they 
have become "something of a panacea for the many problems of development" 
(Montague, 1998: 96). 
2.2.4. Criticism of the Literature and Research Questions 
As reviewed here, from modemization theory in the 1960s, dependency theory in the 
1970s, the market-friendly approach in the 1980s, the developmental state theory in the 
early 1990s, to the social sector theory in the late 1990s, many scholars have been trying 
to argue that either the state, or the market, or the social sector is key to economic 
development. 
However, sorne scholars pleaded for a "less polemic, more nuanced discussion" 
(Lindauer and Pritchett, 2002: 15). In Institutions and Growth in East Asia, political 
scientist Haggard (2004: 53) maintained that "the search for single institutional 'taproot' 
for growth is likely to be a misguided exercise." Economist Stiglitz also argued for 
striking a balance among the three sectors. In Towards a New Paradigmfor Development: 
Strategies, Polices and Processes, he wrote: "The issue [of development] is one of 
balance, and where that balance is may depend on the country, the capacity of its 
govemment, the institutional development ofits markets" (1998: 9). 
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Indeed, why is it not possible for the state and the market and the social sector to work in 
concert to develop the economy? Why can a country not try to strike a balance among the 
three sectors? In fact, scholars of the social sector also argue that three sectors should 
work together instead of one driving out the other two. Uvin, Jain and Brown contended 
that SSOs were "not to compensate for government failure or market deficiency by their 
own actions" (2000:1418); preferably, SSOs should work with the government and 
market institutions. Thomas agreed (1992: 145), writing: "A general model for 
deve10pment needs to go beyond the actions of [SSOs] alone to include the place of 
[SSOs] in public action in relation to other development agents, particularly the state." 
Furthermore, previously scholars tended to focus more on the macroeconomic output 
such as per capita GDP than on the microeconomic leve1, such as the growth of 
indigenous firms. The fact that the macro-level analysis was chosen was ostensibly a 
matter oftheoretical convenience, because the objective of the conventional economic 
development theory is to "understand price-guided, not management-guided, resource 
allocation" (Demsetz, 1997: 426). Sen once criticized such a macro approach, arguing 
that "perhaps the most important thematic deficiency of traditional development 
economics is its concentration on national product, [and] aggregate income" (1983: 754; 
see also 1999: 79-80). In line with Sen's argument, sorne scholars have tried to analyze 
economic development on a more micro-level, including commodity chain (Gereffi, 
1994), clusters (e.g., Hsu and Cheng, 2002), and industries (e.g., Amsden and Chu, 2003). 
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Leibenstein still argued that "organizational economics and institutions [are] missing 
elements in economic development analysis." In his view, "the economic organization is 
a critical determinant of the results of development" (1989: 1361). Stiglitz (1991: 15) also 
pleaded to shift the level of analysis to organizations, because "most production in 
modem economies occurs within organizations." 
Based on the above criticism of the literature, the following broad research questions 
emerge: What is the interplay of the state, the market and the social seetor in the 
economic development process? To be more specific regarding the growth ofindigenous 
firms, what are the roles played by these three sectors to foster entrepreneurial intent and 
cultivate entrepreneurial capabilities? These two broad and interrelated questions can be 
further elaborated in light of subordinate questions, for examples, why are some 
indigenous firms successful while others are not? How do indigenous firms establish 
themselves through the interaction of the three sectors in the economy? 
In conclusion, this chapter, after reviewing the entrepreneurship and economic 
development literature, presents the theoretical concems ofthis study: (1) an improved 
understanding of the growth of the entrepreneurial firms in developing countries by 
drawing on the concepts of entrepreneurial intent and capabilities, (2) the roles that coulcl 
be played by the market, the state and the social sector in the growth process of 
indigenous firm in the context of economic development. The next chapter will outline 
the methodological approaches for exploring the research questions of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the methodological considerations ofthis study. It starts with a 
review of theoretical reasons motivating the choice of methodology and continues with a 
discussion of selection of the sample firms. It also presents a brief history of the research 
settings, China and Taiwan, and of six sample firms. Finally, it discusses the iterative 
process ofhow data were collected and analyzed so as to derive and revise the theoretical 
.propositions that are presented in the last chapter. 
3.1. WHY CASE STUDIES? 
This thesis uses case study methodology to investigate the interplay of the three sectors in 
the growth ofindigenous firms in China and in Taiwan. According to Yin (1984: 20), the 
case study approach could capture relevant data and allow analyses of "how" and "why" 
questions. Therefore, this method is weIl suited to answer the research questions raised in 
Chapter 2: How do indigenous entrepreneurial firms establish themselves through the 
interplay of the market, the state and the social sector in the economy? Why are some 
indigenous entrepreneurial firms successful while others are not? 
Moreover, the qualitative inquiry employed in this study is suitable for investigating 
phenomenon relatively less understood in the literature (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which 
in this study is the interplay of the three sectors. It could allow new theoretical insights to 
come forth from rigorous examination of relevant data collected from multiple sources. 
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And after analyzing through comparing cases, revisiting the extant theories and 
reexamining the data could ensure that there will be a sufficient match between theory 
and data. Furthermore, the multiple-case design employed in this study allows for 
replication logic (Yin, 1984), because by treating a series of cases as a series of 
experiments, each case study in this study serves to confirm and retine the propositions. 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.2.1. Research Settings: China and Taiwan 
China and Taiwan are chosen because they have something in common and something 
different. Both share the Chinese culture; yet upon the same culture, they adopted 
different economic systems. The study examines the time period when China launched its 
economic reform in the late 1970s and Taiwan faced a series of political and economic 
crisis in the early 1970s up to the late 1990s. A brief history of economic and cultural 
systems in China and Taiwan from 1950s to the 1970s is provided in the following. As is 
shown in Chapter 10, though the state, the social sector and the market play the analogous 
roles in China and Taiwan, they differ due to the differing contexts of China and Taiwan. 
3.2.1.1. Socialist China 
Upon the founding of the People's Public of China in 1949, Mao drove China's economy 
toward communism. In 1951, China's government initiated the Five-Anti Movement. The 
state targeted business people who committed the following tive sins: bribery, tax evasion, 
theft of state property, fraud, the theft of state economic secrets. In 1957, China launched 
the Great Leap Forward Movement. Five years after the Great Leap Forward, "aIl 
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privately owned rented property was in fact taken over by the state" (Hughes and Luard, 
1961: 101). 
In 1966, Mao also launched the ten-year Cultural Revolution Movement. In order to 
create a New China, the old traditions were to be destroyed. Attacking Confucianism, 
Mao argued that Communist China should "destroy the four olds (po sijiu, i.e., old ideas, 
cultures, customs and habits). Intellectuals were regarded as "stingy ninth-rankers," the 
lowest rank of Chinese society. As a result, Chinese culture moved towards low 
Confucianism (Makeham, 2003). 
However, when Deng took power in 1978, he turned Mao's policies upside down. First, 
he drove China's economy towards a market economy. In the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress held in 1978, Deng said: "China had gone 
too far in copying socialism from the Soviet Union and needed to move away from that 
path" (Vogel, 1995: 41). Therefore, he argued that the mechanism of the market be 
reintroduced to China. Markets had to be revived and allowed to flourish in order to 
enliven production and satisfy people's needs (Vogel, 1995: 41). Figure 3.1 shows a 
schematic of the Chinese economy under Mao and Deng. 
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Figure 3.1: China's Economy under Mao and Deng 
Socialism 
Mao's drive toward socialism 
(1949) 
~ 
Deng's drive toward capitalism 
(1978) 
Capitalism 
Furthermore, respecting the inteUectual, Deng emphasized "Confucian educational 
thinking" with its "respect for discipline and severe teachers" and its thesis that 
"knowledge [is] above aU else" (Gregor and Chang, 1979: 1074). In Congress, he argued 
that "the intellectual is part of the working class." As a result, Chinese culture was 
gradually moving towards high Confucianism. Figure 3.2 schematically shows the 
evolution of Chinese culture under Mao and Deng. 
3.2.1.2. Capitalist Taiwan 
In 1945, the Kuomintang (KMT) began ruling over Taiwan, a 36, 179-square-kilometer 
island located 150 kilometres offMainland China. Taiwan had been a colony of Japan 
since 1895 when the Qin Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. 
The KMT tled to Taiwan in 1949 after being defeated by the Communist Party that took 
over Mainland China. 
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Figure 3.2: Chinese Culture under Mao and Deng 
Confucianism 
High 
Low 
1949 
Mao's Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) 
1970 
Deng's Return to Power 
(1978) 
1980 
Year 
In the period 1951-1965, the USA provided financial aid to Taiwan. The total amount of 
their aid was USD $1.4 billion that equalled 43% of the gross investment of Taiwan 
during that period. Trying to drive Taiwan toward capitalism, the USA AID pro gram put 
emphasis on polices promoting "private property, individual incentives, freedom of 
enterprise, and competitive markets" (Jacoby, 1967: 130). 
After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, "recapturing the mainland ... remained a central 
preoccupation of the governrnent" (Wade, 1990: 77). The KMT still maintained a strong 
state despite the fact that capitalism was burgeoning in Taiwan. Since 1949, the KMT 
governrnent has continued to as sert that, first, it was the only legitimate governrnent of 
China; second, inevitably it would return to effectively control the whole Mainland. As a 
result, the governrnent in Taiwan embodied "hard authoritarianism": "mainlander-
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technocratic rule under one-man dictatorship" (Winckler, 1984: 482). The hard 
authoritative government discouraged the growth of big business in Taiwan because it 
was afraid that "business influence would in:filtrate the party" and "undermine political 
discipline and bureaucratic loyalty" (Noble, 1998: 15). Figure 3.3 schematically 
illustrates Taiwan's economic system under the influences of the KMT and USA Aid. 
Figure 3.3: Taiwan's Economic System under KMT and USA Aid 
KMT's wish of returning to 
Mainland (1949) 
USA Aid's drive to market 
economy (1951-1965) 
State ~. ________________ --.. Market 
In 1966, Chiang Kai -shek launched the Movement of Cultural Renaissance in response to 
Mao's Cultural Revolution. The rationale behind Chiang's initiative was very simple, as 
Uhalley described: "the Red Guards are destroying the remaining vestiges of the Chinese 
cultural tradition; therefore, Taiwan must exploit this development by emphasizing at this 
moment that it is the preserver ofChinese culture" (1967: 826). As a result, the culture of 
Taiwan under the KMT had been moving toward high Confucianism. Figure 3.4 
schematically illustrates the evolution of Taiwan's culture under the KMT. 
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Figure 3.4: Taiwan's Culture under KMT 
Cultural Renaissance (1966) 
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3.2.2. Sample Selection 
Case study firms were selected on the basis of "theoretical sampling" (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967: 45-77), which is in contrast to statistical sampling. When researchers conduct 
statistical sampling, cases are chosen randomly from a population to test the hypothesis. 
Although in a case study research, cases could be chosen randomly, Eisenhardt cautions 
that "random selection is neither necessary, nor even preferable" (1989: 537). Following 
this suggestion, theoretical sampling is used in this study so as to highlight the theoretical 
issues and to challenge existing theories. 
There are two issues in theoretical sampling: the kinds and number of cases. As for the 
first issue, Eisenhardt suggests, when conducting theoretical sampling, researchers choose 
cases that could fill theoretical categories. Furthermore, cases of polar types are 
particularly preferable, because "creative insight often arises from the juxtaposition of 
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contradictory or paradoxical eviderice;" and when "reconciling these contradiction 
forces," researchers are forced to "reframe perceptions into a new gestalt" (1989: 546). 
Pettigrew also suggests researchers "go for extreme situations," because in extreme 
situations, "the progress is transparently observable." Therefore, cases situated in extreme 
and polar situations could "provide a transparent look at the growth, evolution, 
transformation, and conceivably decay of an organization over time" (1990: 275). 
As for the second issue, the nU1Ùber of cases, Eisenhardt suggests researchers select "a 
number between 4 and 10 cases" (1989: 545). It is rather difficult to generate theory with 
fewer than 4 cases, moreover, its empirical grounding willlikely to be unpersuasive. With 
more than 10 cases, it becomes difficult to deal with the complexity of data. In such 
instance, the researcher might run into the danger of "death by data asphyxiation" 
(Pettigrew, 1990: 281). 
Following the above suggestions, six firms were selected in this study to fill the 
categories of three sectors. The six firms of this study were started by either the state 
(Great Wall), research and development institutes in the social sector (China's Lenovo 
and Taiwan's United Microelectronics Corporation and Vanguard International 
Semiconductor), or techno-entrepreneurs in the market (China's Advanced Technology 
Service Division and Taiwan's Acer). Moreover, the se firms have polar performances: 
three ofthe firms were regarded as successful (China's Lenovo, Taiwan's Acer and 
UMC), and the other three, unsuccessful (China's Great Wall, the Advanced Technology 
Service Division, and Taiwan's Vanguard International Semiconductor). A firm was . 
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regarded as unsuccessful when its market share was declining (Great Wall), or it went 
bankrupt (the Advanced Technology Service Division), or it was losing money and was 
forced to exit its target industry segment (Vanguard International Semiconductor). Table 
3.1 summarizes the general characteristics of each firm. A short description of each case 
will be provided as follows. 
3.2.3. China's the Advanced Technology Service Division (ATSD) 
Chunxian Chen, the founder ofthe Advanced Technology Service Division (ATSD), has 
been publicly recognized as being the first entrepreneur in China's IT industry in the 
1980s (Cao, 2001). Before he set up his company, he was a researcher at the Chine se 
Academy of Science (CAS). Soon after the Open Door Policy was established in 1978, 
Chen, along with 10 fellow CAS scientists, went on academic tours to the USA. What he 
found to be the most impressive of the American accomplishments were Route 128 and 
Silicon Valley. 
After returning to China, Chen borrowed his initial capital, RMB 200 (USD $25) from ms 
colleagues to set up ATSD, a technology consulting firmY Chen's business activities 
soon drew criticism from the conservatives. The Director of the Physics Institute, Wei-
Yan Guan, criticized Chen and his colleagues for being "iconoclasts;" nonethe1ess, Chen 
survived Guan' s criticism thanks to several high-ranking govemment officiaIs who 
openly showed their support for Chen and his firm (Liu, 2004). 
15 According to Segal (2003: 56), ATSD was "an organization many consideredthe frrst nongovermnental 
enterprise" in China. 
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Table 3.1: The General Characteristics of Each Firm 
ATSD Lenovo Great UMe Acer VIS 
Wall 
Location China China China Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
Founding 
1980 1984 1986 1980 1976 1995 
Year 
Founding 
Market Social State Social Market Social 
Sector Sector Sector Sector 
Success/ 
Failure Success Failure Success Success Failure 
Failure 
Soon after, in April 1983, Chen expanded his business. He developed a printing system 
called 888 to print aIl the documents used in the W orld Congress of the International 
Advertising Association held in Beijing. Then in 1987, Chen borrowed RMB $1.6 million 
(USD $200,000) to go into the business of mainframe computers. By this time however, 
the focus of the computer industry had shifted from mainframe computers to personal 
computers. In 1992, China and the USA entered into a comprehensive trade agreement by 
signing a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU), under which China's tariffrate was 
reduced from 35% to 15%. Four years later, as more and more competition entered the 
market, Chen went bankrupt (Sun, 2004). 
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3.2.4. China's Lenovo Computer 
Lenovo Computer, originally named "New Technology Development Company of the 
Computing Technology Institute of the Chinese Academy of Science," was founded in 
1984 by 12 researchers from the CAS when it decided to adopt an institutional 
arrangement called "One Academy, Two Systems." Lenovo received USD $24,000 from 
the CAS in start-up capital as well as the Legend Chinese Insertion Card (LCIC), a piece 
of hardware that enabled users to type Chinese characters more efficiently. Lenovo was 
also granted a great deal of autonomy from the CAS in making its management decisions 
(Gold et al., 2001). 
Launched in 1985, the LCIC was Lenovo's blockbuster, selling at RMB 4,000 (USD 
$500) each. In its first three years, the LCIC generated profits ofRMB 12 million (USD 
$1,500,000) from revenues ofRMB 34.7 million (USD $4.3 million) for Lenovo. It 
accounted for nearly 38.1 % of Lenovo's revenue and 45.6% ofits profits. Before 
Microsoft launched the Chinese version of Windows 3.2 in 1995, the company had 
shipped 160,000 LCICs over a ten-year period (Lu, 2000). 
In 1987, however, the Chinese government charged that the price of Lenovo's LCIC 
violated price regulations, and in 1988, it rejected Lenovo's proposaI to manufacture a 
personal computer because Lenovo was not a state-owned enterprise. As a result, Lenovo 
decided to manufacture its computer in Hong Kong and acquired a motherboard 
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manufacturing company. Meanwhile, the state also discovered that Lenovo was importing 
illegal components and fined the company RMB 2 million (USD $250,000). 
Following the 1992 China-USA MOU that reduced Chinese tariffs, Lenovo responded by 
changing its organizational structure, going from functional departments to a divisional 
structure. It also eliminated direct sales in favor of distributor sales. In 1996, Lenovo 
initiated a priee war, slashing its priees by 30%. Following its successful priee war, 
Lenovo began forming strategie alliances with the multinationals: Kingston Technology, 
USA (1996), Hitachi (1997), Computer Associates (1998), National Semiconductor 
(2000). By 1999, Lenovo was the number-one brand name in China's personal computer 
market with a market share of27.3% (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
3.2.5. China's Great Wall Computer 
The founding of Great Wall Computer embodied China's state entrepreneurship.16 The 
blockbuster product of Great Wall in its formative years was 0520 CH, the first IBM-
compatible personal computer in China that could operate in Chinese characters. The 
birth of 0520 CH could be traced back to China's the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985), 
in which the Chinese government decided to develop the computer industry (Lu, 2000). 
16 At this point, it is worth highlighting the founding sectors of the three Chinese fmns. Compared to Great 
Wall, both Lenovo and ATSD were nongovernmental enterprises because they "are established outside 
either central or local government budgetary channels" (Lu, 1997: 19). Compare to ATSD, the name used 
by Lenovo when founded indicated its strong affiliation with the CAS. Thus it is classified as an enterprise 
founded by social sector organization i.e., CAS. ATSD, though also founded by scientist Chen at CAS, 
lacked such institutional relations, and thus is classified as founded by entrepreneurs in the market. 
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In the Seventh National Five-Y ear Plan (1986-1990), the state decided to commercialize 
the Chinese version of DOS developed by the Ministry of Electronics lndustry (MEl) by 
setting up Great Wall Corporation with RMB 3 million (USD $375,000) as initial capital. 
Employing about 50,000 workers, 15,000 ofwhich were engineers and technicians, Great 
Wall was composed of58 existing state-owned enterprises, 5 universities and 4 R&D 
institutes (Kennedy, 1997). 
In 1990, the last year of the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990), Great Wall received 
RMB 900 million (USD $191.1 million) from the state in order to concentrate the 
production of computers to squeeze out its competitors (Simon, 1992). Later, Great Wall 
also took part in the state's Golden Project that aimed to build up China's information 
infrastructure (Love1ock and Farhoomand, 1999). 
Though Great Wall enjoyed the preferential polices, its decision making was under the 
discretion of the govemment. It was required by the state to use at least 75% domestic 
parts. This created certain quality issues. Great Wall's response to the 1992 MOU with 
the USA was to take a more defensive strategy by building strategic alliances with the 
multinationals: IBM (separate strategie alliances were negotiated in 1994, 1995, 1997, 
1999 and 2000); Microsoft (1995), and Intel (1996). However, compared to Lenovo, 
Great Wall was less willing to take risky actions, and thus gradually lost market shares 
from 10.8% in 1992 t04.1% in 1999 (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
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3.2.6. Taiwan's United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) 
To boost the growth of Taiwan's electronics industry when it faced a series ofpolitical 
and economic crisis, the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) decided in 1976 
to transfer technology from RCA in the USA with USD $10 million in financial support 
from the Taiwanese government. In 1980, it commercialized this technology by creating 
the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) (Mathews and Cho, 2000). 
In the early 1990s, UMC decided to move into higher end products by developing 
Taiwan's first homegrown 80486-chip microprocessor. This move, however, provoked a 
damaging lawsuit from Intel. Meanwhile, National Semiconductor and Nintendo alleged 
that UMC infringed on their intellectual property rights (The Wall Street Journal, 1986; 
1992); Micron Technology also alleged that UMC dumped semiconductor products on 
the American market (Wade, 1997). 
In 1995, UMC decided to transform itself from an integrated device manufacturer that 
needed to be constantly innovative in the product design and manufacturing process, into 
a foundry that would concentrate only on manufacturing (Dickie, 2000). In the same year, 
UMC formed three strategic alliances with Il North American seIniconductor design 
houses. These design houses sent engineers to work close1y with UMC to help design 
new manufacturing processes, providing analysis and feedback via e-mail, 
teleconferences and face-to-face meetings. By the end of 1990s, after acquiring Holtek 
and Nippon Steel Semiconductor, UMC gradually secured its place in the international 
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market (Fuller et al., 2003). In 1998, UMC made USD $131.8 million on sales of USD 
$551.2 million and had 19% of the global foundry business (Asiaweek, 1999). 
3.2.7. Taiwan's Acer Computer Company 
Acer was founded by Stan Shih and his colleagues in 1976 with an initial capital of USD 
$25,000. By creating Acer, Shih aimed to promote microprocessor technology in the 
Taiwanese market. Like most small personal computer makers in Taiwan, Acer was 
manufacturing video game machines in the early 1980s. Thanks to this aspect of the 
business, Acer's operations were able to grow more than tenfold, rising from NT $12 
million (USD $345,800) to NT $150 million (USD $3.34 million). However, the 
Taiwanese government later banned game machines due to pressure from social interest 
groups (Johnstone, 1994). 
Suffering from the governmental ban on video game machines, Acer sought ways to take 
advantage of their stocks of electrical components. They discovered that the heart of the 
game machines was exactly the same as that of the Apple II 6502 microprocessor. Unlike 
most Taiwanese firms that imitated the Apple II microprocessor, Acer decided to begin 
from scratch when designing the Acer personal computer Microprofessor II. However, a 
lawsuit from Apple forced Acer to stop manufacturing Microprofessor II and to switch to 
IBM-compatible personal computers (Saxenian, 2001). 
At this point, Acer encountered a technical problem in its operating system software and 
tumed to the ITRI for help. ITRI set up Multi-Client Project, an R&D pro gram in which 
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five Taiwanese firms participated (Mathews, 2002). ITRI first sent engineers to Wang 
Computer (the USA) for technical training in order to transfer system production 
technology. Then, after acquiring the rights from Seattle Computer Products for DOS, 
ITRI developed its own version of the software operating system. During the next year, 
based on the technological foundation laid by the ITRI, Acer introduced the world's 
second 80386-based computer before IBM did (Chang et al., 1999). 
Yet, at this moment, IBM took action to sue Acer and other Taiwanese computer 
companies. It claimed that it had more than 30,000 patents on the personal computer and 
on average, a small and medium-sized Taiwanese firms would violate from 70 to 10,000 
patents (McGregor, 1988a). Soon after IBM's action, Taipei Computer Association held 
many public discussions with its members to help them deal with this issue (Zhou, 1996). 
After this lawsuit, Acer moved into the business of original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM)Y In the 1990s, OEM products accounted for about 40% of Acer's turnover. In 
the mid-1990s, Acer was making between 60,000 and 80,000 notebook computers per 
month for Apple, Hitachi, Fujitsu and other Japanese companies (LaPedus, 1996b). By 
interacting close1y with multinational s, Acer was able to benefit from a constant flow of 
vital feedback on their product manufacturing process. 
17 In this thesis, original equipment manufacturing (OEM) specifically refers to cooperative relationships 
between brand-name multinationals from the developed countries and the manufacturing companies in 
developing countries. Brand name companies provide detailed technical formats ofproducts and necessary 
technical assistance to allow the manufacturing companies to produce required products (Hobday, 1995b). 
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Meanwhile, Acer continued internationalizing its operations. Between 1992 and 1995, it 
set up 34 assembly sites in each of its major markets around the world and Acer acquired 
several firms in the USA in order to explore the American market. By 2000, Acer was the 
one of the top 10 personal computers vendors in the world (Dedrick, Kraemer, and Tsai, 
1999). 
3.2.8. Taiwan's Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS) 
In the early 1990s, the ITRI launched the Submicron Project, the largest research project 
in Taiwan's history with USD $275 million government funding for 200 researchers over 
a five-year period. In 1995,Vanguard International Semiconductor (VIS) was created as a 
spin-off of ITRI to commercialize the Submicron Project. VIS chose not to build strategic 
alliances with multinationals in the que st for technological autonomy. Instead, it sought to 
draw on the published research of Japanese and Korean firms (Chang, Shih, and Hsu, 
1993). 
In 1997, VIS entered the North American semiconductor market; in 1998, it entered the 
European market. However, at this time, Texas Instruments asked VIS to pay royalties 
retroactively and Micron filed a Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) dumping 
petition against the company. During the litigation, Taiwan Semiconductor Industry 
Association (TSIA) was assisting VIS on this suit and won the case (Central News 
Agency, 1999). Yet, meanwhile, the DRAM business was not looking good for VIS; 
prices for 16-Mbit DRAMs fell from USD $54 each in late 1995 to USD $6 in 1997. VIS 
had a mere 1.9% market share in DRAM manufacturing, while the leading firms such as 
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Hyundai, Samsung and Micron had a 20% market share. VIS's annuallosses were 
approximately USD $136 million (Deveney, 1998). In 2000, VIS decided to withdraw 
from the DRAM industry and entered the foundry business. Its chairman once 
commented: "1 cannot help lament the death of my dream. As for VIS, 1 achieved 
nothing" (Liu, 2000). 
These brief accounts will be expanded in the subsequent chapters that analyze the growth 
process of these organizations in the context of the economic development of China and 
Taiwan. Now this study tums to a description ofhow data was collected and analyzed. 
3.3. DATA COLLECTION 
At the earIy stage of the study, a pilot study was conducted through informaI field visits 
to Beijing and Taipei in the period December 2003 to February 2004. The purpose ofthis 
pilot study was to obtain a sense ofhow business operates in China and Taiwan. Pilot 
study informants consisted of fourteen engineers at Lenovo, one at ATSD and five at 
Acer. InformaI, less lengthy (less than one hour) conversations with members of the 
organizations aIl occurred in the cafeteria, in the restaurants or in their homes, and they 
answered open-ended questions about the history of the company. The informaI 
atmosphere encouraged informants to discuss topics inc1uding their interesting personal 
experience with the company. One Iesson from this pilot study was that aIl three sectors 
might influence the growth of the firms. 
Due to Iimited access to the informants from the sample firms, the next step was to use 
secondary sources to collect information regarding the development of these firms. They 
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included publicly available publications, newspaper and magazine articles, teaching cases 
from various business schools, and scholarly writings. More than 12,185 English and 
Chinese articles were drawn on to construct a general history of these six firms, 
highlighting the major decisions, events, and descriptions of structure and process. 
Chinese newspapers were sourced in the National Library of China in Beijing and the 
Library ofSecurity & Futures Institute in Taipei. In addition, ATSD and Lenovo supplied 
additional documents, including internaI communications, memos and reports that 
outlined each firm's history. 
The selection of the English and Chinese sources provides this study with multiple points 
of view into the phenomenon of interest. For example, the English press may provide 
information on organizational actions, often including top managers' discussion of the 
expected consequences of thes,e actions. However, those articles tend to focus on positive 
aspects of the actions so they were supplemented with Mandarin reports of the same 
actions. By comparison, Mandarin reports often provide more in depth, more objective 
and sometimes more critical information about company dynamics. 
3.4. DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis probably is the most subtle and nuanced, if challenging, part of qualitative 
research, because unlike hypothesis-testing research, qualitative research lacks a general 
accepted model for the process. Eisenhardt regards data analysis as "the most difficult and 
least codified part" of building theory from case studies (1989: 539). Miles and 
Huberman also maintain that ''we have few agreed-on canons for qualitative data analysis, 
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in the sense of shared ground mIes for drawing conclusions and verifying their 
sturdiness" (1984: 16). Patton also says: 
There are no formulas for determining significance. There are no ways of 
perfectly replicating the researcher' s analytical thought processes. There are no 
straightforward tests for reliability and validity. In short, there are no absolute 
mIes except to do the very best with your full intellect to fairly represent the data 
and communicate what the data reveal given the purpose of the study ... strategies, 
guidelines, and ideas [of data analysis] are meant to be suggestive and facilitating 
rather than confining, comprehensive, or exhaustive (1990: 372). 
ln the absence of a standard, the following approach is employed in this study: after 
collecting qualitative data of each firm, the data were analyzed first by writing up the 
histories of the individual case based on the secondary sources, and then comparison 
across the cases was made to refine and to revise the preliminary propositions. 
3.4.1. Analyzing Within-Case Data 
At the core of analyzing within-case data is detailed case study write-ups. Through 
writing up cases, researchers could "gain familiarity with data and preliminary theory 
generation" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). Mason also suggests that familiarity with data 
facilitates the emergence of key categories that could lead to preliminary theory 
generation: 
Your first question may be "where will 1 get my categories from?" ... so we will 
consider what generating ... categories from the data might mean. In the first place, 
it means making· sure that you are as familiar as you can be with your data-read 
them, study them, listen to them, think about them and the process of their 
production, sleep with them under your pillow ifyou think it will help (1996: 120). 
ln writing up the cases, key strategie decisions were presented chronologically (Yin, 1984: 
91). If a researcher fails to do so, then a reader "cannot ordinarily follow how a researcher 
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got from 3600 pages of field notes to the final conclusions, sprinkled with vivid quotes 
though they may be (Miles and Huberman, 1984: 16). Chronologies are crucial to 
building a chain of evidence because they "are prepared to get on top of the data, to 
clarify sequences across levels of analysis, suggest causal linkages between levels, and 
establish early analytical themes" (Pettigrew, 1990: 280). 
Drawing on the definition of strategy as pattern in actions (Mintzberg and McHugh, 
1985), the presence and absence of the three sectors in the key strategic actions of the six 
case histories were first examined, and then considered how they influenced the growth of 
the six firms. At this stage, the key categories that emerged from this study were the 
varied roles that each sector could play. Although similarities and differences among 
the se six cases were noted, they were left for further analysis until all case write-ups were 
complete in order to maintain the independence of the replication logic. The writing 
process of the six cases took about eighteen months to complete. 
3.4.2. Searching For Cross-Case Patterns 
The next undertaking in data analysis was to search for cross-case patterns. Eisenhardt 
suggests that researchers could "select categories ... and then to look for within-group 
similarities coupled with intergroup differences" (1989: 540). The goal of the cross-case 
comparisons, according to Miles and Huberman, is "to ensure that the events and 
processes in one well-described setting are not wholly idiosyncratic;" researchers also 
need to discern "processes and outcomes that occur across many cases," and need to 
understand "how such processes [and outcomes] are bent by specific local contextual 
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variations" (1984: 151). The process of cross-case analysis is "subjective" and is "a 
puzzle:..solving endeavor" (Dutton, 1988: 230, 231). It is similar to "detective work"-
"the tracking down of patterns [and] consistencies" (Mintzberg, 1979: 584). 
Accordingly, once the individual case history was complete, this study proceeded to 
conduct cross-case analysis. At the beginning, the cases of the same founding sectors 
were compared first to examine the patterns involving the thtee sectors. Comparisons 
were made among Lenovo, UMC and VIS that were founded by the social sector 
organizations; and ATSD and Acer that were initiated by entrepreneurs in the market. 
During this process, a difficulty that the author encountered was to find a more 
comprehensive set of roi es of the three sectors to explain all six cases. Therefore, new 
combinations ofpairs offirms were compared for further analysis. For example, Lenovo 
was compared with Great Wall and ATSD of China; and Acer was compared with UMC 
and VIS of Taiwan. Next, the dominant patterns ofthree sectors that emerged from the 
three Chine se firms were compared with those emerging from the three Taiwanese firms. 
In this process of comparison, tables and graphs were created to facilitate searching for 
similarities and differences. As the analysis evolved, the level of abstraction was raised 
and the roles ofthree sectors were summarized into one-to-two word labels to simplify 
the theoretical framework (Langley, 1999). When each time new insights emerged, the 
cases were reexamined to confirm or to adjust those new ideas. In addition, the original 
external source was reread to ensure that ideas emerged at this stage continued to be 
consistent with the histories of the cases. 
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After the development of the se tentative propositions, each case was reexamined again to 
see if their histories confirmed the proposed relationship. If not, the six cases were reread 
carefully again to improve understanding of the underlying dynamics of the three sectors. 
At the same time, the existing literature was tapped into so as to sharpen the theoretical 
constructs and propositions. The rough outline of the propositions regarding the roles of 
the three sectors in this study emerged about ten months after completing the writing of 
the six cases. 
3.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter explains the methodological choices for case study research, research setting, 
and the six sample firms as well as the methods of collecting and analyzing qualitative 
data. Given the objectives of the research and the level of analysis sought, an exploratory 
study with a qualitative emphasis appeared to be a reasonable choice, in theoretical and in 
practical terms. 
Theoretically, a qualitative multiple-case study with replications provides useful insights 
to develop and refine theories. It also offers multiple settings to validate the findings 
obtained in each one of the case. These methodological choices also have enabled this 
study to reconsider the roles of the three sectors in a rich and thorough way while making 
comparison across the six firms. Practical considerations are also regarded as important 
issues for this study, because lack of access to informants of most of the sample firms 
created barriers that may influence the triangulation of the data collection. 
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CHAPTER4 
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY SERVICE DIVISION 
This chapter presents the birth, the growth and the demise of Advanced Technology 
Service Division (ATSD) based in Beijing's Zhongguancun area, China. It was created by 
Chunxian Chen, public1y recognized as the first entrepreneur in China' s information 
technology (IT) industry. After a briefbiography of Chen, this chapter tracks the key 
strategie decisions and their contexts along the history of Chen' s entrepreneurial venture. 
It also documents the development of Zhongguancun after the demi se of ATSD. The 
chapter conc1udes with sorne remarks about how the three sectors influenced the case of 
Chen's entrepreneurial venture. 
4.1. CHUNXIAN CHEN 
Chunxian Chen is public1y recognized as the first mover in China's IT industries in the 
1980s (Cao, 2001). Before he started up his business, he was a researcher at the CAS, the 
most prestigious research institute in China. At the CAS, he earned a reputation as an 
avant-garde researcher who could think big. 
Chen was bom in 1934. Chen's father, a university professor with an American Ph.D. 
degree in veterinary medicine, inspired his interest in science and technology. By the time 
he was ready to enter university, Soviet Russia already had tremendous influence on 
China' s higher education system. In the early 1950s, more than half of China' s university 
science and technology courses used Russian materials entirely (Hsu, 1964: 142-143). By 
the late 1950s, sorne 12,400 Russian works had been translated into Chine se and 
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circulated widely (Hsu, 1964: 142). British and American textbooks had been banned 
since 1949 (Shih, 1962). 
Upon the founding of the People's Public of China in 1949, Mao declared that China 
would lean to one side. That meant the side of the Soviet Union. Communist China 
abandoned the Nationalist Government's education system and adopted that of Soviet 
Russia. In 1950, at the First National Conference on Higher Education, the Minister of 
Education, Ma Hsu-Iun, arguéd that China "must not commit the same old mistake of 
knowledge for knowledge's sake, ignoring the needs of the people and the state." Instead, 
he said, "our higher education must tie in closely with the needs of economic, political, 
cultural, and defense constructions of our nation" (Hsu, 1964: 136). 
T 0 tie education to the national economic plan, the State Economic Commission assigned 
jobs to university graduates. Take the class of 1956 in China, for example. 15,163 or 
24.3% of graduates were sent to Chinese universities to be instructors or graduate 
students or to universities abroad to further their studies (Hsu, 1964: 149). The vast 
majority of those studying abroad were sent to Russia rather than to the USA, especially 
after the Korean War (Waley-Cohen, 1999: 255), the slogan for which was: "Resisting 
America, and Aiding Korea." 
4.2. 1953: CHEN STUDIED IN THE SOVIET UNION 
Chen was among the many excellent students sent to Rl~ssia. In 1953, he entered the 
University of Moscow to study physics. At the time ofChen's studies, it was the heyday 
of Russian R&D. Sputnik, the first satellite in human's history, was launched in 1957. 
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In 1957, Mao visited the Soviet Union. On November 17, he gave a talk to Chine se 
overseas student at the auditorium of the University ofMoscow. And Chen sat in the third 
row, hearing Mao saying: 
The world is yours, and is also ours. But eventually it is yours. You, young people, 
are so energetic and vibrant. You are really like the sun in the early moming. We 
set our high hope on you (Sun, 2004). 
4.3. 1958: CHEN'S RETURN TO CHINA 
As we shall see later, energetic and vibrant Chen would bring hope to China's IT industry 
in the early 1980s. After Chen fini shed his degree in 1958, he went back to China. At that 
time, China's National Plan for Long-Range Development of Science and Technology 
was just launched (1956-1967). Under this Plan, China intended to strengthen its science 
and technology capability with the assistance of the Soviet Union (Suttmeier, 1974). 
Chen started his career as a researcher at the Institute of Physics in the CAS in the 
Zhongguancun area. Zhongguancun covers an area of 100 square kilometers in Beijing's 
Haidian District. Haidian District is located 15 kilometers northwest of the Forbidden 
City, the center of Beijing. Haidian used to be home to imperial resorts, including Yuan 
Ming Yuan (founded in 1709), Summer Palace (founded in 1750) and Fragrant Hill Park 
(founded in 1186). 
Upon Chen's retum to China, Zhongguancun was undergoing a dramatic change. 
F ollowing the Soviet model, the Chinese govemment intended to develop Zhongguancun 
to be an area ofhigher-Ievel education and research. In the early 1950s, Renmin 
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University of China, Central University for Nationalities, and Beijing University of 
Technology were founded in the south area of Zhongguancun. Tsinghua University was 
renovated and expanded in the north area. Beijing University just moved to the west area. 
In the east area, eight major universities were founded, including Beijing Institute of Iron 
& Steel Technology, Beihang University, China University of Geosciences, China 
University ofMining & Technology, University ofPetroleum, Beijing, Beijing Forestry 
University, Beijing Institute of Agriculture & Engineering & Chemistry, and Beijing 
College of Medicine. Soon after in 1953, CAS's Institute of Geography, Institute of 
Physics, Institute of Mathematics, Institute of Semiconductor, Institute of Mechanics, 
Institute of Chemistry also moved to the area of Zhongguancun (Sit, 1999). 
After Chen's return to the CAS in 1959, he engaged in research projects ofpolymer 
semiconductor and helped build up a polymer laboratory. After that in the 1963-1965 
period, Chen organized a cross-Iaboratory team to undertake research on high-energy 
lasers. Once the research ofhigh-energy laser was completed in 1965, Chen helped in the 
founding the Institute ofTechnical Physics where he conducted research on physics of 
nuclear fusion. In the late 1960s, inspired by USSR' s successful construction of a 
Tokamak reactor, a doughnut-shaped chamber used in the nuclear fusion research, Chen 
started to build a similar one after the Soviet Union's mode!. 
Unfortunately, when Chen's research was underway, Mao launched the Cultural 
Revolution in 1966 that had "taken on a distinctly anti-scientific tone" (Wu and Sheeks, 
1970: 462). Political struggle took the place ofresearch. A total of 881 of the 9,279 
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researchers and staff members were subjected to inhumane government interrogations. Of 
the 881 people interrogated,.l 02 were regarded as "bourgeois, reactionary academic 
authorities," enemies of the working class (Cao, 1999: 313). 
Mao claimed that intellectuals were "stingy ninth-rankers," the lowest rank of Chinese 
society. Thus, most of the scientists at the CAS were sent to the countryside to perform 
hard labour. 1,811 CAS researchers were working in factories and rural villages and 190 
researchers were working in 33 junior high schools and 8 elementary schools. Fortunately, 
though Chen was regarded as revisionist during the Cultural Revolution, he was not the 
main target thanks to his close connection to USSR at that time. Chen continued his work 
during the turmoil. During the period 1972-1974, he led a team successfully constructing 
China's first Tokamak reactor, CT-6. In addition to science and technology research, 
Chen also engaged in administrative affairs. In 1974, Chen was appointed as the vice-
director of CAS' s Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics that was located in the 
Chinese interior. 
Around the time when the founding of Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics was 
accomplished, the Cultural Revolution also drew to an end. Deng Xiaoping's return to 
power in 1977 put an end to Mao' s Cultural Revolution. It also ushered in the Spring of 
Science (Huang, 1999). Deng held the first National Science Congress on March 18, 1978. 
The 5,586 scientists who had survived the Cultural Revolution attended (Miller, 1996). 
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Unlike Mao Zedong, Deng respected the intellectual. In Congress, he dec1ared that 
inteHectuals, especially scientists and engineers, to be "full members of the working 
c1ass" (Suttmeier, 1989: 1004). With Deng's leadership, the view of the intellectual as the 
enemy of the working c1ass began to melt away. He also emphasized the importance of 
science and technology in the process of economic deve1opment, referring to them as "the 
first productive force." Deng's administration managed to spend 1.5%, 1.6%, and 1.5% of 
the GNP on R&D in 1978, 1979, and 1980, respective1y (Gu, 1995: 10). 
At the first National Science Congress, Chen was awarded the first prize of the National 
Scientific and Technological Advance Award for his contribution to China's first 
Tokamak reactor, CT-6. Then 44-years-old, Chen was promoted to full prof essor, the 
youngest prof essor in China qualified to supervise doctoral studentsand also to be a 
director of the laboratory ofnuc1ear fusion (Institute of Modem Physics, 2004). 
In 1978, soon after the National Science Congress, China held the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Chine se Communist Party Congress. At the speech at the Third Plenum, first of 
aH, the pragmatist Deng replaced ideologist Mao's class struggle with economic 
development: "more attention had to be given immediately to improving the general 
population's livelihood. People had suffered too much" (Vogel, 1995: 41). Deng also 
announced that China was about to implement a series of Four Modemizations, inc1uding 
industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defence/military. 
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As for economic development, Deng acknowledged the failure of socialism in Mao' sera: 
"The socialist system was too tight and needed to be loosened. Excess planning had made 
the economy lifeless and destroyed motivation." He lamented that "China had gone too 
far in copying socialism from the Soviet Union and needed to move away from that path" 
(Vogel, 1995: 41). Therefore, he argued that the mechanism of the market be reintroduced 
to China. "Markets had to be revived and allowed to flourish in order to enliven 
production and satisfy people's needs" (Vogel, 1995: 41). And Deng's approach to 
reconciling the tension between plan and the market was that the former as a principal 
part and the latter as a supplementary part. 
As for international relations, Deng discontinued Mao's policy of self-reliance. To 
terminate the state ofbeing an autarky in the world economy, Deng argued that "China 
needed to expand its contacts with foreign countries" in order to "take advantage of 
increased commerce with other countries to learn from their technology and their 
experience" (Vogel, 1995: 41). 
4.4. 1978: CHEN'S' VISIT TO THE USA 
Chen, along with 10 fellow CAS scientists took academic tours to the USA soon after the 
Open Door Policy was established in 1978. They visited "more than twenty cities in 
fourteen days" with "two American bodyguards.,,18 During this academic visit, Chen 
presented his experiments conducted by CT -6 at Princeton University. 
18 Author's interview with Chunxian Chen, Beijing, 2003. 
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At that point, the USA, rather than the Soviet Union, was the destination of choice for 
Chen's academic pilgrimages. After Stalin died in 1953, China's relationship with the 
Soviet Union gradually became strained, leading to an eventual split from the Soviet 
Union in the 1960s. In contrast, American President Nixon' s trip to Beijing in 1972 
started the normalization of Chinese-American relations. 
After his academic tour, Chen summarized his American visits in a paper entitled "The 
Diffusion of Technology and New Emerging Industries." He presented it at the 
conference ofthe Beijing Plasma Association on October 23, 1980. The American 
accomplishments that he found to be most impressive were Route 128 and the Silicon 
Valley. 
Of Route 128, Chen said: 19 
We visited a small factory that manufactured superconductive magnets. This was 
a very inspirational and encouraging visit. The founder of this factory used to be a 
prof essor at Boston University. He told us that prof essors contributed knowledge 
and ideas, and other people contributed capital. And they worked it together to 
start up a company. They had produced many series of advanced superconductive 
magnets that were used in laboratories ofhigh-energy physics and nuc1ear-fusion 
physics ... The more contracts they had, the more people they hired. Normally 
they had twenty people working in that factory (1980). 
While in China, Chen lamented, "the factories that manufactured superconductive 
materials had more than thousand employees, however the products they produced were 
really bad." Comparing the USA to the Soviet Union, Chen said: 
19 The following quotations are from the document entitled "The Diffusion ofTechnology and New 
Emerging Industries" (Chen, 1980) the author obtained from Chen in Beijing, 2003. 
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Though the Soviet Union launched a satellite and Tokamak reactor earlier than the 
USA, the USA caught up by the advantage of experiments and equipment. The 
reason why the USA could catch up so rapidly was that the USA had a much 
faster process of transforming technology into products in the markets. Scientists 
and engineers in the USA had very strong entrepreneurship. They always hurried 
up to transform their inventions, technologies into products. And as for this 
phenomenon, we cannot ignore the incentive of profits in the USA capitalism ... 
and the entrepreneurs' self-satisfaction of starting up a business (1980). 
Chen then compared the USA to China. He said: 
We have been working here in Zhongguancun for more than twenty years. We 
know that the density of professional talents here is no less than the areas of 
Boston and Silicon Valley. 1 think there is a huge potential in Zhongguancun that 
we have not been able to capitalize on (1980). 
As mentioned earlier, Zhongguancun underwent a dramatic change in the 1950s. And by 
the end of 1960, Zhongguancun had gained a reputation of an area ofhigher education in 
China (Gaubatz, 1995). In the following decades, higher education and research institutes 
in Zhongguancun had contributed significantly to China's atomic bombs (1964), 
hydrogen bombs (1967), and satellites (1967) (Lewis and Xue, 1988). However, those 
impressive defense technological achievements had low, if any, impact on economic 
development in Zhongguancun. As Suttmeier pointed out, "because of intense secrecy, 
there was little chance that the technical progress made in defense work would find its 
ways into the civilian economy." Furthermore, "the institutional settings ... were biased 
against close and effective connections with production" (1989: 1006, 1005). 
At the conference, the audience just sniffed at Chen' s passionate talk. At the beginning of 
the 1980s after the Open Door Policy, few in China had heard of Silicon Valley. The vast 
majority, if not all, of the researchers regarded "samples, exhibits and presentations" as 
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the ultimate goals oftheir research (Gaungming Ribao, 1985).To "work in industry had 
been "a sign of a failed career" (Suttmeier, 1989: 1009). The idea of commercializing 
research never occurred to them. 
4.5.1980: THE BEGINNING OF CHEN'S START-UP 
Despite the skepticism of the audience, Chen walked his talk in 1980. He ventured to 
capitalize on the potential of Zhongguancun by his entrepreneurship. This marked a 
critical point ofChina's modem history of science and technology (Bi, 1998). Following 
his gut feeling, he started up the ATSD, a technology-consulting firm in the 
Zhongguancun area of Beijing. He felt that he "wanted to do something that he dared not 
to do before". This startup emancipated his spirit which "was repressed in the Cultural 
Revolution. ,,20 
It was the first time ever that communist China had entrepreneurial initiative in the 
market. According to Segal (2003: 56), A TSD was "an organization many considered the 
first nongovemmental enterprise" in China. It should be noted that firms in socialist 
Chinese society were quite different from their counterparts in capitalist USA. Chinese 
firms were created according to the national economic plan and therefore, they were part 
of an administrative framework and were operated according to the order of govemment 
authority (Gu, 1999). 
20 Author's interview with Chunxian Chen, Beijing, 2003. 
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Chen's start-up was not a state-owned enterprise (SOE) and therefore the state did not 
have administrative control over it. Chen operated his start-up based on four self 
principles: self-financing, self-chosen partnership, self-operating, and self-responsibility 
for gains and losses.21 Self-financing: Chen borrowed his initial capital RMB 200 (USD 
$25) from his colleagues. Self-chosen partnership: Chen recruited 14 researchers in the 
beginning. Together they provided technological consulting works to firms in Beijing. At 
the same time, they still held their original positions at the CAS. With the ups and downs 
of Chen' s consulting business, the number of staff was also up to 20-30 then down to 
6-7. 
Self-operating: Chen had to look for clients himselfbecause they would not come to 
contact Chen according to the national economic plan. By October 1981, Chen and his 
colleagues had undertaken seven R&D projects from government, provided technology 
consulting services to another three governmental departments, and helped building one 
electronics factory (Zhongguancun Management Committee, 2004). Se1f-responsibility 
for gains and losses: Chen had discretion over distributing the profits in 1982. The first 
year's revenue was more than RMB 20,000 (USD $2500) and every staffmember 
received RMB 10 (USD $1.25) per month, in addition to his or her original salaries al the 
CAS. Their salaries were thus doubled. 
21 Author's interview with Chunxian Chen, Beijing, 2003. 
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4.5.1. Chen Encountered Opposition 
Chen's measures drew criticism from the conservatives. The Director of the Physics 
Institute, Wei -Yan Guan criticized Chen and his colleagues for being iconoclasts. In 
Guan's opinion, Chen and his colleagues were not engaging in the business they were 
supposed to; furthermore, they were corrupting the mentality of the cornrades at the CAS. 
Chen was regarded as heterodox and his career was in peri1.22 
Under the direction of Wei-Yan Guan, Chen' s ATSD was under investigation four times 
(Chunxian Chen Memorial Office, 2004). However, Chen did not think Guan's measures 
were valid. Chen said: 
We suffered bad reputation. Guan said we were corrupting the staffmentality. 
However, many of my staffs thought, to work here is to serve our nation, to do 
good to our nation. They could not imagine that they were blamed for their 
initiatives. As a result, they quit. Though we were very poor at that time, we did 
not need that extra 10 RMB monthly salary. 1 think what 1 was doing was right; 
therefore, 1 did not need to correct my behavior (Liu, 2004). 
4.5.2. Backing from the Government 
ln 1983, Chen survived Guan's criticism, thanks to Xinhua News Agency's internaI 
reference (Neibu Cankao). Only the most senior and experiencedjoumalists had the 
privilege to write the Neibu Cankao that normally covered controversial issues in society 
(Hazelbarth, 1997). Neibu Cankao was a three-to-ten-page report circulated exclusively 
among officiaIs at the ministeriaiievei and higher. 
22 Author's interview with Chunxian Chen, Beijing, 2003. 
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The internaI report of Chen' s case read as follows: 23 
Advanced Technology Service Division has signed twenty-seven contracts with 
related units and it has accompli shed half of them. It also provided technology-
consulting services to four collective-owned factories in Beijing's Haidian District 
to help them develop and implement new products; it aIso helped the Haidian 
District to construct an area of technology experimentation and to build three 
technology consulting organizations. 
After reading this positive report, officiaIs at various levels of the govemment began to 
urge the state to support Chen in his efforts. First, Yi Fang, then-Director of the National 
Science Committee and former director of the CAS made the following statement on 
January 7, 1983: "What Comrade Chen has accomplished is absolutely right. He could be 
encouraged." 
Then on January 8, 1983, Qi-Li Hu, the Director of the Central Office ofChinese 
Communist Party (CCP) expressed his opinion supporting Chen publicly: 
Comrade Chen pioneered and created a new era. He might create a new path of 
transforming the research result into direct force of production. In addition to that, 
he also created a new avenue. By this avenue, technology staffs could contribute 
to the four modernizations in China. We could allow those technology staffs to 
become rich and allow them to break the iron bowl mentalities. For sure, we need 
to work on the relevant regulations and policies. The Beijing Association of 
Science and T echnology shall support it. 
Eventually, the internaI report reached the highest-ranking officiaI it possibly could. Yao-
Bang Hu, then the General Secretary of the Central Committee, made the following 
statement on January 8, 1983: "The Science and Technology Leadership Team should 
create sorne guidelines and policies to support Comrade Chen." 
23 The following quotations regarding the comments of the high-ranking Chinese officiaIs are from the 
manuscript obtained from Chunxian Chen in Beijing, 2003. 
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In response, Dong-Wan Zhao, the vice-director of the Science and Technology 
Leadership Team, said on January 13, 1983: 
Following the directions of cornrades Yao-Bang Hu and Qi-Li Hu, when we are 
formulating policies and systems regarding science and technology, we shall 
incorporate the opinions of cornrade Chunxian Chen (Zhongguancun Management 
Committee, 2004). 
These supportive words from the high-ranking officiaIs endowed Chen's venture with 
legitimacy. In tum, Chen's venture inspired many other techno-entrepreneurs in 
Zhongguancun. Many scientists and engineers followed Chen to jump into the sea of 
business (xia hai). The number ofnongovemmental high-tech start-ups in Beijing's 
Zhongguancun area in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 were about 10,40,90, and 100 
respectively (Zhongguancun Management Committee, 2004). 
As the number of start-ups multiplied, there emerged "Electronics Street" in the area of 
Zhongguancun. In response, National Science and Technology Committee, the CAS, 
Ministry of Education, Beijing Municipal Govemment, and Haidian District Govemment 
joined forces to establish Zhongguancun Planning and Development Office in 1984 
(Zhongguancun Management Committee, 2004). In order to protect these burgeoning 
high-technology startups, in early 1985, the Chine se govemment announced that it would 
begin to put restriction on import of sorne electronics components (Simon, 1989). 
In June 1986, the Beijing Municipal Govemment commissioned Beijing University of 
Technology and Renmin University of China to survey the enterprises located in the 
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Electronics Street in Zhongguancun. This survey concluded that the Electronics Street 
was an "unignorable scientific and technologie al productive forces." It "represents a good 
form of operation that combines technology and economy" (Zhongguancun Management 
Committee, 2004). 
Following this survey, in October 1986, Beijing municipal government promulgated 
Regulations Regarding Collective-Owned and Privately-Owned High-Technology 
Enterprises in Beijing City. It stated: 
Collective-owned and privately owned high-technology enterprises are newbom 
things in the reform of scientific and technological intuitions. Every district 
governmental unit should give them guidance, management, and assistance in 
order to assist them in the development ofhigh-tech business (Zhongguancun 
Management Committee, 2004). 
In addition to the assistance from the state, Zhongguancun start-ups also decided to help 
each other. In early 1987, the China Non-Governmental Science and Technology 
Entrepreneurs Association was established. The People 's Daily enthusiastically reported 
the burgeoning Zhongguancun in an article entitled: "A Change on the Quiet Beijing's 
Zhongguancun: A Silicon Valley of China is in the Making" (White, 1993). 
it should be noted that this was the first time in China that there was such a large number 
of entrepreneurial start-ups. Many business activities ofthese private start-ups might be 
regarded illicit, if not illegal, from the juridical framework of socialist China. Though 
sorne higher-ranking officiaIs had voiced their support for those who started up 
entrepreneurial enterprises, such as in the case of Chen Chunxian, sorne conservative 
cornrades simply just disparaged "Electronics.Street" as "Crook Street." Worse yet, 
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others regarded Zhongguancun as the seedbed of evil capitalism. And before long, the 
c1uster of entrepreneurial start-ups in the Zhongguancun area began to draw the full 
attention of China' s central authorities. 
4.5.3. The Launchof the National Torch Program 
Ajournalist at Xinhua News Agency wrote an internal reference (Neibu Cankao) 
reporting the Electronics Street in Zhongguancun. On December 7, 1987, after reading 
this Neibu Cankao, Zhao Ziyang, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of 
China, forwarded it to both Rui Xingwen, then secretary of the CCP' s Secretariat of the 
Central Committee, and Wen Jiabao, then director of the General Office of the CPC 
Central Committee. 
On December 8, 1987, Rui Xingwen commented on this report: "Comrade Jiabao please 
read it too. 1 would like to understand Zhongguancun. Could we conduct an in depth 
survey?" On December 9, 1987, Wen Jiabao commented: "1 have ordered the Research 
Office under the General Office of the CPC Central Committee to conduct a research on 
Zhongguancun" (Zhongguancun Management Committee, 2004). 
On December 28 1987, under Wen's direction, the Chinese Central Govemment 
conducted a study to determine the feasibility of turning Zhongguancun into a science-
based industrial park. The study was made possible through the collaborative efforts of 
seven organizations: The Committee of National Education (now the Ministry of 
Education), the CAS, the Chinese Science Association, the Beijing Association of 
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Science, the Haidian District Government, and Research Office under the General Office 
of the CPC Central Committee (Wu, Yan, and Wang, 2004). 
On January 3 1988, Wen Jiabao visited Zhongguancun and held meetings with Chen and 
other techno-entrepreneurs. On January 15, Rui Xingwen also held conferences to discuss 
the relevant policies regarding the start-ups in Zhongguancun. The foIlowing fourteen 
institutions attended the conferences: the National Science and Technology Committee, 
the National Education Committee, the Ministry of Electronic Industry, the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Ministry of Personnel, State 
Administration for lndustry and Commerce, lndustrial and Commercial Bank of China, 
the State Administration of Taxation, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, the 
China Association for Science and Technology, the CAS, the Beijing Science and 
Technology Committee, and Haidian District Government. 
After aIl the site visits, meetings, and conferences, the final product of the study on 
Zhongguancun was a 20-thousand-word report. After reading it, Premier Minister Zhao 
Ziyang released the directive to "construct the Zhongguancun as a science-based 
industrial park." At the locallevel, in May 1988, the Beijing Municipal Government 
issued the Temporary Regulations Regarding the Beijing Experimental Zone for the 
Developmentfor New Technology Industries. The State Council approved the 
establishment of Haidian district as an experimental zone for the development of high and 
new technology. The regulations provided indigenous firms with preferential policies 
(Wang, 2000). At the nationallevel, on April 12, 1988, the First Session of the Seventh 
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National People's Congress passed an amendment to the 1982 Constitution. It legitimized 
"private enterprises" (sinying qiye) (Wang, 2000). 
Of the policies aimed to foster entrepreneurial venturing, the most influential one was the 
National Torch Project carried out by the State Science and Technology Commission in 
1988. Its purpose was to construct the science and technology industry parks nationwide 
to foster entrepreneurial start-ups. The state hoped that by building science parks, the 
R&D institutes, universities and start-ups could work together closely. 
New startups needed to be recognized by authorities of science parks so that they could 
be inhabited in high-technology industry parks. To be new-technology enterprises, firms 
had to meet the following criteria (SSTC, 1991: 563-566). First, the technology 
underpinning the activities of the enterprise should be in areas of "new and high" 
technologies specified by the State Science and Technology Commission. Second, the 
enterprises should have a required amount of disposable capital and physical resources, 
market potential, and acceptable organizational and managerial abilities. And lastly, the 
chief manager should be a scientific or technical professional. 
The National Torch Pro gram triggered a wave of entrepreneurship in Zhongguancun. 
Entrepreneurs in Zhongguancun area now tried to "turn their capital into stocks," to 
"build their industries into scale economic entities," to "renovate their technology," to 
"pool funds from various sources," and to "scientifically manage their enterprises" (The 
Administration Commission of Zhongguancun Science Park, 2000). 
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Two elite universities in Zhongguancun were also drawn into this wave of 
entrepreneurship. In 1993, Beijing University launched its own Founder Group Co. After 
launching its flagship product, a professional color publishing system in 1994, it went 
public on the Hong Kong stock market in 1995. It raised capital of USD $0.36 million. 
Tsinghua University founded its Tsinghua Unisplendour Group in 1993. It developed the 
tirst domestic-made color laser photocomposition system. In 1999, Tsinghua 
Unisplendour Group went public on the Shenzhen stock exchange. In this wave of 
entrepreneurship, there were Il tirms located in Zhongguancun that went public by 2000 
(Hou, 2000). 
4.6. 1990S: THE END OF CHEN'S START-UP 
As mentioned earlier, supportive words from the officiaIs in 1983 endowed Chen's 
venture with legitimacy. Soon after, in April 1983, Chen expanded his business into 
Beijing Hua-Xia New Technology Research Institute with the assistance from Beijing 
Association of Science and Technology, Science & Technology Committee ofHaidian 
District, and Industrial Corporation of Haidian District (Zhongguancun Management 
Committee, 2004). 
In the same year, Beijing Hua-Xia New Technology Reseaich Institute developed a 
printing system called 888 to print aIl the documents used in the World Congress of the 
International Advertising Association held in the People's Congress Hall in Beijing. 
However, Chen did not promote the 888 printer system very weIl thereafter because he 
did not have enough tinancial resources to keep developing the 888 printing system. As a 
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result, Chen lagged behind competitors in delivering the latest printing technology (Liu, 
2004). 
Later, Beijing Hua-Xia New Technology Research Institute also helped corporations in 
the USA convert texts into digital data-10,000 words for USD $4. At the height of the 
business, Chen hired more than 100 operators; annual revenue was USD $100,000. Based 
on this financial performance, Chen expanded his business investments into five other 
cities, including Shenzhen, Tianjin, Chengdu, Kunming and Hong Kong. However, Chen 
was aware of the fact that text digitization business as such did not have highly-added 
value (Liu, 2004). 
In 1987, Chen decided to enter the computer business. In addition to all the capital 
accumulated before then, he borrowed RMB $1.6 million (USD $200,000) to invest in the 
business of mainframe computers (Sun, 2004). By then, his commitment to business 
escalated so that he decided to resign his position at the CAS. However, by the time Chen 
acquired those mainframe computers, the trend had shifted from mainframe computers to 
personal computers (Liu, 2003). Chen mispredicted the development of the computer 
industry, and when Chen figured out what to do, it was just too late to change his strategy 
due to the high purchasing costs of expensive mainframe computers (Sun, 2004). 
In 1990, Chen's morale was boosted by a RMB 3.2 million (USD $400,000) contract. 
Chen was commissioned to build a computer logistic system for the Department of 
Material Supply at the CAS. Somehow Chen and the Department of Material Supply had 
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a conflict over this contract. Chen brought his contract to court where he argued the case 
successfully both in Administration for Industry and Commerce ofHaidian District, and 
Beijing Intermediate People's Court. However, unfortunately, on November 12, 1990, 
Chen lost his case at Beijing Supreme People's Court on the ground that "Beijing Hua-
Xia New Technology Research Institute engages in the business beyond the registered 
sphere of operation" (Zhongguancun Management Committee, 2004). 
Meanwhile, China and the USA entered into a comprehensive trade agreement by signing 
a Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU) in 1992. Under the MOU, fi.rst, China agreed to 
significantly lower import tariffs on many high-tech products. The tariff rate was reduced 
from 35% to 15%. Second, China agreed to remove quotas and li censes on a wide range 
of American computer-related products exported to China (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
As a result, one year after the 1992 MOU, 250,000 personal computers were sold, up 
from 85,000 in 1990. Foreign computers accounted for more than 67% of the 1993 sales 
of 450,000 personal computers in China, up from 58% in 1991. In 1997, the number of 
computers sold in China soared to 3.03 million. China became the world's sixth large st 
personal computer market, after the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain and France 
(China Economic Bulletin, 1998). 
In 1993, faced with strong domestic and foreign competitors in the electronics and 
computer industry and due to a lack of strong technological capabilities, Chen abandoned 
the business of computers totally, and ventured into the business ofvoice beeper. He 
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thought this might be a profitable project because such voice beeper was cheaper than 
Mandarin-character beeper by 60%. Chen invested RMB 2 million (USD $250,000) in 
developing the voice beeper. However, as more competitors entered the markets of 
electronic gadgets, Chen's voice beeper business was shaken out. Chen went bankrupt in 
1996 and Beijing Hua-Xia New Technology Research Institute was disbanded (Sun, 
2004). 
4.7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ZHONGGUANCUN AFTER THE DEMISE OF 
CHEN'S BUSINESS 
The deve10pment of Zhongguancun area started with Chen' s entrepreneurial venturing; 
however, it did not stop with the demise ofChen's business. Thanks to the burgeoning 
deve10pment of the nongovernmental high-technology entrepreneurial firms, 
Zhongguancun started to attract Chine se retumees and the multinationals from abroad. 
4.7.1. Returnees 
In 1997, the Municipal Administrative Committee of the Experimental Zone was founded. 
One of its main tasks was to attract overseas Chine se professionals back home. In the 25 
years following the Cultural Revolution, nearly 600,000 students left China. However, 
only 160,000 retumed (The Economist, 2003). The vast majority of overseas Chine se 
professionals opted not to come back because the working conditions in China were not 
very encouraging. 
Those who came back to their motherland were faced with inferior conditions for 
experimentation and they were confronted with primitive equipment, insufficient 
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materials, and a shortage of funding. One major press reported that "not an insignificant 
portion of the returnees have not been able to make full use of their know-how. Denied 
opportunities to put their expertise to good use, sorne researchers have given up their 
specialties, changed careers, struck out on their own, or even have gone overseas" (Simon 
and Goldman, 1989: 188). To conclude, returned students were feeling stifled. 
To turn around the discouraging working condition, the Municipal Administrative 
Committee of the Experimental Zone established several business incubators of more 
than 140,000 square meters for returned overseas experts (lie, 2003). Moreover, the 
Overseas Students Pioneer Park was established in 1997. Soon after, in 1998, Beijing 
Municipal Science & Technology Commission, National Torch Pro gram, Tsinghua 
University joint forces to create Beijing Tsinghua Software Development Center, the tirst 
software incubator in Zhongguancun. Up to 2002, there were 53 incubators in Beijing, 
accommodating more than 1150 start-ups (Beijing Municipal Science & Technology 
Commission, 2003). 
In addition to creating the business incubators, since the end of 1998, the Municipal 
Administrative Committee of the Experimental Zone had organized conferences that 58 
enterprises and 113 tinancial institutions attended. During those conferences, local 
entrepreneurs were granted a loan ofRMB 40.1 million (USD $4.8 million). In 2000, 
besides state loans, the Administrative Committee introduced the system of stock options 
in order to provide a better incentive system for the returnees (Wang, 2000). 
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According to statistics compiled by the Administrative Committee, by the end of the year 
2002, there were 1,546 enterprises run by returnees and about 18,000 overseas Chinese 
experts returned, which doubled the number of two years before. In total, they registered 
RMB 1.5 billion (USD $180 million) in capital (Jie, 2003). 
4.7.2. The Multinationals in Zhongguancun 
With the homecoming of overseas Chinese experts, the multinational high tech firms 
came to Zhongguancun to set up their research centers (Cao, 2004: 655). They were 
pulled by Zhongguancun in particular and the Chinese market in general. According to 
World Bank researchers Dahlman and Aubert (2001), the establishment ofhigh-tech Park 
in Zhongguancun was the main reason for attracting the multinationals. Furthermore, 
according to Armbrecht, "the size of the market and the quality and quantity of its human 
resources are enormous, especially those related to technology" (2002: 3). The 
multinationals were also pushed by their domestic markets. In the West, especially in the 
USA, "working relationships between industry and either universities or ... national 
laboratories continue to become more difficult" (2002: 3). 
In 1994, Norteljoined forces with Beijing University ofPosts and Communications to set 
up an R&D center. In 1995, IBM opened its IBM China Laboratory in the hope that it 
could build a laboratory as strong as its counterparts located in Almaden (Califomia), 
Yorktown (New York), Haifa (Israel) and Zurich (Switzerland). To support its IBM 
China Laboratory, IBM signed R&D agreements with preeminent universities, including 
Beijing University, Tsinghua University, Fudan University, and Shanghai Jiaotong 
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University. In the same year, Motorola cooperated with Tsing Hua University to open its 
Asia Manufacturing Research Center. In that year too, Microsoft built its R&D center. In 
three years, it rolled out more than 130 research products, which made Microsoft the 
largest software developer in China (Jie, 2000). 
In 1997, Hewlett-Packard and the State Science and Technology Commission of China 
established a joint research center in Zhongguancun. USD $2 million was invested and 
about 60 Chine se scientists were hired in the first two years. In 1998, Intel announced that 
it would invest USD $50 million in the following five years to build the Intel China 
Research Center (Capua, 1998). In the same year, Fujitsu set up a research center in 
Beijing, which is the large st overseas research center (Asiainfo Daily China News, 1998a). 
In that year too, Nokia opened its Nokia China R&D center (China Business Information 
Network, 1998); Sun set up a Technology Development Center in Beijing; Cisco set up a 
network technology laboratory in Beijing that is Cisco's third large st one in the world and 
the largest in Asia (Asiainfo Daily China News, 1998b). 
In 1999, Bell Labs announced the founding ofits Bell Labs Asia-Pacific and China 
Headquarters in Beijing (Ke, 1999). In the same year, Mitsubishi invested RMB 100 
million (USD $12.5 million) to establish its mobile communication research and 
development center in Beijing. In that year too, Ericsson and Beijing Science & 
Engineering University together established a digital communication research center 
(Asiainfo Daily China News, 1999). 
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4.8. CHEN'S LEGACY 
When asked how he felt about the stark contrast between the prospering Zhongguancun 
and his unsuccessful business, Chen said: 
As a science worker, and as a Chinese, 1 am pretty glad that Zhongguancun 
became more and more prosperous. 1 am quite glad that 1 paved the first stone of 
the development of Zhongguancun (Beijing Evening Newspaper, 2004). 
Chen's legacy was embodied in government regulations. In 1998, Beijing municipal city 
released the Regulations on Encouraging Minying (nongovernmental) High-Tech 
Enterprises. In the Regulations, it stated that, led by technological entrepreneurs, minying 
high-tech enterprises are to be operated on the following principles: se1f-chosen 
partnership, self-financing, self-operating, and self-responsibility for gains and losses. 
Besides, they could enjoy the same subsidy policies as the SOEs in the aspects of loans, 
R&D and taxation. 
Moreover, in 2000, China' s government re1eased Regulations on Zhongguancun Science 
Park (Beijing Municipality, 2001). In the Introduction, it states that "organizations and 
individuals in the Zhongguancun area could do anything that is not prohibited by the law, 
regulations and chapters." In Chapter 2, On Market and the arder of Competition, it 
states that "when entrepreneurs register their start up business in the Zhongguancun area, 
they will not be asked by government administrative unit to specify their areas of 
operations." In Chapter 5, Regulations on Governmental Behavior, it states that 
"administrators are responsible for their faults and accountable for their actions regarding 
start-ups." 
81 
At the beginning of the 21st century, twenty years after Chen's pioneering venture, there 
were sorne 15,000 high-tech enterprises in Zhongguancun. Firms were engaging in 
industries of electronic information, optical-mechanical-electrical integration, biological 
engineering, new medicines, new materials, energy-saving technologies, and 
environmentally friendly technologies. Sixt y-one companies were listed on stock 
exchanges at home or abroad. On average, Zhongguancun enterprises invest 3.9% oftheir 
revenue in R&D. The R&D in new products accounted for more than 50% oftheir profits. 
The total income of the enterprises located in the Zhongguancun areas was RMB 284 
billion (USD $34.3 billion) (Cao, 2004). 
According to a survey conducted by the Administrative Commission of Zhongguancun 
Science Park, there were roughly 170,000 people working in high-tech firms in the 
Zhongguancun area. The average age was 28.8 years. The average age of the middle 
management and top management are 31.5 years and 36.6 years, respectively. The 
percentages ofthe employees with bachelor, Master's and PhD degrees are 80%, 8.4% 
and 1.03%, respectively (The Administrative Commission of Zhongguancun Science Park, 
2001). It was reported that sorne engineers working in the high-technology indigenous 
firms in Zhongguancun have become millionaires (Asiainfo Daily China News, 2000). 
The Wall Street Journal regarded Zhongguancun as China's Silicon Valley (Leggett, 
2000). Newsweek (2002) selected Zhongguancun, "the most frenetic neighborhood in 
Beijing, perhaps in all of China," to be one of "the World's New Culture Meccas." The 
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Economist (2003) likened the rapid growth of Zhongguancun to ''the Renaissance in 
Europe or the Meiji Restoration in Japan." 
Prof. Jici Wang of Beijing University said of Chen: "One may well argue that, there 
would be no Silicon Valley without Prof. Frederick Terman. In my opinion, there would 
be no Zhongguancun without Prof. Chunxian Chen" (Chunxian Chen Memorial Office, 
2004). Chen passed away at seventy years old on August 9, 2004 in Zhongguancun, 
Beijing. 
4.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Writing in the late 1980s, Fischer made the following argument in discussing the 
influence ofmarket forces on China's industrial innovation: 
There is little evidence, in fact, that market forces are actually influencing the 
process of technical decision making in Chinese enterprises.. .. [I]t appears that an 
enterprise's commitment to innovation is frequently more the result of the 
historical centrally controlled allocation of scientific and technical talent to the 
enterprise than the presence of market influences. In short, it is not at aIl obvious 
that market forces have yet had any major or lasting impact on the process of 
Chine se industrial innovation (1989: 134-135). 
Rather than a government's centrally planned entity, Chen's case was a typical 
entrepreneurial initiative. First, he undertook a "creative response" (Schumpeter, 1947) to 
the opportunities of the economic reform in the early 1980s in China. Furthermore, on 
encountering criticism on his new venture, Chen demonstrated adequate "will power ... to 
break down the resistance that the social environment offers to change" (Schumpeter, 
1947: 157). 
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Though not necessarily engaging "the new commodity" and "the new technology," 
Chen's entrepreneurial venture did involve "the new type of organization" (Schumpeter, 
1942: 84) that had four innovative management styles in contrast to SOEs: self-chosen 
partnership, self-operating, and self-responsibility for gains and losses, aIl of which were 
"something that is outside of the range of existing practice" (Schumpeter, 1947: 150). 
Eventually Chen's venture also brought about "creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942: 
84) to the operating context ofChina's IT industry in that it destroyed the old regulations, 
and created new ones. 
Upon starting up his business, what was the source of resistance to Chen' s venture? How 
did he overcome this hurdle successfuIly? Why did Chen fail in the end? The following 
discussion shows how the three sectors influenced Chen's entrepreneurial venture, the 
first of its kind in China in the era of economic reform. 
4.9.1. Strained Relations with the Social Sector 
Upon initiating his entrepreneurial startup, conflict between Chen and his supervisor 
emerged. Chen and his supervisor represented the archetypical entrepreneur and 
administrator, respectively. Chen was a techno-entrepreneur, someone who was 
"constantly attuned to environmental changes that may suggest a favorable chance"; in 
stark contrast, his supervisor typified the administrator who wanted "to preserve resources 
and reacts defensively to possible threats to deplete them" (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985: 
87). The conflict was never resolved probably due to Chen's "unwillingness to submit to 
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authority, an inability to work with it" (Cooper and Dunkelberg, 1986: 56); as a result, the 
CAS seemed to play little, if any, role in Chen's venture. 
Though first movers may have a head start when compared with followers, the 
competitiveness in fact does not come from the action of "pioneering per se" (Lieberman 
and Montgomery, 1988: 49); instead, the crucial part of building up competitive 
advantage offirst movers lies in "the acquisition of the resources" (Rumelt, 1987: 152), 
so that they can transform opportunities into long-term competitive advantages (Kerin, 
Varadarajan and Peterson, 1992). 
Owing to the strained relationship with ms affiliated unit, Chen did not receive financial 
support and technological capabilities from the CAS. Although Chen was the first moyer 
in China's IT industry, yet, due to lack offinancial resources, he was not able to preempt 
scarce assets, which, according to Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), is one of the 
sources offirst-mover advantages; had Chen had more capital, he might have invested in 
plant and equipment to deter the entry of other entrepreneurs into industries. Moreover, 
due to lack of technological capabilities transferred from the CAS, Chen was not able to 
derive a first-mover advantage by moving down the learning curve of new products or 
processes (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988); as a result, Chen's first entrepreneurial 
venture only provided technological services that did not require technical-intensive 
investment, and did not create entry barriers. 
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4.9.2. Failure to Build a Stronghold in the Market 
Lack oftechnological know-how and lack offinancial support contributed to Chen's 
failure to build a stronghold in the market. When the competition is trying to level the 
playing field by rapid imitation, firms should "seek to gain advantage by creating 
strongholds that exclude competitors from their turf' (D'Aveni, 1994: 15). However, 
since the business Chen was involved with was neither capital- nor technological-
intensive, the entry barrier to his turfwas low. After Chen's entrepreneurial venture 
gained legitimacy from China's central government, many other scientist and researchers 
jumped onto the bandwagon of startups in the Beijing Zhongguancun. As Hannan and 
Freeman have pointed out, when previously illegitimate business ventures became 
legitimated and familiar, then "attempts at creating copies oflegitimated forms are 
common, and the success rate of such attempts is high" (1986: 63); after aH, what made 
Chen's venture distinctive was his innovative way of operating business, and 
unfortunately, "no ... protection exists for ... business innovation" (Rumelt, 1987: 145). 
4.9.3. The State 
The relationship between entrepreneur Chen and the Chinese government was more 
nuanced than suggested by the state-led development theories. Contrary to the literature 
that delineates a unidirectional" influence from the state on entrepreneurship, the foHowing 
discussion, drawing on Giddens' structuration theory (1984),24 illustrates how Chen's 
entrepreneurship interacted with the Chinese government (see Figure 4.1)?5 
24 The relation between entrepreneurs and government in this study is akin to that between agent and 
structure in structuration theory. According to Giddens, "agents and structures.are not two independently 
given sets ofphenomena." Agents "are the same time the creators of the social systems, yet created by 
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From 1979, the Chinese government began to shape a national culture system and 
national economic system to become more conductive to entrepreneurship. As mentioned 
earlier, when regaining power, Deng held the National Science Congress and the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1978. The former 
recognized the status of the intellectual in society, whereas the later ushered in an era of 
economic reform. Though Deng did not aim to trigger entrepreneurship in the Chinese 
economy, these changes did encourage scientists and engineers working in the 
Zhongguancun area of Beijing to take the initiative. 
Consequently, potential entrepreneurs were influenced by the new systems that were 
conductive to entrepreneurship and they took initiatives. Encouraged by these systems, 
Chen wrote an article entitled "the Diffusion of Technology and New Emerging 
Industries" after visiting the USA in 1980. He maintained that the Zhongguancun area of 
Beijing could emulate the Silicon Valley and Route 128 of the USA; and soon after, Chen 
decided to act and became the first scientist working in the Zhongguancun area of Beijing 
to start up his business. 
them" (1984: 204), whereas structure "is always both constraining and enabling" (25). Taken together, 
agents and structures represent a duality: ''the structural properties of social systems are both medium and 
outcome of the practices" of the agents (25). 
25 Figure 4.1 was inspired by Yates and Orlikowski (1992). 
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Figure 4.1: The Interaction between Entrepreneurship and National Institution in China since 1979 
1. From 1979, the Chine se government began to 
shape a national culture system and a national 
economic system to become more conductive to 
entrepreneurship. 
4. Eventually, entrepreneurial initiatives 
modified the Chinese national culture 
system and national economic system. 
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2. Consequently, potential entrepreneurs were 
influenced by the new systems that were conductive 
to entrepreneurship and took initiatives. 
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3. Thus, through taking initiatives entrepreneurs 
enacted the Chinese national culture system 
and the national economic system. 
Thus, through taking initiatives entrepreneurs enacteJ26 the Chine se national culture 
system and national economic system. Though the Chine se government had been 
changing its systems, the old social mentalities still regarded profit-seeking as sin; 
therefore, in one way or another, Chen enacted China' s new national culture and 
economic system when he received a cascade of support from the high-ranking officiaIs 
after he encountered opposition at the CAS. 
Eventually, entrepreneurial initiatives modifie~7 the Chinese national culture system and 
national economic system. The endowed legitimacy from the high-ranking officiaIs on 
Chen's business venturing reinforced China's national culture and economic system; and 
this in turn, encouraged more scientists and engineers to plunge themselves into business. 
As a result, there gradually emerged a cluster of start-ups in the Zhongguancun area of 
Beijing, which was formalized in the National Torch Pro gram in 1988. Subsequently, 
Chen's business venturing modified the national economic system after the Chinese 
government had mended relevant regulation by incorporating the path-breaking features 
ofChen's business venturing into 1998's Regulations on Encouraging Minying High-
Tech Enterprises, and 2000's Relations on Zhongguancun Science Park 
26 As JoAnne Yates noted in an article entitled "Using Giddens' Structuration Theory to Inform Business 
History", institutional "structures only exist as they are enacted by human agents" (1997: 160). Giddens 
also maintained that "the structural properties of social systems exist only in so far as forms of social 
conduct are reproduced chronically across time and space" (1984: xxi). 
27 In Giddens' structuration theory, agent's "action ... involves power in the sense oftransformative 
capacity" (1984: 15). 
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4.9.4. A Final Word on Chen's Entrepreneurial Venture: Failure or Success? 
Davidsson (2003) once criticized conventional research on entrepreneurship for just 
discussing the success and failure of entrepreneurial ventures without considering the 
outcome of entrepreneurship at the societallevel. In this regard, he categorized four kinds 
of entrepreneurial ventures (see Figure 4.2): success ventures (having positive outcomes 
on the societal and venture level), catalyst ventures (having a positive outcome on the 
societallevel but negative outcome on the venture Jevel), re-distributive ventures (having 
a positive outcome on the venture level but negative outcome on the societallevel), and 
failed ventures (having a negative outcome on both level). 
Figure 4.2: Outcomes on Different Levels for New Ventures 
VENTURE- Positive 
LEVEL 
OUTCOME Negative 
SOCIETAL-LEVEL OUTCOME 
Positive Negative 
Suc cess Ventures Re-Distributive Ventures 
Catalyst Venture Failed Ventures 
Source: Davidsson (2003: 85) 
Of the se four sorts of ventures, ofinterest to this study is the catalyst venture. Though not 
successful in themselves, they "inspire more profitable successors ... [and] contribute to 
entrepreneurship as a societal phenomenon" (Davidsson, 2003: 13-14). When at first 
entrepreneurial ventures in an industry fail, failing entrepreneurs often trigger the 
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emergence of entirely new industries because other potential entrepreneurs learn and 
benefit from their experience (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). This in turn, could lead to "higher 
subsequent growth rates and a reduction of unemployment" in the economy (Audretsch, 
2004: 180). Thus,judging from the level of the firm, Chen's venture was a failure; 
nevertheless, if judging it from the level of society, it may be argued that Chen' s venture 
was a success because it stimulated the development ofChina's information industries 
that emerged from the interaction between Chen's entrepreneurship and China's national 
institutions. 
The next chapter presents the Lenovo case, an entrepreneurial venture also created by the 
scientists affiliated with the CAS. However, compared to Chen's case, Lenovo had quite 
different relations with the CAS, the government and the multinationals in the market. 
And as a result, the performance result of Lenovo differed from ATSD. 
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CHAPTER5 
LENOVO COMPUTER 
This chapter presents the birth, the growth and prosperity of Lenovo Computer based in 
Beijing Zhongguancun, China. As the number one brand name in the Chinese personal 
computer industry, Lenovo acquired the personal computer division oflBM for USD 
$1.25 billion in 2004. With annual global revenues of USD $13 billion, Lenovo now is 
the third-Iargest personal computer vendor, after Dell and Hewletl-Packard (Bulkeley, 
2004). After a brief description of the reform of China' s innovation system, this chapter 
tracks the key strategie decisions and their contexts during the history ofLenovo. The 
chapter conc1udes with some remarks about how three sectors influenced the 
development of Lenovo. 
5.1. 1980S: THE OVERHAUL OF CHINA'S INNOVATION SYSTEM 
Lenovo is a spin-off of the Institute ofComputing Technology (ICT) at the CAS. CAS 
was founded in 1949 as China's leading institution ofresearch and development, and its 
innovation system was transplanted from Russia in the 1950s. Before its founding, Chen 
Po-Ta, Deputy Chief of the Propaganda Department and Vice-President of the Marx-
Lenin Institute, visited Moscow to consult with Sergei 1. Vavilov, the Director of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences. This was followed by a visit by Kuo Mo-Jo, the President 
of the CAS, who returned with the Chinese translation ofVavilov's Thirty Years of 
Soviet Science. In 1953, the CAS sent 26 scientists on a three-month mission to visit 
Soviet research institutes (Lindbeck, 1961). 
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Using Soviet Russia's system as a model, the CAS began to move its research out of 
state-owned industrial enterprises that did Uttle R&D at the time, and into national 
institutes ofresearch. However, it seems that the national innovation system transplanted 
from Soviet Russia did not meet China's expectations. As Guanzhao Zhou, then President 
of the CAS pointed out: 
The 123 institutions created since the 1950s suffer from many problems. They are 
overstaffed, weakened by serious inbreeding, c10sed to outsiders, and far less 
dynamic in both personnel and research than similar institutions abroad (1995: 
1153). 
China started the overhaul ofits innovation system in the early 1980s (Gu, 1999). The 
turning point was the 1985 National Working Conference of Science and Technology, 
during which Premier Minister Zhao Ziyang cast harsh criticism on the Chinese 
innovation system. Zhao also directed criticism towards CAS' s innovation system, in 
particular, since its research had little impact on the economy. In Zhao's words, "the 
[innovation] system can no longer accommodate the situation in the four modemization 
programs, which depend heavily on scientific and technological progress." He continued, 
"one of the glaring drawbacks of this system is the disconnection of science and 
technology from production" (Gu, 1999: 17). 
To overhaul the innovation system, Zhao first suggested weeding out bureaucratie 
administration in order to combine research with production: "if you want research 
institutes to serve the whole society, you must break down hurdles of all [bureaucratie] 
descriptions." Second, he suggested changing the current funding system of the research 
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institutes: "ifyou want the scientific personnel of the research institutes to voluntarily and 
regularly go to enterprises to identify research items, you must alter the funding system" 
(Gu, 1999: 18). 
Before long, Zhao's criticisms were crystallized into the 1985 Decision on the Reform of 
the Science and Technology System ("the Decision"). First, the Decision aimed at 
transforming public institutions from bureaucratic to professional organizations. Second, 
the Decision decreed that "funding for research institutes should be reformed." As a result 
ofthis mandate, the State cut the operating budgets ofCAS's institutions by 70%. Under 
the guidelines of the Decision, it was at the discretion of the CAS to undertake the 
commercialization oftechnological achievement to fill the financial gaps (Yu, 1999). 
Pressured by the State to finance itself, the CAS decided to adopt an institutional 
arrangement called "One Academy, Two Systems." The first system involved keeping "a 
small number of its research personnel in basic research." And the second system was 
designed to encourage most researchers "to seek outside support for applied research that 
directly benefits the economy and that meets market needs" (Cao, 2001: 38). 
The CAS decided to commercialize its research through spin-offs. By 1997, CAS' s 123 
institutes had created 900 spin-offs. In the 1990s, the distribution ofCAS's annual RMB 
1.4 billion (USD $175 million) income was as follows: 20% from the national 
government's budget allocation, 30% from contracts with national ministries, 30% from 
contracts with enterprises, and 20% from contracts with provincial and municipal 
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governments (IDRC and SCTC, 1997). Ofall CAS's spin-offs, Lenovo was the most 
successful one. 
5.1.1. 1984: The Founding of Lenovo 
Lenovo was started up by Chuanzhi Liu, Guangnan Ni, and other researchers at CAS' s 
ICT in 1984. Frustrated that his research output could not link to the market and inspired 
by Chunxian Chen (see Chapter 4), Liu decided that starting a business was his best 
option. As Liu put it, "Under a Soviet-style planned economy, there was very little 
interaction between research institutes and enterprises ... life was false!" (Sheff, 2002: 47) 
Liu invited Guangnan Ni to join his startup. Ni had just retumed to the CAS after several 
years as a visiting research officer at Canada's National Research Council in Ottawa. 
During his visit, Ni advanced his knowledge of micro computer and C language. Chuanzhi 
Liu and Guangnan Ni were regarded as ''the best partners in the Zhongguancun." It was 
publicly recognized that Ni was good at technology and Liu was good at management.28 
ln 2000, they were both voted as among the ten most influential people in China's IT 
industry in the 20th century. Liu was ranked at No. 4 and Ni at No. 5. 
The grassroots impetus of Liu and Ni matched the mission ofCAS's "One Academy, 
Two Systems" pro gram perfectly. In a 20-square-meter office, they founded Lenovo, then 
called "New Technology Development Company of the Computing Technology Institute 
of the Chinese Academy of Science." Besides a 20-square-meter office, ICT also gave 
28 Author's interview with Guangnan Ni, Beijing, 2003. 
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them USD $24,000 in startup capital that at that time was worth only ten IBM-XT 
personal computers.29 
5.1.2. Autonomy in Management 
Though Lenovo was founded as a spin-off subordinate to ICT, ICT decided to follow the 
industrial recipe in Zhongguancun. The startups in Zhongguancun were operated on four 
principles: self-financing, self-chosen partnership, self-operation, and self-responsibility 
for gains and losses (see Chapter 4). Upon its founding, Lenovo was granted a lot of 
autonomy to make its own management decisions. As Liu, then-CEO of Lenovo, said: 
[The CAS] did give me a very good opportunity. When 1 discussed terms and 
conditions, 1 requested the authority to make decisions myself. 1 didn't want the 
government to decide who would work for me. In addition, 1 had financial 
decision-making power. 1 could determine the wages and bonuses of our 
employees, and 1 didn't have to do so according to what the government told me 
(Gold et al., 2001: 74). 
5.1.3. Technology Transferred from ICT: The Legend Chinese Insertion Card 
ln addition to granting autonomy of management, ICT transferred 29 technological 
products to Lenovo. Of these technological products, the most crucial one was the Legend 
Chinese Insertion Card (LCIC). LCIC was a hardware that enabled users to type Chinese 
characters more efficiently. The main function of LCIC was "association." It enabled the 
word processing system to pop up Chinese characters that could be used to complete 
words more quickly. Take the word "computer (dian-nao)," for example. When users 
typed "dian," "nao," among other word endings, would immediately pop up, ready to be 
29 Author's interview with Guangnan Ni, Beijing, 2003. 
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selected. Users were given the option to choose a word ending, rather than to type the 
ending to finish dian-nao. Thus, with this new technology, it took fewer keystrokes to 
express a thought in Chinese. 
The technological knowledge embodied in LCIC had been accumulated at the CAS over a 
ten-year period. In 1968, researcher Yongxi Wan developed a monitor that could display 
256 Chinese characters for Computer 717, the first transistor computer in China. In 1974, 
Ni deve10ped a nascent version of the "association" typing system to input Chine se 
characters. In 1978, Ni' s invention matured into a 111 Chinese character information 
processing system. With the 111 System, users could input, code, save, display, and print 
Chinese characters. Later, in 1978, Ni and his colleagues pub1ished their research in the 
Chinese Journal ofComputers (Ni, 2004). 
Thanks to such previous technological accumulation, LCIC outperformed the earliest 
Chinese character-processing system, CCDOS, a product deve10ped by the SOE Great 
Wall Computer (see Chapter 6). The advantage of CCDOS was its low co st; its 
weaknesses were that it could process only 10 Chinese characters per second, it could 
display only ten Hnes of Chinese characters on screen at one time, and its data bank of 
Chinese characters consumed one-third of a computer's hardware resources. Moreover, 
CCDOS could not put Chine se characters on the screen directly, needing to first process 
Chine se characters through a BIOS system. In contrast, a computer with LCIC could 
process Chine se characters at the same speed as English, not consume any of a 
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computer' s hardware resources, and display Chinese characters directly on the screen 
without working through the BIOS. 
LCIC helped to solve one of the most critical bottlenecks of developing personal 
computers in the 1980s: processing Chinese characters on the computer, when most 
available operating systems were in English. The inability of users to use their first 
language was a serious hurdle in China's technological progress. It should be noted that 
while Westem languages use either alphabet or syllabic characters, Chinese language uses 
ideographic characters. In addition to the 128-ASCII character set widely accepted in 
Westem computers, the 4000 Chinese characters needed to be installed in Chinese 
computers for regular usage. An American mathematician visiting a computer installation 
in China in the late 1970s observed: "this is so far the only case known to me where the 
complexities of Chinese script may have a real effect on the progress of science" (Doar 
and Kelly, 1984: 158). 
Launched in 1985, LCIC was Lenovo's blockbuster product, selling at the price ofRMB 
4,000 (USD $500). In its first three years, it generated profits ofRMB 12 million (USD 
$1.5 million) and revenues ofRMB 34.7 million (USD $4.3 million). It accounted for 
nearly 45.6% and 38.1 % of Lenovo's profits and revenues, respectively. LCIC helped 
Lenovo' s sales grow at a rapid rate. In the first three years, the average growth rate of its 
sales was 500%. In ten years, the company shipped 160,000 LCICs before Microsoft 
launched the Chine se version of Windows 3.2 in 1995. In the first three years ofLCIC's 
life, Lenovo upgraded the hardware ofLCIC three times and its software seven times (Ni, 
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2001). In 1988, thanks to LCIC, Lenovo was awarded first prize for the State Award for 
Scientific & Technological Achievement. 
5.2. LATE 19808: GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE 
In 1987, the Chinese government charged that the price of Lenovo's LCIC violated price 
regulations. The State was more and more concemed about price stability because 
inflation rates in 1987 and 1988 were 8.8% and 20.7%, respectively. Inflation had 
accompanied the rapid growth of the economy since 1978 (Naughton, 1996). As a result, 
Lenovo was fined a hefty RMB 400,000 (USD $50,000) by the Bureau of Commodity 
Price of District Haidian in Beijing, amounting to a significant portion of the company's 
annual profit (Computer World, 2004). 
In 1988, Lenovo decided to conduct research on the application of LCIC to personal 
computers. At that time, there were three kinds of personal computers on the market: the 
PC-XT that was out offashion; the 286 PC that was the mainstream; and the 386 PC that 
was still under development. Upon examining aIl of the options, Lenovo's research team 
decided to develop its own 286 PC. 
After accomplishing this, the company decided to also manufacture this new model. 
However, the government rejected this decision. As Liu said: 
1 wanted Lenovo to make its own PCs because we were technology experts. But at 
the time, China was entirely a planned economy. The government wouldn't permit 
us to produce computers, because in China you had to have a license. The 
government felt that China had many [national] factories (Gold et al., 2001: 74). 
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Given the government's stance on the issue, Lenovo decided to manufacture its computer 
in Hong Kong. It set up Hong Kong Legend in 1988 and in late 1988 acquired a 
motherboard manufacturing company in Hong Kong, Quantum Design International 
(QDI). Soon after, Lenovo launched its Lenovo brand-named motherboard, becoming one 
of the first four indigenous firms to have the capacity to both design and manufacture 
motherboards. Through QDI, it was aiso able to set up an R&D team in Hong Kong, the 
only city in China where most the multinationals provided their own technological 
support and consulting (Lu, 2000). 
In 1990, the State discovered that Lenovo was importing illegal components and fined the 
company RMB 2 million (USD $250,000). In order to import key components, the 
company needed two Iicenses from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade: an import license (at that time, computers were among the forty-five items 
requiring an import license) and a foreign exchange license (Liu, 2000). However, 
because Lenovo was not an SOE, it was allowed neither. 
It was not tmtil the end of 1990 that the government officially recognized Lenovo. At the 
1989 World Computer Fair in Hanover, Germany, the Chinese delegation was so 
impressed by the computer Lenovo had developed. Later the government arranged 
officiaIs of the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEl) to travel to Hong Kong to 
thoroughly inspect Lenovo's R&D and manufacturing capability, and it turned out that 
the MEl was content with the quality of Lenovo product. In 1990, China's Central 
Planning Department granted Lenovo the licenses it needed to import parts to China. In 
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addition, Lenovo was recognized by the National Torch Program of National Science and 
Technology Ministry. After gaining recognition from the government, Lenovo launched 
its brand-name personal computer into the market. And, in 1992, thanks to the success of 
its personal computer, Lenovo once again won the first prize for the State Award for 
Scientific & Technological Achievement. Lenovo's personal computer was honoured as 
the best personal computer made in China (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
5.3. 1990S: THE CHINA-USA MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) 
In 1992, China and the USA entered into a comprehensive trade agreement by signing a 
MOU that lowered import tariffs (see Chapter 4). Lenovo's performance decreased as a 
result of the MOU. In 1993, Lenovo missed its annual shipping goal of 30,000 units by 
10%. This was the first time in Lenovo' s history that it did not achieve its goal. One 
Chinese media outlet was pretty pessimistic about Lenovo' s prospects, carrying the 
following headline: "How Much Longer Can Lenovo Fly the Flag ofChina's Computer 
Industry?" 
5.3.1. Lenovo's Reorganization 
In response to the MOU, Lenovo first underwent a re-organization. Previously, Lenovo 
had a functional organizational structure, with vice-presidents responsible for purchasing 
and marketing. However, Lenovo found that such organizational design contributed to 
coordination problems between different departments. 
Lenovo suffered from over-compartmentalization. Each functional department was too 
focused on its own goal, missing the big picture. For example, in 1993, there was a 
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conflict between the Purchasing Department and the Marketing Department. After the 
1992 MOU, the prices ofpersonal computer components dropped dramatically. Hence, 
the Purchasing Department was able to source components at 5% below budgeted priees. 
However, it did not inform the Marketing Department because it wanted to use it as a 
buffer against missed target goals. Thus, the Marketing Department maintained the 
original priees set before the MOU that were much higher than those of its competitors. 
As a result, Lenovo' s inventory turnover was only 1.7 times, while its competitors had an 
average of 5 to 6 times (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
In an effort to avoid future conflicts of interests between functional departments, Lenovo 
adopted a divisionalized organizational form. In 1994, it integrated its different 
departments into personal computer, peripheral equipment, networking device, software, 
terminaIs and power supply business units. Liu appointed Yuangqin Yang, then 29-year-
old, to lead the Personal Computer Business unit. The new division's interest was much 
more in line with Lenovo's overall corporate interest (Rukstad et al., 2001). 
Lenovo also restructured its incentive program. It initiated an option pro gram to provide 
employees with high-powered incentives to encourage them to contribute their skills and 
efforts in line with common goals. A 35% equity share was distributed to employees. The 
15 founders ofthe organization received 35% ofthat amount, and those who joined 
Lenovo after 1988 received a 20% share. The remaining 45% was shared among the key 
employees. Furthermore, 10% of the employees had stock options. As a result ofthese 
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changes, employees' interests began to align more closely with those of the company as a 
whole (Segal, 2003: 77). 
5.3.2. Restructuring the Distribution Channel 
In contemplating how to compete with the multinationals in the domestic market, Liu said: 
Multinational corporations are just like rabbits, while Chinese indigenous firms 
are more like turtles. In the race, if the rabbits have tremendous technologicallead 
and don't like to take naps, then the turtles need to do two things. First, the turtles 
need to learn from the rabbits and try to develop the genetics of rabbits inside 
themselves. Second, turtles should ask the rabbits to race in an environment in 
which the turtle might have a competitive advantage, like swamps (2002). 
From Lenovo's point ofview, the swamp was the distribution channel. Accordingly, 
following Liu's direction, Yan's first strategic decision was to restructure Lenovo's 
distribution channel. Eliminating Lenovo's direct sales and switching entirely to 
distributor sales was the first move in this direction. Before 1994, Lenovo relied on more 
than 100 sales representatives and several hundred local distributors. However, in 1994, 
Yang cut the sales force to only 18 people-just enough to run an efficient distributor 
network. At this time, Lenovo had no reputation with its distributors. Therefore, 
following the restructuring, the company made a considerable effort to develop a strong 
distribution channel. For example, most Chine se computer firms suffered from slow 
collection of receivables. In order to avoid this, Lenovo asked all distributors to pay cash 
up front initially. 
Lenovo also tried to tie most of its distributor incentives to cash collection history. It also 
tried to discipline corrupt distributors. As Yang stated, "corruption is quite common in the 
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business practice of sorne Chinese companies, but we would never tolerate such 
practices." Lenovo had "dismissed ... or even sent to court" those who had "disclos[ ed] 
confidential pricing information ... in exchange for a kickback." By 1996, Lenovo had 
3,000 distributors, while Lenovo's closest competitor did not achieve a 1,000-dealer 
network until2000 (Rukstad et al., 2001: 5). 
5.3.3. Going Public 
In order to raise more capital, Hong Kong Lenovo went public on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange in 1994. Twenty-five percent ofthe shares were issued to the public; 39% of 
the shares were controlled by Lenovo headquarters in Beijing; and 32% went into the 
hands of four key figures at China Technology, who helped Lenovo built its branch in 
Hong Kong. Lenovo's initial public offering raised HKD $200 million (USD $26 million), 
most ofwhich went to expanding Lenovo's manufacturing capacity (Lu, 2000: 93). 
5.3.4. Priee War 
After expanding its manufacturing capacity, Lenovo was aIl set to confront its foreign 
competitors and, in 1996, decided to initiate a price war. It exploited the opportunity that 
major computer components, including central processing units (CPUs) and DRAMs, 
were falling at a 25-30% annual rate. As Liu said: 
One of the main characteristic features of the personal computer industry was 
salient cost of key computer components. The cost of computer components 
accounted for 80% of the total costs. And the key components, like CPU and 
DRAM hard drive, accounted for 40% of aIl component costs ... and in 1996, the 
price ofDRAM fell from USD $16 to USD $2. Normally, one computer needs 
eight DRAM (Rukstad et al., 2001: 7). 
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Lenovo slashed its personal computer prices accordingly by 30% and was the first moyer 
to launch a personal computer with Intel's latest Pentium chip. Previously, the price of a 
foreign-brand personal computer was between USD $2,169 and USD $1,800, which was 
out of reach for the typical Chinese family. Now Lenovo was selling its personal 
computers for USD $1,161 with the slogan '"one family, one computer." China's one-
child-per-family population-control policy had fueled the home-computer boom. Chine se 
families highly regarded their children's education as a means to a bright future. Parents 
cheri shed the only child they had and wanted to give their offspring every possible 
advantage. A personal computer at home was a means to a better education for their 
children (China Business Information Network, 1996a). 
Domestic competitors quickly followed suit. However, because they did not undergo a 
reorganization and restructuring oftheir distribution channels as Lenovo did earlier, their 
margin was low. Lenovo had managed to reduce unit overhead of the product to about 
20% of total unit cost. Furthermore, its main domestic competitor, Great Wall Computer, 
faced quality problems (see Chapter 6). As a result, driving down the priee did not 
provide enough incentives for consumers. 
Unlike domestic competitors, foreign competitors did not follow Lenovo's suit. They held 
an attitude of "wait and see." As Yang said: 
Foreign companies probably thought that we were just desperate to c1ear out 
stocks and did not be1ieve that we could sustain at the lower prices for long, or 
they probably did not consider Lenovo a competitor at aIl at that point. Besides, 
foreign eompetitors still have to confront the issues of shipping eosts, 15% import 
tariffs, and 17% value-added taxes (Rukstad et al., 2001: 7). 
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As a result, Lenovo's price war was successful. In Yan's words, "we were quite confident 
about our cost analysis and the estimate about price trends on components in the global 
market." In early 1997, Lenovo started to capture the number-one spot in China's 
personal computer market. It sold almost 140,000 personal computers, with a 10.7% 
market share, ahead ofIBM's 7.5%. In 1995, before the price war, Lenovo ranked 
number 5 in the market, selling 75,728 personal computers with a market share of7% 
(Preston, 1996). 
5.3.5. Strategie Alliances with the Multinationals in the Market 
After the successful price war, Lenovo started forming strategic alliances with the 
multinationals at a relentless speed. In 1996, Lenovo partnered with the American 
Kingston Technology Corporation to install a special Kingston RAM product, enabling 
the most popular software to run smoothly and quickly (China Business Information 
Network, 1996c). In the same year, Lenovo partnered with Motorola, Apple, and IBM. 
Together, the four companies invested USD $15 million to develop a computer operating 
system based on the PowerPC chip (China Business Information Network, 1996d). 
In 1997, Lenovo formed a partnership with Hitachi to develop new concept desktop 
computers. The contract was signed on September 29, the 25th anniversary of the 
normalization ofSino-Japanese diplomatic relations. In the same year, Lenovo also 
partnered with Hewlett Packard. Together they developed HP Brio PC. Its potential target 
market was small- and medium-size companies (Wei, 1997). In 1998, Lenovo partnered 
with Computer Associates. They formed a USD $3 million joint venture, the purpose of 
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which was to create a software development tool that could compete with Microsoft's 
Visual C++. Each party owned 50% of the project (Roberts, 1999). 
In 1999, Lenovo partnered with Texas Instruments. They set up a digital signal 
processing laboratory in Beijing and jointly developed locally favored network products, 
including an asymmetric digital subscriber line, routers, voice over IP, and a high-end 
laser printer. In the same year, Lenovo also formed a partnership with Microsoft to co-
deve10p the handtop computer, Tianji, the price ofwhich was about USD $540 in China, 
$60 less than the price of3COM's Palm computer (Wang, 1999). In 2000, National 
Semiconductor cooperated with Lenovo to open a research laboratory. Each initially 
invested USD $120,000 in the laboratory (Liu, 2000). 
While Lenovo was gradually establishing itself in the market, serious conflicts erupted 
between Liu and Ni, the best partners in the Zhongguancun. Ni proposed to expand the 
research capacity of Lenovo, while Liu preferred to restructure distribution channels. It 
seemed that there was no room for compromise between them. As a result, Ni was 
discharged from the position of Chief Technology Officer in 1995, and the entire R&D 
team was dismissed. In 1996, Lenovo tried to rebuild its corporate R&D division; 
however, that effort ended up being dismissed in 1997 (Yan, 2002). Corporate R&D 
activity at Lenovo was basically discontinued between 1995 and 1998. In 1998, things 
started to change when the CAS launched its Knowledge Innovation Program. 
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5.4. 1998: CAS'S KNOWLEDGE INNOVATION PRO GRAM 
The CAS initiated the Knowiedge Innovation Program to further commercialize its 
research output. lt submitted a proposaI entitled "Striving to Build a National Innovation 
System to Meet the Era of a Knowledge-Based Economy" to the Party Central Committee 
and the State Council. In February 1998, this proposal was endorsed by Chinese President 
Jiang Zeming, who said: 
Both the knowledge-based economy and innovation consciousness are vital to the 
development of our country in the 21 st century ... The Chinese Academy of 
Science has made sorne proposaIs ... 1 think support should be given to the 
Academy to work out sorne pilot projects ... in an effort to build up our own 
innovation system (Chinese Academy of Science, 2003). 
At that time, according to the statistics from the Ministry of Science and Technology, 
only 5% of the 30,000 scientific research results achieved by 5,100 research institutes in 
China were commercialized. In this Knowledge Innovation Pro gram, the CAS wanted 
Lenovo to take over and manage the lnstitute's staff, patents, property, and equipment. In 
October 1998, ICT officially became a research arm of Lenovo. The Director onCT was 
also the Director of Lenovo's research institute, and Lenovo controlled 40% of the Board 
ofDirectors onCT. The Board of Directors appointed Dr. Gao Wen to be the Research 
Director. It also decided that 50% of the funds would go to the field of applied computer 
technology research, 30% would go to frontier scientific studies, and the last 20% would 
go to sorne basic studies (Institute of Computing Technology, 2005). 
In the process of consolidating ICT' s R&D resources, Lenovo laid off about 90% of its 
R&D staff. Only the top 100 researchers continued their projects. Each researcher had an 
annual budget ofRMB 200,000 (USD $25,000). Lenovo set up a second ICT to 
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accommodate some 640 semi-retired researchers. The second ICT was in charge ofICT's 
infrastructure that included human resource management, security, real estate, power 
supply, medical care, logistics, and transportation. It was also responsible for managing 
ICT's 14 spin-offs that were engaged in businesses that included networking, 
communication, information management, computer-aided· design, system integration, 
and power supply (Tang, 2001). By doing this, Liu hoped to counter the bureaucratie 
arrangement of the research institute. What emerged from this process was a more profit-
oriented ICT, in line with Lenovo's market performance goal. 
5.4.1. 1999: The Break between Lenovo and the leT 
Unfortunately, conflicts soon emerged between Lenovo and ICT. Though ICT was a 
subsidiary of Lenovo, its Director, Gao Wen, also wanted it to cooperate with other 
enterprises on its research in order to upgrade China's IT industry as a whole. But Lenovo 
wanted to appropriate the benefits of the research it had funded. At the core of this 
conflict was the fact that the CAS's role was different from the role of a private enterprise. 
It had "to explore the areas of technology that [would] be critical for the nation in the 
future" (Science, 1999: 1673). In 1999, Lenovo officially broke away from ICT. In 
October 1999, Dr. Gao Wen resigned, and ICT's Board of Directors appointed Dr. Guojie 
Li as ICT's Director. Becoming an independent entity once again, ICT would no longer 
be subordinate to Lenovo (Jiang, 2000). 
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5.4.2. 2000: Building the R&D Institute at Lenovo 
After the break with ICT, Lenovo appointed Zhiqiang He to build Lenovo's R&D 
institute. He previously worked with Ni on the development of LCIC when he joined 
Lenovo in 1986, after obtaining his Master's degree. In 1999, there were no Chinese 
enterprises that had corporate R&D institutes. Because there were no local examples to 
follow, in 2000, He and other Lenovo key researchers flew to the USA twice to visit other 
companies to see how they ran their corporate R&D institutes. 
After the visits, he had sorne musings on how Lenovo should build its R&D institute. In a 
letter to the top management, he argued that Lenovo needed to overcome four hurdles: 
"First, the financial input to the R&D should be constant. Second, there was a hurdle 
regarding commercializing technology. In Lenovo history, once the research was finished, 
it was only put on the shelf. Ifit did not perform weIl, we did not even look into it." He 
continued, ''third, the Chief Technology Qfficer did not evaluate the R&D proposals 
carefully. As a result, there was no linkage between R&D and corporate strategy. Fourth, 
Lenovo needed high-calibre researchers" (Sun, 2001). He criticized the engineers at 
Lenovo for lacking a clear vision for how industrial research could contribute to the 
company's bottom line. He wanted the output of the R&D institute to be linked to 
Lenovo's overaIl corporate strategy. 
Based on He's analysis, Lenovo constructed a two-tier R&D system. The first tier was at 
the division level. Each business division had its own department of R&D that focused on 
commercialization. The second tier was at the corporate level, which focused on 
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developing research and design capacities. Lenovo wanted its R&D personnel at the 
corporate level to take time to research without feeling the pressure of the market. 
Lenovo' s research institutes at the corporate level included: Lenovo Research Institute 
(buitt in 1999), Software Design Center (built in 2001), Industrial Design Center (buitt in 
2001), and Motherboard Design Center (built in 2002).30 
Lenovo adopted two approaches to facilitate the linkages between the business division 
and corporate R&D. First, every R&D institute lab had a staff responsible for technical 
marketing. This staffwould analyze the potential markets ofthè technology, bringing a 
marketing perspective to the formulation of R&D projects. Second, when each business 
division tried to commercialize the corporate-Ievel R&D, Lenovo transferred not only the 
technology, but also the technicians to the business division.31 
5.4.3. 2000: Tian Xi Computer 
ln 1999, Lenovo invested RMB 12 million (USD $1.45 million) to develop the Tian Xi 
computer, the first blockbuster product to roll out of Lenovo's R&D Institute and the first 
computer in China designed to facititate access to the Internet. China started its 
development of an Internet network in 1987. In the following decade, three institutions 
were responsible for the construction of networks in China. The State Education 
Commission constructed the China Education and Research Network, the CAS 
.constructed the CST net, and the Ministry ofPosts and Telecommunications (MPT) 
30 Author's interview with engineers at Lenovo, Beijing, 2003. 
31 Author's interview with engineers at Lenovo, Beijing, 2003. 
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constructed ChinaNET, the major player in China's network business. Under the 
leadership of China Telecom, ChinaNET offered Internet service in sorne 230 cities and 
controlled nearly 70% of China's connection capacity (Harwit, 2004). 
In the past, in order to go online, Chine se users first needed to line up at the post office to 
apply for an account. Then they needed to install their modem and relevant software. 
After connecting to the telephone line, users could surf online. Tian Xi computer was 
Lenovo's creative response to the above cumbersome situation. Working with ChinaNET, 
Lenovo preloaded Tian Xi computer with an Internet connection. By simply hitting a 
single button and registering an account name, users could enjoy one year of free Internet. 
Tian Xi computer had 42 patents and generated RMB 3.7 billion (USD $450 million) 
alone in patent licensing in 2000. The market shares in China of Lenovo, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, and Compaq were 27.3%, 6.2%, 6.1 %, and 2.9%, respectively. Meanwhile 
the Internet population in China grew exponentially: 80,000 in 1996,2.1 million in 1998, 
8.9 million in 1999, and 22.5 million in 2000 (Bickers, 2000). 
5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In 1990, Redding wrote the following in the Spirit ofChinese Capitalism: 
The first professionally managed and publicly owned Chinese multinational is still 
waiting somewhere in the shadows, and may, in any case, be a fantasy ofminds 
which assume all enterprises contain the same essential dynamics, and are not 
really cultural artifacts (1990: 176). 
Instead of waiting in the shadows, Lenovo moved into the global spotlight. It would have 
stretched the imagination in the early 1990s to envision that an indigenous Chine se 
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computer company would someday acquire IBM's Persona! Computer division for USD 
$1.25 billion (Bulkeley, 2004). The following examines how Lenovo established itselfin 
the computer industry in the Chinese economie-cultural context. 
5.5.1. The Social Sector 
The social sector played a key role in Lenovo's founding. Lenovo's organizational 
capability was developed through the technology transferred from the CAS. As Chandler 
noted, organizational capabilities are "created during the knowledge-acquiring processes 
that are always involved in commercializing a new product" (1992: 84). After 
successfully commercializing the technology of LCIC, Lenovo proceeded with a 
"progressive exploitation of latent economies of scale" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 259) to 
advance LCIC's technological frontier. Consequently, LCIC was the dominant design 
(Utterback, 1994)32 for Chinese characters representation in personal computers before 
being displaced by a substitute, the Microsoft Chine se version of Window 3.2. 
5.5.2. The State 
The state loomed large in Lenovo's early stage operation. The Chine se government was 
the main source of the entry barrier to the domestic computer industry. When a target 
industry became active, the state could use its regulatory power to limit the number of 
firms competing in that industry. Porter wrote, "government can limit or even foreclose 
entry into industries with such controls as licensing requirements and limits on access to 
32 Dominant design in the market is a product "that wins the al1egian~e of the marketplace" (Utterback, 
1994:24). 
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raw materials" (1980: 13). The purpose is to increase economies of scale that could be 
enjoyed by state-supported enterprises and to alleviate overcapacity in the industry 
(Doner, 1992). 
As one of a handful of non-state-owned pioneering enterprises initiated by scientists at 
the CAS in the early stage of economic reform, Lenovo was a stepchild in the eyes of the 
government. Aldrich and Fiol (1994) argued that one of the main hurdles for 
entrepreneurs is their lack oflegitimacy. Because there are few predecessors before them, 
their risky undertakings are not easily appreciated by other people and consequently, 
"new organizations are always vulnerable to the liabilities ofnewness" (1994: 663). To 
paraphrase Aldrich and Fiol, it could be argued that Lenovo was subjected to the liability 
of non-state-ownership. 
Not permitted to build a factory in Beijing, I:enovo turned to Hong Kong where it 
acquired a motherboard company that subsequently developed its superior technological 
capabilities in that field. Eventually in 1989, the Chinese government recognized Lenovo 
due to its high quality computers. As Schon argues, "the opportunity for learning is 
primarily ... at the periphery, not in the nexus of official policies at the center." He 
continues that the "center's role is to detect significant shifts at the periphery, to pay 
explicit attention to the emergence" of winners (1971: 177-8). 
Furthermore, Lenovo' s experience of engaging in the motherboard business pointed to a 
new pattern of entrepreneurial Ïnvestment: an emergentinvestment due to the 
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government's blocking their target business. It can be juxtaposed to two other kinds of 
entrepreneurial investments identified by Hirschman (1958) in The Strategy of Economie 
Development: autonomous investments that purely spring out of entrepreneurial initiative, 
and induced investments that respond to the rising demand in the market. 
5.5.3. The Markee3 
As elsewhere, the multinationals in the market brought a "perennial gale of creative 
destruction" to the Chinese computer industry (Schumpeter, 1942: 84). For example, the 
Chinese version of Windows 3.2, launched in 1995, wiped Lenovo's blockbuster LCIC 
out of the market. Nevertheless, Lenovo gradually established itselfin the domestic 
market, surviving both the loss of the LCIC product and the effect of the 1992 MOU that 
reduced the trade tariff. 
Economist Krueger (1980) once argued, ''trade policy [is] an input to deve1opment," 
maintaining that opening the domestic market to international competition could trigger 
the emergence of indigenous entrepreneurship, bringing about technical change and 
fostering economies of scale for local firms. However, the case here shows that the 
opposite-"development is an input to trade policy"-may be true. As Wade observed, 
33 In neoclassical economic development theories, market is associated with competition; therefore, this 
thesis uses multinationals, which bring tierce competition to the emerging economies, as a surrogate for the 
abstract notion market. 
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the Chine se govemment "constrained their trade liberalization" for the sake of developing 
the "capacities of domestic firms to compete against imports" (2003: 631).34 
After exposure to the international competition, Lenovo explored technologically related 
areas by building strategie alliances with multinationals to tap into their knowledge pool. 
Through such cooperative relationships, Lenovo could receive "vital technological and 
organizational training" to boost its "leaming capacity." It should be noted that the 
cooperative relationship between Lenovo and its foreign partners was "hierarchical," due 
to the disparity in technological capability (Zhou and Xin, 2003: 129). Though the 
relationships between Lenovo and the multinationals were hierarchical, they were 
interdependent as weIl: just as the local entrepreneurs needed the multinational s, the latter 
also depended on the former and would have been less competitive without such 
connections in the host country (Evans, 1979). 
The next chapter presents the case of Great Wall, an SOE in the personal computer 
industry. Contrary to the case ofLenovo, in its formative years, Great Wall received 
favorable treatment from the govemment. Similar to Lenovo, Great Wall built up 
strategie alliances with multinationals after the 1992 MOU. Nevertheless, Great Wall's 
performance differed from Lenovo. 
34 The finding here also supports Wade's research on the growth of East Asia: "The observed sequences in 
East Asia better fit the hypothesis that 'as countries grow richer they liberalize trade' rather than the 
hypothesis that 'trade liberalization propels countries to become richer'" (2005: 104). 
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CHAPTER6 
THE GREAT WALL COMPUTER 
This chapter presents the birth, the growth and the decline of Great Wall Computer, based 
in Beijing China. Founded in 1986, Great Wall Computer was an SOE in China's 
personal computer industry. After a brief description of China's Sixth Five-Year Plan 
(1981-1985), this chapter tracks the key strategie decisions and their contexts along the 
history of Great Wall. The chapter conc1udes with sorne remarks about how the state 
influenced the development of Great Wall. 
6.1. THE SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN (1981-1985) 
In the late 1970s, China possessed little modem computer technology, and most 
computers were imported from the Eastern bloc. At that time, it was estimated that there 
were 1,500 computers installed nationwide. They were low-speed data processors 
composed oflow-end and outdated vacuum tube technology that normally took up the 
space of entire rooms (Hui and McKown, 1993: 14). Most ofthem were used for 
computing numerical data in laboratories; a few were used for industrial manufacturing 
control in the defense sector (Baum, 1982). Sorne American computer scientists who 
visited China and saw computers used there conc1uded that China's computer technology 
was lagging behind current American technology by 15 years (Maier, 1980: 863). 
Anxious to catch up, the State Administration of Computer Industry (SACI) was 
established in 1979. It soon held the First National Meeting of Planning for Computer 
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Industry to review the experiences of over two decades of researching and developing 
computer technology. Based on the suggestions of SACI, the Chinese government 
incorporated developing the indigenous computer industry into the Sixth Five-Y ear Plan 
issued in 1981. The objective was to build up the technological autonomy so as to avoid 
dependence on Western technology. To achieve this goal, China first sought to attract 
foreign investment and technology, with which it would develop its own mass-production 
facilities (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). 
Soon after in 1984, IBM approached the SACI for cooperation and contacted Zhi Wang, 
then Deputy Director, who later abandoned his civil service career to start up the Great 
Wall Computer. Born in 1942, Wang was son ofthen Vice-President Wang Zhen. In the 
period 1979 to 1986, he worked at the SACI as Vice General Engineer and then as 
Deputy Director. 
Upon hearing that IBM was looking for cooperation, Wang was quite surprised. He said: 
We know that IBM seldom formedjoint ventures with local firms. People know 
that IBM' s proprietary technology was closed to outsiders. 1 tried to figure out 
why IBM approached us. 1 think probably b~cause at that time China just opened 
its market to the world and IBM tried to form a new image in China (Yang, 2000). 
During the negotiation with IBM, Wang and his colleagues brought IBM representatives 
to visit several state-owned electronics factories located in Southern China. In turn, Wang 
also had chance to visit IBM Japan. After the visit, Wang said: 
We leamed that IBM Japan conducted business differently. Product development 
was done in-house. Production was outsourced to several Japanese companies. 
The company only controlled marketing and distribution. Sucha model is very 
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successful and quite revealing to us. We thought that we could certainly copy this 
business model (Lu, 2000: 152). 
However, the negotiation for joint venture just did not go well, because IBM did not want 
to transfer their technological expertise without guarantee of substantive returns, while 
China single-mindedly sought foreign investment and technology without taking IBM's 
concems into consideration (Hui and McKown, 1993). How to share profits was another 
issue. As Wang recalled the negotiation process with IBM: 
The negotiation was a detailed and painstaking process. At the center was how to 
divide the profits. You had to go step by step though each of the stages of the 
value chain to see each partner' s contributions. So we went through each and 
every aspect of the business process, including R&D, purchasing, production and 
marketing. This way we leamed how IBM organized its business. It was the first 
time we leamed first-hand that there were different ways of organizing a business 
(Lu, 2000: 152). 
Meanwhile, in 1982, the three-year-old the SACI was merged into the Ministry of 
Electronics Industry (MEl) that had been formerly called the Fourth Ministry of Machine 
Industry. Supervising four departments: broadcasting, radar and navigation, electronic 
devices and components, and computers, MEl owned 216 computer factories, 36 of 
which were facilities related to manufacturing computer components (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1987). 
In February 1983, the MEl held the National Coordination Conference on computer 
development in China. At the Conference, impelled by the spread of a worldwide 
revolution in personal computers, Chinese experts reached a consensus that China should 
catch up quickly to manufacture IBM compatible computers. Accordingly, the Chine se 
officiaIs gave an order that China should develop its first IBM-compatible computer 
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before the National Exhibition ofComputers to be held in August, 1983 (pC World, 
2005). 
However, most computer experts thought it would be very hard to reach this goal. The 
main hurdle to building up IBM-compatible computers was to develop a Chine se version 
of DOS. Since more than 100 universities and research institutes that attended the 
National Coordination Conference did not have confidence in undertaking this R&D 
project, the responsibility to develop an IBM-compatible Chinese computer fell on the 
MEL 
Yuanchao Yan, an assistant engineer working in the MEl, volunteered to take on the hard 
task. Born in 1951, Yan had no formaI training in computer science due to the Cultural 
Revolution. In 1968, then 17:..year-old Yan was sent to Inner Mongolia to take part in 
farming. After the Cultural Revolution, he took sorne basic courses in electronics at the 
Huazhong Institute of Engineering. When starting his career in MEl in 1979, he knew just 
a few things about computers and he tried to absorb computer knowledge by himself 
(World Executive Network, 2004). Yan had confidence he could develop the Chinese 
version of DOS, because previously he had experience in successfully displaying Chine se 
characters on computer monitors. Besides, he wanted to get himself promoted via this 
opportunity because he was concerned about his low status in the MEl (World Executive 
Network, 2004). 
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In developing the Chinese version of DOS, with a budget ofRMB 300,000 (USD 
$37,500), Yan led a development team composed of four engineers with undergraduate 
degrees, three undergraduate students, and one technical college student (Ji, 2001). At 
that time, there was only one IBM personal computer available at the MEL And due to 
the policy at MEl, Yan was only able to access that computer two hours per week. After 
negotiating with his supervisor, he was granted the monopolized use ofthat computer 
(World Executive Network, 2004). 
However, upon moving the only IBM personal computer to his laboratory, one assistant 
rushed to operate the llO-voltage IBM computer on the 220-voltage power supply. This 
imprudent action that seemed to almost destroy the computer upset Yang at that moment. 
Fortunately, after careful scrutiny of the computer's hardware, it tumed out that only the 
power supply was ruined, and Yan tried to get another power supply imported from Hong 
Kong (World Executive Network, 2004). 
In May 1983, Yan successfully demonstrated his initial outcome, managing to show two 
Chine se characters on the computer screen by writing computer programs. Yan's 
approach was quite different from other computer experts in China who were trying to 
display Chinese characters on computer screen by adding new hardware. After this 
encouraging initial demonstration, Yan and his team devoted all their time to writing the 
computer pro gram that could run a Chine se version of DOS (World Executive Network, 
2004). 
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6.1.1. 1983: The Birth of the 0520 CH, the First Chinese Computer 
On June 30 1983, four months after this project was launched, Yan and his research team 
fini shed writing the computer program and they called the pro gram Chang Cheng DOS 
(CCDOS).35 With CCDOS, they helped build China's first Chinese computer, the 0520 
CH. As the first indigenously developed personal computer that could be commercialized 
and manufactured on a large scale, the 0520 CH was regarded as the hope ofChina's IT 
industry. In October, Yan brought the Chinese computer installed with CCDOS to the 
International Telecommunication Exhibition held in Geneva. This was the first time that 
China's indigenously developed computer was exhibited on the international stage (World 
Executive Network, 2004). 
Afterwards, as requested by the Beijing Zhong Nan Hai, Chinese White House, Yan and 
his R&D team also successfully expanded the functions of the 0520 CH to print 
documents in Chinese characters. Later, thanks to his technological accomplishment of 
CCDOS, Yan was awarded the second prize for the State Award for Scientific & 
Technological Achievement (World Executive Network, 2004). 
After Yan and his team successfully developed the CCDOS, copycats entered the market. 
However, Yan was not concerned about other people pirating his innovation. Instead, he 
said: "At any rate, 1 worked for the nation. If my intellectual product was good for 
35 In Chinese, Chang Cheng means the Great Wall. 
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everyone, then 1 should not have protected others from using my brain child" (World 
Executive Network, 2004). 
Compared to other research projects undertaken at the governmentallaboratories, Yan's 
successful development of the Chine se computer 0520 CH was exceptional. Normally, to 
initiate a new research project, researchers needed to get it listed in the government 
economic plans and it would take months to complete this process. Then it would require 
another couple of months, if not years, for government to allocate funds through several 
hierarchies ofbudgetary authorization (Lu, 2000). 
At that time, the Chinese authorities gradually came to recognize that "the Achilles heel 
ofChina's S&T system [hadJ been in the transfer ofresearch to production." They also 
noticed that "a combination of entrepreneurial talent and market stimuli" was key in the 
West's postwar development success, especially in Silicon Valley (Simon, 1989: 623). As 
Zhi Wang said: 
By 1984, we realized that the existing way of organizing the industry had reached 
a dead end. We had to find new ways, but none of us had any experience in this. 
Since there was not an existing model to follow in the country, we had to explore 
(Xu and Zhan, 1990: 13). 
6.1.2. 1986: The Founding of Great Wall 
Accordingly, in 1986, Zhi Wang decided to commercialize Computer 0520 CH by 
starting up Great Wall Computer Corporation so as to bring together the research and 
production. The initial idea of founding Great Wall was to build an industrial 
conglomerate, a Chine se version of Japan's keiretsu or South Korea's chaebols. 
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Employing about 50,000 workers, 15,000 ofwhich were engineers and technicians, Great 
Wall was composed of58 existing SOEs, 5 universities and 4 R&D institutes (Kennedy, 
1997). 
Great Wall had five branch companies located in five provinces. Its wholly owned 
subsidiaries included Shenzhen Aihua Electronics, Great Wall Microcomputer 
Development, Longxing Corporation, Kunlun Electronic Publishing Equipment, Northem 
CAD, Computer Exhibition and Advertisement, Guiling Training Center, and the China 
Great Wall Finance. Great Wall also had subsidiaries with controlling shares including 
China Computer Leasing, Huabei Computer Terminal Equipment, Huaming Electronic 
Industrial Real-Estate, Southem Information Enterprises, and Yantai Training Center. It 
also had a number of associated companies through holding minority stakes, including 
Baxian Plastic Center, Kaifa Keji, China HP. Moreover, MEl had tried to bring together 
the Great Wall, the China computer System Engineering Corporation, the China 
Computer Service Corporation, the Beijing Number Three Computer Manufacturing 
Factory, and the Hunan Huaihua Jiannan Machinery Factory (Lu, 2000: 157). 
The government hoped that Great Wall could trigger technological transformation of 
China's computer industry. As the brochure of the Great Wall read: 
The computer industry is a newly established industry attracting worldwide 
attention. It would have been a great pit y for the Chinese people if they could not 
have a share in this area or could not have one or more oftheir own famous brand-
name products (Lu, 2000: 150). 
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6.2. THE SEVENTH FlVE-YEAR PLAN (1986-1990) 
The founding of the Great Wall was in line with China's Seventh Five-Year Plan that 
called for the accumulated development ofhigh-technology industry, especially industries 
of computers and electronics. China intended to upgrade most of itstechnological 
industries as soon as possible because at that time, it was estimated that only 20% of the 
industries in China could measure up to minimum requirements of developed countries, 
while the other 60% were so obsolete that they needed replacement. This technological 
lag could partially explain the wide gap between China and developed countries in 
economic efficiency and productivity (China Dai/y, 1985). 
In order to catch up, starting in 1986, the State Council had been allocating financial 
resources to the integrated circuit, computer hardware and software industries. In the 
. following 14 years, the state had put RMB 180 million (USD $22.5 million) in 514 
projects and RMB 20 million (USD $2.5 million) in 9 SOEs individually. The Chinese 
government allocated RMB 3 million (USD $375,000) to the Great Wall as initial capital 
(Xiao, 2000). 
Under the Seventh Five-Year Plan, Great Wall along with other SOEs in high-technology 
industries enjoyed the following preferential policies: they were not required to pay 
product taxes and import taxes on sorne key electronics components, and just needed to 
pay only half of the income tax. As a result, in its formative years from 1987 to 1989, 
Great Wall received a net ofRMB 57.5 million (USD $7.2 million) that was available for 
investment (Lu, 2000). 
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Furthermore, the state allowed Great Wall to take apre-tax charge equivalent to 10% of 
sales revenue for R&D expenditures so that Great Wall could have more abundant 
resources to fund its R&D on new products (Lu, 2000: 160). This policy of state 
subsidized R&D significantly supported Great Wall Computer' s continuous product 
upgrades. In the period of 1986-1990, Great Wall' s spent RMB 47.2 million (USD $5.9 
million) on R&D (Lu, 2000: 161). Another related industrial policy was tax concession. 
In the period of 1987 to 1989, Great Wall saved RMB 33.9 million (USD $4.2 million) in 
value-added taxes and RMB 36.9 million (USD $4.6 million) in income taxes (Lu, 2000: 
160-161). It should be noted that the aforementioned preferential policies were 
discontinued in 1994 when China reformed its tax policies. 
In 1990, the last year of the Seventh Five-Y ear Plan (1986-1990), the Chinese 
government spent more than RMB 40 billion (USD $5 billion) in upgrading electronics 
manufacturing facilities, accounting for 6.3% of an funds invested in Chine se industry. 
Great Wall received RMB 900 million (USD $191.1 million) from the state in order to 
concentrate the production of computers to squeeze out its competitors. The Chinese 
electronics and computer industry suffered from duplicate production that made each 
factory unable to achieve economies of scale (Simon, 1992). Therefore, the Chinese 
government sought to consolidate its manufacturing resources in key enterprises. 
Under those preferential policies, Great Walliaunched many innovative products in the 
Chine se computer market in the second half of the 1980s. In 1987, Great Walliaunched 
China's first 286 computer with production of 20,000 units in that year. In 1988, two 
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years after Compaq introduced the first 386-bit computer in the world, Great Wall 
launched China's first 386-bit computer in eight main cities. In 1990, Great Wall 
launched China's frrst 486 microprocessor GW486/25, in which it developed China's first 
integrated circuit to process Chinese characters (Zhao, 2001). By the late 1980s, Great 
Wall had become·China's largest domestic computer company, with a market share of 
11.2%, while Lenovo's was 6.5% (Brauchli, 1994). 
However, Great Wall was required by the government to use at least 75% domestic parts 
to manufacture its computers (Rukstad et al., 2001). The goal of such a local content rule 
was "strengthening national firms, and enhancing technological skills" in the upstream 
industries (Amsden, 2001: 154). It would require "a high level of expertise ... on the part 
of government bureaucrats to choose specific parts an<;l components correctly" (Amsden, 
2001: 153). However, given China's computer technology was significantly lagging 
behind the West, it was very doubtful that MEl had highly competent technocrats with 
sufficient computer knowledge to fulfill this mission. 
Moreover, the MEl licensed only a few SOEs to manufacture key components for the 
Great Wall. Those factories were operated as quasi-monopolies in each segment, 
therefore their products had low quality. For example, in 1985, only 25% of electronic 
products were classified by the State Planning Commission as "high quality" (Simon, 
1992:23) 
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Great Wall experimented with China' s first domestically made computer components and 
parts. Such mandatory policy brought quality problems to Great Wall. As Wang said: 
By the end of the 1980s, we did not have quality computers because Great Wall 
computer used China's first motherboard, first hard disk, first soft disk, first 
expansion slots, etc. If we do not use domestically manufactured computer 
components and peripherals, we would not be able to get a manufacturing license. 
As a result, the quality of Great Wall Computer has an inbom problem (Chinese 
Business Online, 2004). 
In 1989, the National Product Quality Inspection Center undertook an investigation into 
the quality of computers manufactured by Great Wall. It found that there were 17 hard-
drive defects and 3 floppy-drive defects on Great Wall's computers, and as a result, the 
quality of Great Wall's personal computers ranked the lowest among major domestic 
personal computer vendors. Commenting on this embarrassing experience, one manager 
lamented: "It was obvious that the manufacturing quality problems were coming from the 
suppliers of the hard drive and floppy drives. But Great Wall as the system integrator got 
all the blame" (Lu, 2000: 162). Due to this problem, though Great Wall had annual 
production capacity of more than 30,000 personal computers, only half of production 
capacity was sold (Lu, 2000). 
6.3. THE EIGHTH FlVE-YEAR PLAN (1991-1995) 
In 1991, China carried out the Eighth Five-Y ear Plan that aimed to build up the 
semiconductor industries, a key component in the computer. By the end of 1980s, China 
had been suffering from a shortage of integrated circuits. On average China consumed 
sorne 350 million to 400 million integrated circuits each year to produce electronic and 
computer-related products and only one-third of the required amount was domestically 
produced. Furthermore, it was estimated that China' s semiconductor technology was 
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lagging behind the West by at least 5-10 years due to its outmoded factories. Under the 
Eighth Five-Y ear Plan, China specified four sectors to receive preferential policies: 
integrated-circuit production, computer production, computer software development, and 
program-controlled telephone switching (Simon, 1992). 
Great Wall Computer submitted a proposaI for a major investment project in response to 
the National Eighth Five-Year Plan, asking for governmentalloans to build new 
production facilities with annual production capacity of 200, 000 personal computers and 
50,000 high-resolution monitors. With investment ofRMB 287 million (USD $36 
million), the total construction area was 50,468-square meters. Moreover, it also sought to 
add the design capacity of application specific integrated circuit chips onto its R&D 
facilities (Lu, 2000). 
6.3.1. 1993: The Golden Project 
Great Wall also participated in the state's Golden Project initiated in 1993 that aimed to 
build China's telecommunication and information infrastructure. Since the early 1990s, 
the Chine se government had been concemed that the lack of information infrastructure 
would be detrimental to China's economic development. At that time, 3 out of every 100 
residents had access to a telephone, and only 1 out of 400 had computer access (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1987). The Minister of the Ministry ofPosts and 
Telecommunications (MPT), Wu Jichuan, once said: 
insufficiency in telecommunications capacity and shortage of services have been a 
major factor affecting China's opening up to the outside world and restricting 
China's economic growth (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 1999: 2). 
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In the early 1990s, however, it was the Minister of Electronics Industry, Hu Qili, who 
proposed the Golden Project to the Chinese leadership. His proposai soon gained support 
from high-ranking Chinese officiaIs. By the end of 1993, a high-Ievel committee called 
Joint Committee of National Economic Informatization under the State Council was 
formed to promote and coordinate the Golden Projects (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 
1999:16). 
Under the Golden Project, the Chinese government spent USD $200 billion to construct 
the information infrastructure. It hoped to accomplish the following goals by 2020. First, 
China would have a broadband telecommunications network that would be capable of 
delivering over 1 million telephone channels and 10,000 TV channel s, and facilitating the 
connections arnong business, government and home users. Second, based on the 
foundation of the Golden Project, China would build an information processing and 
services industry through which aIl sectors of the national economy could be connected. 
Third, China hoped eventually it could grow industries that could manufacture 
communications and information equipment (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 1999: 1) 
In the Golden Project, Great Wall was engaging in the "Golden Card" and "Golden Tax." 
Golden Card was an electronic money project and its goal was to use the national 
information infrastructure laid by the Golden Project to replace cash transactions with an 
electronic transaction. Once the Golden Card was installed, Chinese people could use 
credit and debit cards to process their payments, savings and withdrawals. It was hoped 
that once the Gold Card was completed in the next 10 years, 200 million credit cards 
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would be used by 300 million people across 40 main cities in Mainland China (Lovelock 
and Farhoomand, 1999: 15). Golden Tax was a project to computerize China's tax 
collection system, enabling the Tax Bureau to have direct access to financial and 
accounting data of Chine se firms. Based on the foundation of Golden Tax, the Tax 
Bureau could establish a standard tax management information system to reduce the 
amount ofuncollected taxes (Lovelock and Farhoomand, 1999: 21). 
At this stage, as China's economy in transition to a socialist market economy, Great Wall 
relied on the revenues generated from the projects commissioned by the government 
rather than financial subsidies. For example, in 1994, Great Wall won contracts that 
brought total revenue ofRMB 197 million (USD $24.6 million) from the Golden Projects 
(Lu, 2000). Meanwhile, the Chinese government also encouraged Great Wall to raise 
capital for itself. In 1997, Great Wall went public on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
raising a total of RMB 649 million (USD $81 million) from its initial public offering 
(Lazonick, 2004). 
6.4.1992: ENTER THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
At the beginning of the 1990s, China decided to abandon its goal of self-reliance and 
instead switched to importing high-end computers like mainframes and minicomputers. In 
1992, China and the USA entered into the comprehensive trade agreements via its MOU 
that reduced tariffs. In response to the MOU, Great Wall decided to cooperate with 
multinationals. As Wang remarked on the need for strategic alliances at a company 
planning meeting in October 1992: 
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In the past, we thought we could rely on ourselves to conquer the world given our 
products and capabilities. Five years have now passed and how have we fared? 
We thought we could at least make it in the lower end of the high-tech product 
spectrum. We have not even made breakthroughs in that area. Now, we should 
seek to shorten the gaps in product development, production management and 
marketing through strategie alliances with foreign companies (Lu, 2000: 164). 
As an SOE, Great Wall had good connections with the government and foreign firms 
were very willing to build good relationships with the Chinese government. Furthermore, 
Great Wall's strategy offorming strategie alliances with multinationals was encouraged 
by the government. Yuan Sutai, official of MEl said: 
The purpose of any joint venture, or even a wholly owned [by foreigners] 
investment, is to allow Chine se companies to learn from foreign companies ... We 
want them to bring their technology to the soil of the People' s Republic of China 
(Hamilton, 1995). 
6.4.1. 1994: Strategie Alliances with IBM 
As we have seen earlier, the first foreign partner that Great Wall tried to work with was 
IBM. However, it was not until1994 that IBM had its firstjoint venture with Great Wall. 
Over the years of trying to promote its business in the Chinese computer market, IBM 
gradually found out that one of the bottlenecks was a lack of local distribution channel s, 
and it realized that without partnering with a Chinese firm, it would be hard to expand its 
business in China. At that time, IBM sold about 6,000 computers annually in China, while 
Great Wall sold about 20,000. 
Therefore, IBM turned to Great Wall for partnership. This time the key issue of the 
negotiation between Great Wall and IBM was which should hold the majority share. 
Wang said: 
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IBM asked to hold 51 % stakes, and we at Great Wall also wanted to hold 51 % 
stakes. For this issue, the negotiation went nowhere for six months. Finally IBM 
persuaded us by two reasons. First, if IBM held the majority of the stakes, then the 
joint venture could use the IBM's intellectual property. Second, the joint venture 
could purchase the computer components from IBM at lower prices (Yang, 2000). 
The first joint venture was the International Information Products in Shenzhen. IBM 
owned 51 % and Great Wall owned 49%. They jointly set out two production lines to 
manufacture desktop computers. It manufactured personal computers for IBM and Great 
Wall for the domestic and overseas markets (Hamilton, 1995). In 1995, Great Wall and 
IBM invested USD $1.3 billion to form another joint venture: Shenzhen GKI Electronics 
in Shenzhen. With IBM holding 60% ofthe equity stakes and Great Wall 25%, GKI 
engaged in the business of circuit board development, design, assembling, testing and 
relevant consulting services (China Daily, 1995). Meanwhile, in the same year, IBM also 
founded the IBM China Research Lab in Beijing to develop products, like speech 
recognition software, to serve the needs ofChinese markets (Gelb, 1997). 
In 1997, IBM and Great Wall invested USD $76.85 million to form theirthirdjoint 
venture: Hailiang Storage Product Co. IBM held 80% of the equity and the Great Wall 
held the rest (Holman, 1997). The main product of Hailiang Storage Product was hard 
disk drives. With the technology transfer from IBM, the production of the magnetic head, 
a key component of the hard disk drives, later was ranked third globally with a 15% 
market share (Wei, 1998). In 1999, IBM had its fourthjoint venture with Great Wall: 
IBM Leasing. It was located in Shanghai and it had USD $20 million in registered capital. 
IBM held an 80% stake while Great Wall had the rest. It was the first foreign computer-
leasing company in China (China Business Information Network, 1999). In 2000, IBM 
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had its fifthjoint venture with Great Wall: Beijing GKI Electronic. It was located in 
Beijing with USD $25 million invested. IBM held 70% stake while the Great Wall held 
the rest. With 1,000 employees, it manufactured circuit boards for Nokia's mobile phones 
(Leopold, 2000). 
In total, Great Wall created five joint ventures with IBM. By setting up suchjoint 
ventures, Great Wall had access to technology and manufacturing know-how (Kraemer 
and Dedrick, 2002). For example, in setting up the firstjoint venture, IBM sent 5 
managers and Great Wall sent 25 engineers to work at the joint venture. In the following 
years, Great Wall's engineers learned IBM's way of management. As Zhi Wang said of 
the benefit Great Wall derived from this joint venture with IBM: "The most important 
wealth that we created from this joint venture was that we have developed a stable, 
pro active, innovative management team" (Gan, 2001). In addition, by working with IBM, 
Great Wall could build relationships with other multinationals. As Wang said: 
Now, through the relations with IBM, we could build contact with firms that had 
connection with IBM, and through them, Great Wall could have a c1ear sense of 
trend of the development of computer technology (Sina Technology Online, 2002). 
For IBM, cooperating with Great Wall helped IBM foster a good guanxi (relationship) 
with the Chinese government. What mattered in conducting business in China was to 
have a good guanxi with the government. For example, in doing business in China, one 
needed to process 43 separate importlexport documents (Taninecz, 1996). And a good 
connection to the government could ~mooth the process. Arthur Yarzumbeck, the general 
manager of IBM in China, said: "Had it not been for Great Wall, 1 think we could still be 
floundering in that bureaucracy" (Taninecz, 1996: 28). 
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Because of the good relationships with the Chinese government, IBM was chosen by 
China's MEl to lead the "Golden Bridge" project, also known as the China National 
Economic Information Network. It was the Internet backbone ofChina's national 
information infrastructure enabling all ministries at provincial, municipal, and district 
level conne ct to each other. Once finished, the Golden Bridge project would support 
Internet access like e-mail, electronic data interchange, online database retrieval and 
application service systems at a transmission speed of two megabits per second. By this 
project IBM boosted its sales of AS/400 mid-range computers to compensate its shrinking 
markets in mainframe computer and low margins in personal computers (The Economist, 
1994). 
Another specific bene fit for IBM from formingjoint ventures with Great Wall was 
receiving the support of China's government on its product. In 1995, MEl signed a 
statement of direction with IBM in Beijing. It endorsed IBM's OS/2 Warp operating 
system as a preferred product and recommended it to Chine se users. Previously IBM' s 
OS/2 Warp had been struggling with the much more prevailing Microsoft Windows 
operation system (Bangsberg, 1995). 
6.4.2. 1995: Cooperation with Microsoft 
Microsoft was the second foreign firm that Great Wall worked with to secure its position 
in the market. In 1995 with Great Wall, Microsoft developed a Chinese version of 
Windows 95. In 1996, Microsoft signed an agreement with Great Wall that Golden Great 
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Wall computers made by Great Wall would use the Chinese version of the Windows 3.2 
operatiilg system. To facilitate this cooperation, Microsoft's Bill Gates invited the vice 
minister ofChina's MEl and other high-ranking officiaIs to visit Microsoft's headquarters 
in Seattle (Wu, 1996). 
6.4.3. 1996: Cooperation with Intel 
Intel was the third foreign firm with whom Great Wall cooperated. In 1996, Intel signed 
an agreement with Great Wall that enabled Great Wall to manufacture and market the 
next generation Pentium processor-based personal computer systems. Intel would also 
provide Great Wall with motherboard manufacturing technology (China Business 
Information Network, 1996b). 
6.5. 1990S: RESTRUCTURING OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT 
While Great Wall was trying to build up strategic alliances with multinationals to 
confront the increasingly intensive market competition in the 1990s, its supervising 
governmental units underwent a series of restructuring characterized by merger-
separation-merger with rather brief intervals between each major reform. 
6.5.1. 1988: the Ministry of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry 
ln 1988, MEl merged with the State Machine-Building Industry Commission into the 
Ministry of Machine-Building and Electronics Industry (MMEI). Meanwhile, the China 
Computer Industry Association (CCIA) was founded in 1987 at the dawn of the merger. 
The purpose of this merger was to bring out about the synergies among the electronics 
and computer related industries and the machine building industries. China aimed to 
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emulate Japanese successful deve10pment of "mechatronics" segments in the 1970s that 
integrated the technology ofmechanical and e1ectronics engineering (Simon, 1988: 30). 
However, traditional bureaucratic loyalties were found to get in the way of the well 
intended cross-fertilization between these two ministries. Therefore, the coordination 
between different organizational units was restricted (Simon, 1988: 30). It turned out that 
the emphasis ofthis new MMEI was on the machinery sector, and the development of the 
electronics and computer industries was ignored. 
The neglect of the electronics industries probably was due to the rather strong background 
in machinery of the first MMEI minister, Zou Jiahua, who was former minister in charge 
ofState Machine-Building Industry Commission (Frisbie, 1992). The output value of the 
electronics industry only accounted for 9% of total output generated by industries 
administered by the MME!; and within the e1ectronics industries, computers accounted 
for only 9% (Hui and McKown, 1993). 
6.5.2. 1991: The Founding of Chinatron 
Since the development of e1ectronics related industries was ignored under the MMEI 
administration, a ministry-Ievel SOE, Chinatron was formed in 1991 to demonstrate 
China's commitment to the development of the e1ectronics industry in the Eighth Five-
Year Plan. Headquartered in Beijing, Chinatron took most R&D on electronics and 
computers from MMEI, reporting directly to the State Council, State Planning 
Commission, and the Ministry of Finance (Frisbie, 1992). 
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The founding of Chinatron also continued China' s momentum of concentrating the 
computer industry initiated in the Seventh Five-Y ear Plan (1986-1990). It was observed 
that multiplication of small scale factories led to a low degree of development of 
technology due to the lack of economies of scale and scope. To consolidate the industry, 
Chinatron centralized the efforts of manufacturing and research and development 
undertaken at different SOEs to achieve large scale economies. It was in charge of 87 of 
China's largest electronics factories, 37 research institutes, 7 universities and other 
associated organizations (Young, 1992). 
Those 87 SOEs, including the Great Wall Computer, under the guidance of the Chinatron 
numbered about halfthe 170 firms previously under MEL Chinatron's revenue in 1991 
was USD $3.3 billion, accounting for 25% ofChina's total electronics production. It 
should be noted that Chinatron' s budget did not come from its total profits; rather, it came 
from ministry's budget (Kraemer and Dedrick, 1994). 
Modeled on international big business, Chinatron' s organizational structure had three 
levels. At the first level, the headquarter was the investment center that formulated 
corporate strategies and allocated financial resources; at the second level, SOEs were 
grouped according to their product to behave as profit centers; at the third level was the 
individual factory, operating as a cost center (Frisbie, 1992). 
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Though created as an independent government unit to supervise the electronics industry, 
Chinatron had a rather complex relationship with MMEI and needed close coordination 
with it. MMEI Vice-Minister Zeng Peiyuan served on Chinatron's planning committee, 
while Chinatron President Zhang Xuedong served on MMEI's planning group. MMEI 
was in charge of the financial and material allocations to state-owned factories under the 
supervision of Chinatron; MME!' s computer bureau was still responsible for the 
development of China' s computer software regulations (Frisbie, 1992). 
ln addition to MME!, Chinatron also needed to coordinate with local governments about 
the revenue-sharing schemes, taxation and utilities of each factory. Possibly due to 
excessive bureaucracy and lack of authority to make final decisions, Chinatron was 
dissolved in 1993, only two years after its founding (Simon, 1996). 
6.5.3. 1993: The Reemergence of the Ministry of Electronics Industry 
Meanwhile, after the MOU with the United States in 1992, the competition in the 
domestic computer industry became more and more intensive. With the demise of 
Chinatron, in order to revitalize the computer industry, the Chinese govemment decided 
to disband the large and unmanageable MME! into two original independent units: the 
State Machine-Building Industry Commission and MEL 
ln 1993, China's computer industry and Great Wall were again under the administration 
of the Computer Department of the MEl that employed 30-40 people working in 5 
offices, and managed 216 state-owned factories, producing 82% ofChina's total domestic 
139 
computers. MEl's main goal was to turn Great Wall into a major supplier to the domestic 
and world markets of low-end personal computers and peripherals, inc1uding printers, 
monitors, and circuit boards (Hui and McKown, 1993). 
The low end market segment was targeted so as to avoid direct competition with the 
foreign firms that provided high-end products. Yet, given the large number of 
organizational units involved in the discontinued operation of Chinatron and dissolution 
of MME!, the working relationships and responsibilities within MEl regarding the 
computer industry were still undefined. Thus, how MEl' s goal was to be achieved 
remained unc1ear. 
Moreover, the Chinese govemment also started to increase the autonomy of the SOEs, the 
"centrallink" in China's "socialist market economy." ln the 14th Party Congress held in 
1992, General Secretary Jiang Zemin maintained that each SOE should "become a legal 
person operating on its own, assuming sole responsibility for its profits and losses" 
(Miller, 1993: 28). By 1995, Great Wall and other SOEs received no more subsidies from 
the govemment and competed on their own. As the govemment intended to sever the 
linkages between the bureaucrats and SOEs, losing the valuable connections to the 
govemment would render the SOEs vulnerable in the competitive market (Gilley, 1998). 
6.5.4. 1998: the Founding of the Ministry of Information Industry 
ln March 1998, the Ministry of Information Industry (MIl) was created on the basis of the 
former MPT and the former MEL MEl and MPT were merged because the convergence 
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of computers and telecommunications put the former in conflict with the latter on a 
number of issues. For example, MEl was planning to expand its mandate from 
manufacturing electronic equipment to building information networks. Assuming a key 
role in various projects of the Golden Projects, MEl apparently was regarded as invading 
the territory of MPT that used to have a monopolistic position in the telecommunication-
related areas (Carroll, 1998). Moreover, .MEI also objected to MPT's proposed draft 
Telecommunications Law at the State Council executive meetings (Yang, 2002: 197). 
The creation of MIl aimed to turn bureaucratic competition into cooperation and hoped to 
eliminate the ministerial conflicts that caused policy paralysis. For example, since the 
telecommunication regulations were under the jurisdiction of MIl, therefore the turfwars 
seemed to fade away, and significant progress was made towards legislation for 
telecommunication industries. MIl was in charge of the information infrastructure, the 
national computer policies, and government-supported companies. Its strategy to develop 
the domestic industry was to leverage access to China's market in exchange for 
technology and investment from foreign firms (Dedrick and Kraemer, 1998). Such 
restructuring was also part ofthen Premier Zhu Rongji's efforts to streamline and 
modemize the governmental bureaucracy in China, the large st reorganization ever since 
the founding ofPeople's Republic of China. The number ofministries was slashed from 
45 to 29 and the number of civil servants was cut from 8 million to 4 million (Gilley, 
1998). 
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ln conclusion, through the 1990s, Great Wall was entangled in the China' s government 
reorganization and caught in the conflict between ministries and this somehow slowed its 
pace of the development (Pearson, 2005). The market shares of Great Wall in 1992 and 
2000 were 10.8% and 4.6% respectively, while the market share of Lenovo in the same 
period rose from 6.3 % to 28.1 % (Rukstad et al., 2001: 18). 
6.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Waterbury once wrote in praise of SOEs: 
A dynamic, carefully and rationally planned, state enterprise sector could, as far-
sighted helmsman of the economy, mobilize scarce resource, stimulate markets, 
adopt new technologies, and rapidly lift the entire economy to a level of self-
sustaining industrial growth (1993: 260). 
Through the 1980s, Great Wall stimulated the computer market, launched new computers 
with the latest technologies, and contributed to China's economic reform through 
participating in the Seventh Five-Y ear Plan. Yet, in the 1990s, especially after the 1992 
MOU, it seemed that Great Wall could not live up to expectation. With a head start in the 
market and technology upon its founding, why did the performance of Great Wall decline 
in the 1990s? How did the three sectors get involved in this national champion's history? 
Consider the social sector first. The China Computer Industry Association (CCIA) was 
created during the Chinese government restructurlng in the late 1980s, yet like most of 
the Chine se trade associations, it was led by party members and their agendas were set by 
the state. During the history of Great Wall, it seemed that the CCIA played little, if any, 
role. 
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Next, consider the multinationals. After the 1992 MOU, multinatioanlss such as 
Microsoft did render Great Wall' s Chinese personal computers obsolete in the market, but, 
subsequently, encouraged by the government policy of "technology for market access" 
(Kraemer and Dedrick, 2002), they set up numerous joint ventures with Great Wall. 
Given the large size ofChina's domestic market, it was conceivable that Great Wall was 
in a good position to bargain with multinationals. In a sense, together with the Chinese 
government, they formed what Evans called a "triple alliance" (1979). 
6.6.1. The State 
Of the three sectors, the state played the most crucial role in the rise and decline of Great 
Wall. The rise of Great Wall could be traced back to the fact that it was an imperative for 
the Chinese government to set up a state-owned computer enterprise to launch the 
domestic computer industry. The decline of Great Wall in the 1990s could be attributed to 
the interventions ofChinese government that caused Great Wall's insulation from the 
market, its lack of managerial autonomy and its lack of entrepreneurial orientation. The 
decline can also be attributed to the reorganization of the Chinese government that pulled 
Great Wall into internaI conflicts and confrontation within the public sector. 
Development economists argue that when a country is a late starter in the economic 
development, SOEs can help it to catch up. For example, based on the experiences of 
electronics industries in India, Brazil and Korea, Sridharan (1996: 113) found that "one of 
the government' s most important policy initiatives, right from the outset, was the creation 
of national champion-type public sector electronics firms to pioneer local production." 
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Through its large-sc ale operations, SOEs can generate "movement on a broad front" 
(Gerschenkron, 1962) through their linkages to upstream and downstream industries 
(Hirschman, 1958). As this case shows, the founding of Great Wall triggered in the 1980s 
the development of a Chinese-version of integrated circuit, and computer hardware and 
software. 
Setting up SOEs implies that the government lacks "faith in the entrepreneurial initiatives 
of local private capital" (Evans, 1995: 129) in that competing with large, established 
multinationals in the high-technology industries requires capital and technology in excess 
of what small, entrepreneurial ventures can afford. As Chapter 4 and 5 show, there was no 
shortage of entrepreneurship in the Chinese technology-based industries in the 1980s. Yet, 
SOEs operated as a "filtering mechanism" (Wade, 1990: 226) that attracted most of the 
attention of the policy makers. For example, Great Wall received favorable treatment 
from the government, while Lenovo was treated as stepchild in its formative years. It was 
not until the end of the 1980s, when the National Product Quality Inspection Center found 
Great Wall's computer to be low quality that the Chinese government started to recognize 
Lenovo. 
Setting up SOEs can also indicate a government's commitment to initiate an import-
substituting economic policy to "defend against foreign-owned enterprises" (Lewin, 1981: 
1321). The dependency-theory literature argues that relying on the multinationals to 
trigger economic growth makes the national economy more vulnerable to external players. 
In order to avoid this, the state can take up the role of entrepreneur, starting in technology 
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areas that provide little incentive for multinationals to invest (Levy, 1988). As this case 
shows, the technology niche that Great Wall carved for itself was the Chine se version of 
DOS, where multinationals did not find it a worthwhile investment. 
To summarize, when entering the nascent Chine se computer industry, Great Wall had 
several of what Jones and Mason called "revealed institutional advantages" of SOEs that 
included "capital intensive," "large in sc ale relative to product market," "large relative to 
factor markets," and "high forward linkages" to downstream industries (1982: 41). Yet, 
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unfortunately, such revealed institutional advantages, though successful in developing the 
computer industry in the beginning, were eventually offset by the intervention and 
reorganization of the Chinese government itself. 
Once created, SOEs are insulated from the market competition by government protection. 
Moreover, the Finance Ministry would "allocate scare government resources" to them 
(Hafsi, Kiggundu and Jorgensen, 1987: 722); and thanks to the vertical structure ties to 
the state, SOE's output can be "directed to state and municipal agencies that redistribute it 
under the central plan" (Nee, 1992: Il). For example, in addition to the initial capital of 
RMB 3 million (USD $375,000), Great Wall operated under protection and favorable 
fiscal polices (e.g., tax exemption and deduction), selling its products to governmental 
units, while also engaging in China's Golden Project. 
As subordinate units under the supervising ministries, SOEs lack managerial autonomy. 
Their operations tend to be "based on the imposition ofrules and on obedience for its own 
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sake" (Gouldner, 1954: 24). For example, because the computer industry was strategically 
important for economic development, Great Wall' s decision-making was under the 
discretion ofthe government. The Chinese government required it to use at least 75% 
domestic parts to manufacture its computers and that led to quality problems. In contrast, 
as a nongovernmental enterprise, Lenovo could employ equipment and components from 
abroad to assemble its brand-name computers. 
Since SOEs are under the state control, which can mean "uniform hiring, promotion, and 
dismissal and salary policies ... across the public sector" (Hafsi, Kiggundu and Jorgensen, 
1987: 722), their managers may lack entrepreneurial orientation to make risky decisions. 
Given that their careers will be threatened by losses occurred during their tenure, they 
"want to be exactly sure of everything and avoid all possible mistakes" (Adler et al., 1992: 
462). For example, after the 1992 MOU, it seemed that Great Wall took a more defensive 
strategy than Lenovo; the former' s "mandarin-turned management team" (Lu, 2000: 157) 
looked to the multinationals for help, while the latter decided to confront the international 
competition head-on. Dedrick and Kraemer (2001: 6) found that Great Wall "failed to 
match Lenovo's aggressiveness, flexibility, and profit-oriented management." Indeed, 
, "the experience ... of a firm's personnel," as Penrose maintained, "to a large extent 
determine[ s] the response of the firm to changes in the external world" (1959: 79-80). 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of SOEs may often suffer from the constant organizational 
restructuring ofits supervising ministries. According to Rueschemeyer and Evans (1985: 
68), "in order to undertake effective interventions, the state must constitute a bureaucratic 
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apparatus with sufficient corporate coherence." Moreover, Chibber also found that "the 
difference in state ... coheslveness explains the difference in developm~nt outcomes" 
(2002: 953). As shown in this case, since the 1990s, when the domestic computer industry 
was opened to international competition, its supervising unit MEl also underwent a series 
of organizational restructurings, first merged into the State Machine-Building Industry 
Commission in 1988, then separated in 1993, and merged again with the MPT in 1998. 
To compound the issue, another supervising unit, Chinatron, was created in 1991 and 
aboli shed in 1993. 
Kraemer and Dedrick commented on China's computer policy: "policy changes have 
been more ad hoc than part of a coherent strategy" (1994: 5). In fact, for SOEs, like Great 
Wall, the "biggest problem was not its relations with the private sector," argued Evans, 
"but its relations with ... the state apparatus" (1995: 135). Ifthere is anY lesson to be 
learned from the Great Wall case, it probably will echo Evans, who concluded that for 
SOEs that engage in high-technology industries, "the state's comparative institutional 
advantage does not lie in producing high-technology commodities" (1995: 129). 
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CHAPTER7 
UNITED MICROELECTRONICS CORPORATION 
This chapter presents the birth, the growth, setback and eventual prosperity of United 
Microelectronic Corporation (UMC), based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Founded in 1980, UMC 
was the first Taiwanese company engaged in the semiconductor industry. After a brief 
description of the historical background in the 1970s, this chapter tracks the key strategie 
decisions and their contexts along the history ofUMC. The chapter conc1udes with sorne 
remarks about how three sectors influenced the development ofUMC. 
7.1. THE EARL Y 1970S: THE AGE OF CRISES 
In the early 1970s, the Nationalist Government in Taiwan led by the KMT confronted an 
avalanche of crises. There were political crises. In 1971, the United Nations derecognized 
Taiwan. In 1972, Japan derecognized Taiwan. In the same year, American President, 
Richard Nixon visited Beijing. The number of countries recognizing Taiwan (the 
Republic of China) feU rapidly: 62 in 1971, 39 in 1973, and 23 in 1977. In the meantime, 
Chiang Kai-shek, the authoritarian leader of the KMT, passed away in 1975. In addition 
to political crises, there was an economic crisis. In 1973, the first energy crisis erupted. 
The growth rate of Taiwan' s GNP in 1974 was 1.1 %; inflation hit 40%; and the trade 
deficit exceeded USD $1 billion (Gold, 1986). 
The Nationalist Government's response to political and economic crisis was to encourage 
high-technology industries by building on the CUITent electronics industry (Li, 1988). It 
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meant that the government would have to trigger a quantum leap from the low-end 
electronics industry to a high-end semiconductor industry. A research institute was 
needed to serve as a springboard. 
7.1.1. The National Chiao Tung University 
A possible springboard might have been the National Chiao Tung University (NCTU), 
the preeminent engineering school in Taiwan. Founded in Shanghai in 1896, NCTU 
resumed teaching and research in Hsinchu, Taiwan in 1957. In 1960, with United 
Nation's funds, it established the Far-Eastern Electronics and the National 
Telecommunications Training Center. In 1963, Prof essor Li in the Department of 
Electrical Engineering, together with Dr. McNally from the United Nations, established 
the tirst vaçuum laboratory in Taiwan. One year later, the tirst semiconductor laboratory 
was constructed. 
With labs in place, NCTU was able to further advance its research. In 1965, the tirst 
planar bipolar transistor was produced, 18 years after Shockley and his colleagues 
invented the transistor at Bell Telephone Laboratories. In 1966, the tirst integrated circuit 
was produced at NCTU, eight years after Jack Kilby invented the tirst integrated circuit at 
Texas Instruments.36 It may be argued that, in 1970s Taiwan, semiconductor-related 
technologies were only circulated within a small group of prof essors and students at 
NCTU. 
36 Infonnation from the website of the Semiconductor Research Center at NCTU: 
http://www.src.nctu.edu.tw/homee.htm. 
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However, compared to similar research centers in other parts of the world, NCTU was not 
able to provide Taiwanese industries with the technological opportunities required to 
maintain a competitive edge. Like other elite universities in Taiwan, National Taiwan 
University and National Tsinghua University, NCTU was more dedicated to educating 
qualified engineers than conducting pioneering research. Together, their competitive 
engineering programs attracted the smartest students, and were key to Taiwan's techno-
entrepreneurial environment. The state had to find another way out. 
7.1.2. 1973: the Founding of the Industrial Technology Research Institute 
Yun-Xuan Sun, then Minister of Economic Affairs, decided to create the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute (ITRI), emulating the Korean public research institutes 
that he visited in 1969 and 1970 (Xue, Hsu, and Perkins, 2001). Sun, bom in 1913 in 
Shandong, Chin~, was one of the elite technocrats serving in Chiang Kai-shek's 
administration. Chiang's elite technocrats had excellent educational backgrounds before 
they fled to Taiwan. Of Taiwan's top 44 elite technocrats in the 1950s and 1960s, 43 were 
university graduates and more than 60% had advanced degrees from the USA and Europe 
(Vogel, 1991: 25). Chiang provided bureaucratic elites with much more autonomy than 
did South Korea (Evans, 1995). 
Sun insisted that ITRI be a nongovemmental organization so that it would be free of 
certain laws and regulations. And, therefore, like its Korean counterparts, it could lure 
overseas Chinese engineers back home byoffering salaries that were two or three times 
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larger than those of civil servants. However, it was not as easy to create a 
nongovernmental organization with the government's money as Sun thought. There was 
massive opposition to Sun's decision in the Legislative Yuan. Most of the legislators 
bought into Sun's idea of creating an R&D institute. However, they did not support the 
idea of its being nongovernmental. Being nongovernmental meant it could be free from 
the government control, which was inconceivable to them. Sun kept negotiating and 
communicating with legislators for almost a year. Eventually, the project was passed by 
the Legislative Yuan (Hong, 2003). 
In 1973, with NT $1 million (USD $28,000) from the government, ITRI was set up in 
Hsinchu city, 70 kilometers southwest of Taipei. Upon its founding, the ITRI first merged 
three existing public R&D institutions: Union Industrial Research Laboratories, Mining 
Research & Service Organization, and Metal Industrial Research Institute. Second, ITRI 
created Electronics Research and Service Organization (ERSO) in 1974 (Hong, 2003). 
ITRI identified itself as a collective laboratory for the technology-based industries in 
Taiwan. 
7.2. 1974: WHEN ITRI MET ReA 
As a collective laboratory, ITRI' s first task was to undertake unprecedented technology 
transfer from foreign firms (Chen and Sewell, 1996). This historical decision was reached 
in a small, traditional Taiwanese breakfast restaurant in Taipei in 1974. Several high-
ranking government bureaucrats, including the Ministers of Economic Affairs, 
Transportation and Communication, and the Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan, 
were having an informal meeting there. Their agenda was to determine how ITRI could 
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contribute to upgrading Taiwan's electronics industry (Hong, 2003). The key figure at 
this meeting was Dr. Wen-Yuan Pan (1912-1998). Pan was bom in Mainland China and 
then trained at Princeton University in the USA. At that time of the meeting, he was 
working at RCA's David SamoffLaboratories (Mathews and Cho, 2000). 
ln the meeting, Pan stated that "to expedite the growth of Taiwan's electronics industries, 
the IC (integrated circuit) industry should be targeted." He went on to say that ''the best 
way to develop it was to transfer technology from foreign companies, particularly the 
American companies, to save valuable time" (ERSO, 1994:5). Pan also estimated that it 
wouid take four years and USD $10 million to accomplish this project. His ideas were 
approved by the govemment officiaIs. It should be noted that at that time, Taiwan's GNP 
was about USD $400 per capita. 
7.2.1.1974: Enter the Technical Advisory Committee 
Pan organized a Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) immediately after retuming to the 
USA by the end of 1974 (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001). The TAC was a voluntary 
organization, receiving no financial support from the govemment. It was composed of 
seven overseas Chinese, inc1uding Dr. Ding-Yi Li at AT &T Bell Labs, Dr. Tian-Pei Li at 
Princeton University, and Dr. Kong-Zhang Ling at University of Maryland. Most of the 
members were bom in Mainland China, fled with the KMT in the 1940s, and then 
obtained American PhD degrees in the 1960s. 
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Pan's generation ofhigh-caliber, overseas Chinese professionals in the USA in the 1960s 
were in sharp contrast to the 1880s generations that had worked in mining, farming, and 
railroad construction (Liu, 2002). Prime examples ofPan's generation are two 1957 
Nobel Laureates ofphysics, Chen Ning Yang and Tsung Dao Lee, who researched "the 
so-called parity laws whieh has led to important discoveries regarding the elementary 
partic1es:,37 
Pan's generation was the product of the push of education poliey in Taiwan and the pull 
of immigration poliey in the USA. The KMT had put an emphasis on education since the 
1950s. The number of university graduates in 1950 was 5,379. In 1965, the number had 
grown tenfold to 55,812 (Woo, 1991). Moreover, in the 1950s, about 8% of university 
graduates chose to go abroad, mostly to the USA to advance their studies. By the early 
1960s, the figure had risen to 16% (Greene, 2000). 
The USA government's passage ofthe Hart-Celler Act in 1965 offered a window of 
opportunity for immigration. Under the Act, those who possessed skills that were scaree 
were aecepted as citizens or permanent residents. As a result, the number of immigrants 
from Taiwan increased dramatieally, from 47 in 1965 to 1,321 in 1967. One-third of 
Chinese immigrant engineers in the USA were of Taiwanese origin. Consequently, only 
7% ofthose who left Taiwan in the early 1960s returned (Saxenian, 1999). 
37 From the website of the Nobel Prize in Physics, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/physics/laureates/l957/index.html 
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With Pan's leadership, the TAC's first task was to help ITRI draft a proposaI to invite 
foreign companies to bid for deals. The TAC invited seven candidates in total and was 
particularly interested in Fairchild and RCA. Fairchild requested a USD $12 million 
royalty, exceeding ITRI's budget of USD $10 million. Fairchild lowered its royalty to 
USD $3 million after ITRI declined its offer. However, such a dramatic change made 
ITRI uncomfortable with the deal (Hong, 2003). 
RCA provided better terms and conditions for ITRI. It requested an affordable royalty, it 
wanted to sign a ten-year contract, and it promised to help ITRI set up pilot factories in 
the first five years and train 300 engineers in the following five years, ten ofwhom would 
be taught how to design IC. Besides teaching ITRI technical skills, RCA also agreed to 
teach the administrative procedures of running an IC factory. 
The TAC's second task under Pan's leadership was to help ITRI evaluate which 
technology to transfer. There were two kinds of process technologies for semiconductors 
at RCA at that time: bipolar and unipolar. Even though bipolar technology was used in 
manufacturlng communication ICs, TAC favored unipolar technology because it would 
have forward linkage effects (Hirschman, 1958) on Taiwan's low-end electronic products. 
Still, there were two kinds of unipolar semiconductors: complementary metal oxide 
semiconductor (CMOS) and negative-channel metal-oxide semiconductor (NMOS). 
CMOS has lower computing power than NMOS and relatively speaking, a very small 
market share (less than 10%). However, CMOS was cheaper and had the potential for 
many more linkage effects (Chiang, 1990). Eventually, the TAC bet on RCA's CMOS 
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technology. In fact, CMOS later emerged as the dominant design in semiconductor 
process technology due to its temperature stability of silicon and low heat generating 
properties (Linden and Somaya, 2003). 
This deal made sense for RCA because it was in the process of gradually withdrawing 
from the IC industry after exiting the computer industry. The 7-micron CMOS technology 
transferred to ITRI was already complete1y obsolete in the American semiconductor 
industry. The state-of-the-art technology on the market was at 1.5 micron or even finer 
resolutions. With dec1ining performance, it was hard for RCA to resist the royalty 
(Mathews, 1997). 
In 1976, ITRI recruited 37 young engineers and sent them to RCA for a year of training. 
Upon their arrivaI at RCA, the plant's General Manager, Bernard V. Vonderschmitt 
wondered "if the Taiwanese would be able to understand something as technically 
challenging as making microchips." However, at the end of the pro gram, Vonderschmitt 
wondered again: "Would we be able to continue without them?" (Science, 1993: 358) In 
fact, RCA later attempted to acquire the pilot plant at ITRI that had a higher yield rate: 
70% compared to 50% at RCA (Fuller, 2002). 
7.2.2. 1977: Constructing a Pilot Plant 
In October 1977, ITRI's engineers constructed a pilot plant with the assistance of the 
TAC and RCA's consultants. It should be noted that RCA's consultants Ieft after one year, 
while the TAC remained active in the following years. This pilot plant was funded by the 
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first phase of the govemment's Electronics Industry Development Project (1975-1979), 
with a budget of NT $489 million (USD $14.9 million) (Liu, 1993). It was important to 
have a pilot plant first because a pilot plant was "indispensable in attempting to predict 
the performance of a full scale production plant" (Rosenberg, 2000: 86). After two 
months, ITRI was able to manufacture CMOS devices. At the beginning, it manufactured 
500 ICs per week.Later, its capacity was enhanced to 4,000 ICs per week to reach the 
minimum efficient scale (Hong, 2003). 
At this point, ITRI felt that it was time to commercialize its technology. However, no 
Taiwanese entrepreneurs showed initial interest in CMOS technology because the capital 
required was too much for a single small- or medium-sized enterprise to afford, and the 
technology involved was too advanced for local Taiwanese entrepreneurs whose 
knowledge was limited to telephones, switch boards, television, tape recorders, and radios 
(Little, 1974). As a result, ITRI decided to commercialize its technology by creating spin-
offs. Dr. Ding-hua Hu, Director ofERSO and Dr. Chin-tay Shih, Vice-Director ofERSO, 
proposed it to the Ministry of Economic Affairs: 
to start up an IC company was critical for Taiwan's own IC technological 
development ... IfERSO had not advocated the formation of a new company, then 
either the resources devoted to the pilot plant would have been wasted, or the 
multinationals would have absorbed the manpower trained by ERSO, hurting local 
IC development (ERSO 1994:63). 
7.3. 1980: FOUNDING OF UNITED MICROELECTRONICS CORPORATION 
As a result, the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) was founded. It was 
established as integrated device manufacturer, vertically integrating the production of ICs 
from the design segment through fabrication to the test andassembly stages. Upon its 
156 
founding, the state did not try to prote ct the nascent UMC from international competition 
by raising tariffs, which was the case in the early stages of development of the textile 
industry. Most of the tariffs for IC imports are under 1 % (Carroll, 1996). 
Before the founding ofUMC, the development of semiconductor industry in Taiwan was 
dominated by the multinationals. As early as 1966, General Instrument Microelectronics 
of the USA established the first semiconductor packaging business in Kaohsiung city in 
the south of Taiwan. Soon after General Instrument came Philips, Texas Instruments, 
RCA and Mitsubishi that set up semiconductor assembling factories to tap into the low-
cost labor (Mathews and Cho, 2000). 
UMC's initial capital was USD $12.5 million, with private firms holding 45% ofthe 
equity share and the state-owned Bank of Communications held the rest. UMC was led by 
Robert Tsao, Vice-Director ofthe ERSO. He eamed a bachelor's degree in Electrical 
Engineering from National Taiwan University and a master's degree in Management 
Science from NCTU. 
By then, ITRI had enhanced the RCA-transferred wafer size. ITRI had also increased the 
yield rates to 70%. The process technologies transferred from ITRI to UMC included 5.0-
Mm metal gate CMOS, Si-gate single-poly CMOS, Si-gate double-poly CMOS, single-
poly NMOS, and double-poly NMOS technologies. In addition, more than ten products 
were transferred from ITRI to UMC, including melody ICs, telephone ICs, timer ICs, 
memory ICs, and calculator ICs (Chang, Shih and Hsu, 1994). 
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ITRI also created a transfer project team of 31 seasoned engineers to facilitate the process 
and product technology transfer. Those engineers previously worked at ITRI as 
manufacturing supervisor, testing manager, sales manager and sales supervisor, quality 
control manager, and circuit design manager. The major tasks involved in planning this 
project included establishing an IC fabrication plant with four-inch wafer capability, 
selecting the new clean room design, reserving space in layout for increasing capacity and 
future process requirements, and providing information on equipment with newer and 
betler functions for UMC (Chang, Shih and Hsu, 1994). 
This transfer project team was also responsible for training at UMC. The training of 
personnel included technology training, such as process engineering, equipment 
engineering, product engineering, and facilities and testing; and management training, 
such as quality assurance, industrial engineering, production control, and materials 
control (Chang, Shih and Hsu, 1994). Soon after in 1985, UMC successfully 
commercialized a series ofICs used in calculators. UMC's mass production ofICs could 
help local firms achieve secure sources because most calculators made in Taiwan were 
equipped with ICs imported from three dominant Japanese firms. 
As a second moyer, UMC pursued a different route from Japanese and South Korean 
semiconductor firms that are usually part of large business groups. Japanese firms 
manufactured a broad variety of semiconductors and South Korean firms specialized in a 
narrow range ofhigh-volume products. In contrast, UMC was a relatively small firm and 
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found itselfniche markets. It aimed at the low-end electronic market in Taiwan and 
Southeast Asia, focusing on manufacturing application specifie integrated circuit (ASIC) 
products, including toys, telephones, watches, calculators, and computers (Meaney, 1994). 
7.3.1. 1980: Hsinchu Science Park 
Meanwhile, to complement the upgrade of domestic industry and the development of 
technology-intensive industry, the Hsinchu Science Park (HSP) was established in 
Hsinchu by the Taiwanese government in 1980 under the Statute for the Establishment 
and Administration of a Science-Based Industrial Park. The government acquired 1186 
acres ofland and set up the infrastructure with a budget of USD $520 million (Singer, 
1997). UMC was the first company to be located in the HSP, 45 miles southwest of 
Taipei. 
T 0 be located in the HSP, firms were required by the administration of the HSP to spend a 
certain proportion oftheir revenues on R&D, and a certain percentage oftheir employees 
must be scientists and engineers. Once permitted to operate in the HSP, the land rent was 
zero for firms and preferentialloans, tax reduction, administration services and other 
incentives were granted (Gwynne, 1993). 
ln fact, the HSP was modeled after USA Califomia's Silicon Valley, whose main 
characteristic feature was the intensive interactions between Stanford University and local 
firms. Surrounding HSP were prestigious research and educational institutions, including 
the NCTU, the National Tsing Hua University, ITRI, the National Center for High-
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Performance Computing, the Synchronous Radiation Research Center, and the National 
Space Pro gram Office, Precision Instrument Development Center, the Chip 
Implementation Center and the National Nano Device Laboratories (Lee, and Yang, 
2000). 
7.4. 1990S: BOOMING BUSINESS 
In 1988, UMC's sales had increased from USD $30 million in 1986 to USD $100 million. 
Its blockbuster, greeting-card chip that plays music, helped UMC gain a reputation of 
putting product innovation inside custom-designed chips (Mc Gregor, 1988b). In the same 
year, UMC was listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. With sufficient financial capital, it 
began to construct a USD $200 million factory to make custom-designed consumer chips 
(Hsu, 1997). 
In the early 1990s, the demand for semiconductor products in Taiwan was increasing, 
with an average annual growth rate of 25%. UMe invested USD $926 million on 
constructing integrated circuit factory in the HSP. This factory had a monthly output 
capacity of 30,000 eight-inch le wafers. At that point, UMe had two plants 
manufacturing four- and six-inch le wafers. The steady growth of semiconductor industry 
had promoted Taiwanese firms to become the world's fourth large st supplier ofIC chips, 
in terms of production value, behind the USA, Japan, and South Korea (Huang, 1995b). 
In 1994, UMe transferred 0.8-micrometer le design rules, production facilities and 
management expertise to the German firm, Thesys (Berger, 1995). It was the first time 
that a Taiwanese company has transferred its le technical knowledge to a European firm. 
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At that time UMC was Taiwan's top and the world's 31 st largest IC producer. In 1997, 
UMC ranked the 54th with 170 patents among the top 200 patent winners in the USA 
(Central News Agency, 1997). 
7.4.1. The Competition between UMe and the Multinationals in the Market 
The rapid growth ofUMC started to provoke attacks from the multinationals in the 
market. First in 1986, National alleged that UMC infringed on its intellectual property 
right ofits product called Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter (The Wall Street 
Journal, 1986). It accused the UMC of exploiting the technical data it received from 
National in a 1983 manufacturing agreement to manufacture its own product. Later, in 
1992, Nintendo alleged that UMC manufactured chips that had video game programs 
invented by Nintendo and sold those computer chips to other videogame companies (The 
Wall Street Journal, 1992). 
ln 1993, UMC launched a series ofhigh-end products, the U5 series ofI486SX-class 
processors that UMC had been working on since 1991 (Hardie and Uimonen, 1995). For 
the past two years, UMC had spent approximately NT $500 million (USD $18.8 million) 
on this project, and one-tenth ofthis budget was supported by the Industrial Development 
Bureau, Ministry of Economic Affairs. UMC contracted out the circuit design of 
microprocessor to a USA design house, in which UMC had a 49.7% stake (Flannery, 
1993). 
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UMC intended to develop Taiwan's first home-grown 80486-chip microprocessor, the 
most important component of personal computers and planned to promote its brand-
named microprocessor first in Europe and Asia rather than in the USA where Intel was 
the dominant player with more than 75% market share. UMC thought that the promotion 
costs and le gal expenses were too high if it confronted Intel directly in its home market 
(Kraar, 1994). 
Soon after UMC launched its U5 series ofl486SX-class processors, in 1995, Intel reacted 
quickly by filing suits against UMC in different countries, including Germany, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and the USA. Intel argued that the design ofUMC's microprocessor had 
infringed on sorne patented design of Intel (Hardie and Uimonen, 1995). Eventually UMC 
paid Intelless than USD $5 million to settle this intellectual property infringement 
dispute and decided not to design and manufacture its own microprocessor. Engineers at 
UMC who previously worked on project of developing microprocessor were deployed to 
other departments ofthe company (The Wall Street Journal, 1996a). 
Soon after the case with Intel, in 1997, Oak alleged UMC and eight other Asian chip 
makers infringed two Oak patents for CD-ROM controller technology. UMC immediately 
settled this patent infringement dispute with OAK (Electronic News, 1997). In the same 
year, Micron Technology also charged that UMC and other Taiwanese semiconductor 
firms were dumping static random access memory (SRAM) onto the American market 
(Wade, 1997). 
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It had become an industry recipe that American semiconductor firms resorted to anti-
dumping laws to fight firms from other countries. In the 1980s, Japanese firms were 
charged with adopting predatory pricing strategies. The same tactics were successfully 
adopted to compete against Korean firms. In the 1990s, Micron won a case accusing 
South Korean firms of dumping their semiconductor products on USA markets (Y oder, 
1992). 
In the 1990s, the United States was also a major export market for Taiwanese SRAM 
manufacturers. The USA accounted for about half of Taiwan's total SRAM exports. In 
1995 and 1996, Taiwan exported USD $137 million and USD $93.4 million worth of 
SRAMs respectively that roughly accounted for 9 percent of the USA SRAM import 
market (Central News Agency, 1998). It was estimated that UMe and other Taiwanese 
SRAM firms could manufacturer SRAM at a cost of USD $1.60 per unit; in comparison, 
Micron produced its SRAM at a cost of USD $2.20 per unit (Carroll, 1997). As a result, 
Micron again resorted to anti-dumping laws to defend against Taiwanese firms that they 
accused of predatory pricing. 
Upon hearing about this case, Genda Hu, the president of the Taiwan Semiconductor 
Industry Association (TSIA), also, director-general of the ERSO under ITRI, flew to the 
USA immediately to he1p Taiwanese firms. TSIA was very serious about this case 
because once this anti-dumping charge from Micron set a precedent for future cases, it 
was certain to have a significant affect on the potential development of Taiwan 
semiconductor industry. Founded in 1996 with 57 member firms, TSIA was formed in 
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order to join the World Semiconductor Council founded in 1991 by the USA and Japan. 
ITRI was one of the main players in founding TSIA, and the first chairman of TSIA was 
Shih Chin-Tay, the president of the ITRI (Carroll, 1996). 
TSIA argued that the issue was the calculation of the production costs. Many Taiwanese 
firms regarded dividends paid to the shareholders as profits after tax; however, from the 
perspective of American officiaIs, it was part of the production costs. Furthermore, the 
way of calculating the R&D costs was also in dispute. Calculating the production costs of 
foreign firms was at the discretion of the USA Department of Commerce. 1t gathered the 
costs of material, labor, overhead, marketing and management from foreign enterprises 
and then compared the sum of those costs to that provided by the USA petitioner firms. If 
there were a discrepancy between these two figures, the USA Department of Commerce 
would arbitrarily adjust the figures gathered from the foreign companies (Harbert, 1998). 
TSIA argued that Taiwanese semiconductor firms were puni shed for making their 
operations more efficient than their USA competitors. The Deputy Director of TSIA Chen 
said: "The Taiwan IC industry labour has reached such a high level of efficiency which 
significantly reduces costs compared to a vertically integrated, multi-product company 
like [Micron]" (Electronic Times, 1998). 
Interestingly, the large st USA SRAM manufacturer, Motorola, manufacturing SRAM 
worth USD $520 million annually, took sides with Taiwanese firms. Motorola argued that, 
since South Korea's Samsung, the strongest player with more than 13% market share in 
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the USA, was exempted from this case, then, Micron's anti-dumping allegation 
specifically towards Taiwanese firms whose combined market share was less than 5% 
would become meaningless. As a result, Samsung would benefit from this case because it 
could become more competitive after Taiwanese firms were subject to punitive tariff rates 
(Harbert, 1998). 
Even so, Micron still insisted that the low price strategy adopted by the relatively small 
Taiwanese firms would eventually drive American firms to undercut their prices or even 
completely pull out of the market. Accused of offering SRAM 63.4% lower than market 
prices, UMC faced a newly imposed punitive tariffrate of93.9% (Robertson, 1998). 
7.5. 1995: THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 
At that time, it had become increasingly more difficult for UMC to be an integrated 
device manufacturer. To do so, it had to be simultaneously innovative in both the field of 
product design and manufacturing processes. As mentioned earlier, the semiconductor 
products designed by UMC usually had to confront lawsuits from the multinationals. 
Usually it was very hard for UMC, a latecomer to the market, to find ways around the 
patents or not to infringe on them in the first place .. Aside from the intellectual property 
infringement issues, UMC also faced the shorter design cycle for new semiconductor 
products. Once the design phase was complete and the product was launched into the 
market, UMC had to face the inherent risk of the product life cycle. 
The uncertainties inherent in the stage ofproduct design in tum affected UMC's decision 
making in the manufacturing process. It had become difficult for UMC to determine 
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which product could fully utilize its fabrication capacity. AIso, it was becoming more and 
more expensive to build a semiconductor manufacturing factory. The cost to build such a 
standard fabrication was about USD $1.3 billion and the cost to build an advanced 
fabrication that could manufacture 12-inch wafers was about USD $3.5 billion (Financial 
Times, 1998). The investment cost was usually out of the reach for indigenous firms like 
UMC coming from developing countries. 
In fact, as early as 1984, the chairman ofUMC Tsao wrote a proposaI to Taiwan's 
Economie Ministers that he intended to transform UMC from an integrated device 
manufacturer to a pureplay foundry firm that specialized in manufacturing without 
designing its own brand-name microchips in the market. Tsao wanted UMC to 
concentrate on fabrication and to get rid ofits IC design business. However, the director 
of the ITRI did not agree with Tsao's idea because there was a technological hurdle to 
execute this strategy (Dickie, 2000). A central technological challenge then was that it 
was hard for the design houses to communicate with the foundry about the specifies of 
their design. This technological hurdle explained why the dominant players in the 
semieonduetor players were mainly integrated device manufacturers that vertieally 
integrated the departments of design and manufaeturing within the boundary of the firms. 
However, this teehnological hurdle was overeome in the mid-1990s when advanced 
eomputer-aided design technology helped the design houses to eodify specifies of 
semieonduetors devices features (Fuller, Akinwande, and Sodini, 2003). Besides 
advanced computer-aided design technology, high-bandwidth digital communication 
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networks also facilitated the design houses to communicate huge amounts of data about 
design blueprints to foundries (Macher, Mowery and Simcoe, 2002). Once this 
technological hurdle was overcome, design houses could turn to foundries. As a result, 
the technology advance triggered the disintegration of segments of design and 
manufacturing in the semiconductor industry. 
However, it should be noted, there were still a number of established semiconductor 
manufacturers that integrated the activities of device design and device manufacturing. 
Pureplay foundries accounted for roughly 75% of the worldwide foundry market, with 
integrated device manufacturers accounting for the remaining 25%. Compared to the most 
advanced integrated manufacturers in developed countries like Japan and the USA, pure-
play foundries' manufacturing capabilities stilliagged behind (Macher et al., 1998). 
In transforming itselffrom an integrated device manufacturer tQ a pureplay foundry, 
UMC reorganized its operation by spinning off its less profitable personal computer 
chipset and communications product groups into independent companies--Integrated 
Technology Express and Davicom. Later it also spun offits memory, multimedia and 
consumer chip businesses, and finally its SRAM business that accounted for two-thirds of 
its business (Hardie et al., 1996). According to Tsao: 
The aim of the reorganization ofUMC is to simplify inhouse product lines. The 
separation of sorne design departments, particularly for ASIC products, allows 
UMC to devote company resources to its new DRAM venture. What we are 
engaged in here is a strategy of specialization. By doing so, we won't waste our 
human power and other management resources on other things by not focusing on 
them properly (Hsu, 1997: 9-10). 
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Now as a foundry, UMC could concentrate on product manufacturing because it did not 
need to concem itselfwith the activities and costs involved in the product design and 
marketing. Previously as an integrated device manufacturer with a USD $1 billion 
fabrication, UMC had to make sure it could gain USD $3 billion in revenues in order to 
coyer the relevant costs associated with design and marketing; now UMC just needed to 
secure USD $1 billion in revenues to break even (Dickie, 2000). 
7.5.1. Cooperation between UMC and the Multinationals in the Market 
As mentioned earlier, the cost of constructing a leading-edge wafer fabrication facility 
was more USD $3 billion, which was beyond the financial capability ofUMC; 
accordingly, forming strategic alliances with multinationals became a natural strategic 
choice for UMC. The design houses that were UMC's partners chose to cooperate with 
UMC to ensure they had a reliable source of manufacturing. In retum, they granted UMC 
the right to license and manufacture their semiconductor products (Carroll, 1995). 
UMC's firstjoint venture was formed on July 1995. UMC teamed up with S3 and 
Alliance Serniconductor to form the United Serniconductor Corporation. Cornbined 
capitalization for the fabrications was USD $2.22 billion in total (Electronic Engineering 
Times, 1995a). UMC's foundry fabrication factory rnanufactured 25,000 wafers per 
rnonth and it would generate nearly USD $1 billion in sales per year. With the success of 
this strategic alliance between foundry and design houses, sorne other design cornpanies 
in North America also wished to cooperate with UMC. Furthermore, at that tirne, design 
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houses in the semiconductor industry were suffering from a two-year shortage of 
submicron wafer foundry capacity. 
UMC's second joint venture was formed on September 18, 1995. It was a USD $1 billion 
joint venture with five design houses from Taiwan, Canada and the United States, 
including ATI Technologies, lntegrated Silicon Solutions, Oak Technology, OPTi, and 
Trident Microsystems (Electronic Engineering Times, 1995a). UMC held a majority 50% 
stake and the rest was shared by its partners. The production facility was located at the 
UMC factory at the HSP, Taiwan. This new facility manufactured 25,000 eight-inch IC 
wafers per month, using a 0.25 micron production process. 
UMC's thirdjoint venture was built on October 2, 1995. UMC cooperated with three 
USA design houses, Xilinx, Lattice Semiconductor Corporation and Cirrus, to build the 
United Silicon. Lattice invested USD $60 million to take a 10% stake; Cirrus invested 
USD $90 million to take a 15% stake and Xilinx invested USD $150 million for a 25% 
stake (New York Times, 1995). Armed with 0.25-micron technology transferred from its 
partners, the United Silicon's production capacity was 25,000 wafers per month 
(Electronic Engineering Times, 1995b). 
To ensure the quality of the chips produced by USIC, partners worked closely with UMC 
to enhance its technology capacity. For example, Xilinx sent engineers to cooperate with 
UMC to help design new manufacturing processes. They provided analysis and feedback 
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on UMC's manufacturing process via e-mail, teleconferences and in person (Hamilton, 
1999). 
In just one year, UMC initiated three joint ventures with several design houses from 
North America. Later, UMC decided to merge the affiliates that it had formed with design 
houses. Previously it had tried to grow through ownership of stakes in joint ventures; 
however UMC had been hurt by the performances of those partners. In addition, UMC 
was criticized for lack of transparency in how it shifted business among these ventures 
(Oyama, 1999). Now UMC could expand its manufacturing capacity more easily after 
combining its joint ventures into a single entity. By doing so, UMC could also .eliminate 
competition that existed among those affiliates. 
In addition to forming strategic alliances, UMC also tried to acquire multinationals so as 
to absorb their technological capabilities. In April 1998, UMC invested USD $130.6 
million in Holtek, a Hsinchu-based semiconductor company to acquire a 15% stake. The 
purpose was to get access to Holtek manufacturing capacity (LaPedus and Chen, 1997). 
In December 1998, UMC acquired a 56% stake in Nippon Steel Semiconductor (NSS) for 
USD $1.37 billion. Previously, with 930 employees, NSS focused mainly on the field of 
manufacturing DRAMs. Yet, due to in intense international competition in the DRAM 
industry, it had suffered losses of about USD $1 billion in the 1996-98 period (Moore, 
1999). 
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The acquisition ofNSS helped UMC to expand its capacity and to gain markets in Japan. 
After acquiring NSS, UMC first transformed NSS from a DRAM manufacturer to a 
foundry firm. To facilitate the transformation, UMC sent a team oftwenty to transfer 
UMC's process manufacturing technology from Taiwan. UMC also implemented a cost-
cutting pro gram that led to after-tax earning ofY10 billion (USD $85 million), a 30% 
improvement on the previous year (Harney, 1998). 
This was the first time that a Taiwanese firm acquired a Japanese firm in the 
semiconductor industry. One industry analyst said: "That a very traditional Japanese 
company like Nippon Steel is selling one of its businesses is extremely unusual" (Hamey, 
1998). One year after the acquisition, the stock price ofNSS jumped dramatically from 
USD $400 per share to USD $6,700 on Tokyo's over-the-counter market (Moore, 1999). 
After these joint ventures and acquisitions, UMC gradually evolved into a one-stop shop. 
When design houses brought their blueprints, UMC was able to develop a prototype and 
manufacture the final products. In 1998, UMC made USD $131.8 million on sales of 
USD $551.2 million and had 19% of the global foundry business (Asiaweek, 1999). 
7.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In The Visible Hand, Chandler tried to explain how big business grew in the West: 
The modem industrial enterprise-the archetype oftoday's giant corporation-
results from the [vertical] integration of the processes of mass production with 
those of mass distribution within a single business firm ... the se integrated 
enterprises came to dominate many of the nation's most vital industries within less 
then three decades (1977: 285). 
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Contrary to the growth pattern described by Chandler for technologically sophisticated 
capital-intensive firms in the developed countries, UMC followed another route: it 
established itself in the market by vertically disintegrating value-chain activities. One 
may wonder, before UMC implemented the disintegration strategy in the later stage ofits 
development, how it got started, and how its technological capability got built up in the 
beginning. In fact, it is observed that aIl three sectors-the state, the social sector and the 
market-played influential roles in the growth of UMC. 
7.6.1. The State 
In the beginning of this case, it was observed that the Taiwanese govemment was stirred 
by a series of political and economic crisis to take action to move into high-technology 
industries. In other words, crisis created "moments of transition" (Evans, 1986: 805) that 
helped "accelerate the process by which an industry upgrades and penetrates international 
market" (Porter, 1990: 162). 
The role of the state in the UMC case initially stemmed from revising the national 
innovation system in Taiwan. Before ITRI was founded, the most significant institutions 
in Taiwan's national innovation system were universities whose main task was to develop 
human resources.38 After ITRI was created, the focus of Taiwan's national innovation 
system turned to channeling technology from abroad and to commercializing it by way of 
spin-off enterprises. This institutional arrangement encouraged engineers and researchers 
at ITRI to pursue opportunities in high technology, high-risk industries. 
38 For discussions on the notion of national innovation system in the context of developing countries, see 
Kim and Nelson (2000), and Nelson (1993). 
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In addition to revising the national innovation system, the government also provided the 
ITRI with the necessary financial resources to undertake technology transfer activities 
from RCA and to spin offUMC. In the early 1980s, the state also created the HSP, which 
provided a better infrastructure for UMC and other firms to operate in the high-
technology industries. It should be noted that the Taiwanese government did not set up 
trade tariffs to keep the multinationals away from its nascent domestic semiconductor 
market 
7.6.2. The Social Sector 
There were two important social-sector organizations in the history of the UMC: ITRI 
and TAC. The technological foundation ofUMC was laid by ITRI, which transferred the 
semiconductor technology from RCA. It should be noted that the cost ofthis technology 
transfer was about USD $10 million while Taiwan's GNP was then about USD $400 per 
capita. Hirschman once highlighted the importance of the "image of change" in the 
process of economic development: the "change [is] conceived as possible," and 
"everybody is ambitious, dissatisfied with his present lot, and believes in the possibility 
of change" (1958: 25; 17); without such an image of change, it would be "difficult to take 
decisions needed for development in the required number and at the required speed" 
(1958: 25). Mintzberg also argued that "how people feel about themselves, personally and 
collective1y, influences the energy with which they develop themselves" (2006: 9). 
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Through exploiting the technology transferred from the RCA, ITRI helped UMC 
compress the time to enter the semiconductor industry (Cho, Kim and Rhee, 1988). The 
UMC case is typical of firms in the developing countries. Hobday conducted research on 
how East-Asian latecomer firms learned technology after World War II. He found that 
indigenous firms in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore relied on the 
technology imported from the developed countries. By doing so, they had "substantial 
technological resources to learn rapidly from the leader' s experience," and they could 
"avoid sorne ofthe R&D costs through imitation" (1995a: 1172). 
In the process of this international technology transfer, TAC played a crucial role in 
helping ITRI decide which semiconductor technology to transfer. At that time, there were 
two competing technologies in the semiconductor industry and without the technological 
expertise of TAC, it would be hard for ITRI to tell which one could become dominant 
design and it would be very risky to lock oneself into a non-dominant design technology 
(Arthur, 1989; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). 
TAC acted as "bonders and bridgers," catalyzing the technology transfer process; without 
such help, ''the time needed to search for answers and find appropriate resources may 
increase dramatically" (Lesser and Prusak, 2001: 101). The importance of picking up the 
right technology corroborates Amsden's observation on Korea's development experience: 
Creating competitiveness in late industrialization amounts to taking the risk of 
deciding what skills, on the part of the individuals, and what technological 
capabilities, on the part of firms, are both possible and profitable to learn (1989: 
292; italics added). 
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As dependency theorists may have predicted, RCA transferred outmoded semiconductor 
technology to ITRI (see, Barrett and Whyte, 1982: 1071). Usually there are no incentives 
for the multinationals to transfer core technology unless there is pressure from the local 
government that has a strong bargaining power (Zhou and Xin, 2003). Technology 
transferred to indigenous firms may inc1ude "know-how" (production engineering), but 
not "know-why" (basic design and R&D) (Lall, 1992). Nonethe1ess, thanks to the 
supervision of TAC, ITRI learned to build up a pilot plant that had higher yield rate than 
that ofRCA. This is in line with Gereffi's argument (1994) that, industrial success in East 
Asia was due to organizationallearning and institutional responses to·upgrade 
technologicallearning. With such good foundations, UMC later even transferred its 
technology to a German company. 
7.6.3. The Market 
Multinationals in the market played dual roles in UMC's growth process. As UMC tried 
to move into higher-end product segments, it confronted fierce competition from the 
multinationals in the global markets. After being attacked by the multinational s, UMC 
sought to develop, as Penrose put it, "a particular ability and strength ... which will give 
them a special position" (1959: 137). In other words, UMe needed to find its own niche 
by specializing its operations. 
Given its relatively small scale and constrained resources, ifUMC failed to specialize to 
fill a niche market, there could have been "a bottleneck" that Penrose described as 
restricting further growth: 
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In the long run the profitability, survival, and growth of the firm does not depend 
so much on the efficiency with which it is able to organize the production of even 
a widely diversified range of products as it does on the ability of the firm to 
establish one or more wide and relatively impregnable "bases" (1959: 137; italics 
added). 
UMC decided to disintegrate its value-chain activities, transforming itself from an 
integrated device manufacturer to a pure-play foundry firm. As Penrose maintained, "the 
specialization of firms on narrowly defined products" could lead to "an increase of 
efficiency" (1959: 71). And the latest development of computer-aided design technology 
facilitated this process because it enabled the communications between UMC and the 
design houses.39 As a result, contrary to the visible hand of management described by 
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Chandler (1977), existing market mechanisms could now coordinate the flow of 
information effectively. 
Furthermore, in reorienting itself as pure-play foundry firm, UMC started to develop 
cooperative relations with multinational design houses that transferred technology to itself. 
It also undertook acquisition of multinational subsidiaries because "acquisitions permit a 
faster rate of growth" (Penrose, 1960: 2). 
In retrospect, UMC's strategy of disintegration was successful in part because it 
synchronized with the global high-technology industrial trend. As AsiaWeekreported: 
The key to the new business environment is disintegration. After WWII, 
economists promoted the theory of vertical integration in which manufacturers 
would take an the stages of production, from processing the raw material to 
distributing the fini shed item. This approach was popular with the corporation for 
39 Schumpeter once argued technological change usually "strikes not at the margins of the profits ... of the 
existing firms," instead, it shakes "their foundations and their very lives" (1942: 84). 
176 
forty years. However, the emphasis is now on continuous technological 
enhancement to make products that appeal to better educated customers who have 
an awakened sense ofproduct quality (1995: 30). 
Chapter 8 presents the Acer case, the most intemationally famous Taiwanese personal 
computer company. Though initiated by entrepreneurs in the market, it also resorted to 
ITRI for technological assistance, as did UMC; yet unlike UMC, which received 
govemment' s financial support in its formative years, Acer' s growth at sorne point was 
hindered by the govemment. 
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CHAPTER8 
ACER 
This chapter presents the birth and the growth of Acer. It was created by Stan Shih, one of 
the most admired entrepreneurs in Taiwan's IT industry. After a briefbiography ofShih, 
this chapter tracks the key strategic decisions and their contexts in the history of Acer. 
The chapter concludes with sorne remarks about how the three sectors influenced the case 
of Shih's entrepreneurial venture. 
8.1. LATE 1970S: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF ACER 
As founder of Acer, Stan Shih pioneered Taiwan's development of the personal computer 
industry in Taiwan. Fortune called him "one of the 25 people you ought to know for 
doing business in Asia." MicroTimes put him into one of the 100 most influential people 
in the USA information industry (Johnstone, 1994). 
Shih was bom on December 18, 1944 into a middle-class family in an agricultural county 
in Taiwan. However, at the age of 4, Shih lost his father and his family suddenly became 
impoverished. His mother single-handedly ran a small grocery, selling eggs, supplies, and 
lottery tickets. Stan helped his mother sell groceries and later credited his skills with 
numbers to that early childhood experience (Bartlett and George, 1998). 
Unlike the best and the brightest ofhis high school classmates who went to medical 
school, Shih chose to study electronics engineering at the National Chiao Tung University 
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(NCTU), the pre-eminent engineering school in Taiwan. Upon graduation in 1968, while 
most of his fellow students chose to study abroad for their graduate training, Shih again 
ran against the tide and decided to stay in Taiwan for his M.Sc. degree in electronics 
engineering. "1 come from a rural area," he once said, "ifs not my nature to follow what's 
fashionable" (Bartlett and George, 1998: 4). In fact, aIl his life, he has been fond of 
saying: "Me too is not my style." 
At university, Stan participated in extracurricular activities. Hestarted up clubs for table 
tennis, voIleybaIl, photography, and chess. He reflected on that experience: "1 was captain 
of aIl the societies, and from that 1 leamed how to deal with people" (Johnstone, 1994). 
At that time, Shin's personal goal was to pursue a Ph.D. and someday become the 
president of the NCTU. However, in the late 1960s, during his undergraduate study, he 
witnessed that many multinational s, like Philips and General Instruments, started to set up 
manufacturing sites in Taiwan. Those multinationals triggered the development of the 
electronics industry in Taiwan. Therefore, Shih decided to work in Taiwan rather than to 
study for a Ph.D. abroad. 
Shih got two offers after he graduated from his master' s program: One was from a 
subsidiary of Philips of the Netherlands located in Kaohsiung City in southem Taiwan; 
and the other was from a local firm called Unitron Electronics located in Hsinchu City, 
where Shih studied. Both companies had alumni ofthe NCTU. However, Shih preferred 
Unitron Electronics to Philips because he thought his English might not have been able to 
up to the standard of foreign companies. 
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Unitron Electronics was founded by a famous family in Shih's hometown with technical 
support from a prominent prof essor of the NCTU. Though Unitron Electronics was a 
family business, the top management consisted ofNCTU alumni. In addition, Unitron 
Electronics was the first local firm that set up an R&D department. Shih was quite happy 
working there because he thought he could apply what he learned in school. 
Later, Shih was invited by the family members ofUnitron to found a new company called 
Qualitron, a professional manufacturer specializing in ca1culator manufacturing. It 
marketed its own brand name products and also sold OEM products to multinationals. 
Thanks to its technology, brand name and constant profits, it was one of the most 
successful companies in Taiwan (Zhou, 1996). 
At Qualitron, Shih led the development ofmany innovative products, inc1uding Taiwan's 
first electronic ca1culator and the world's first pen watch (Roy, 1989). As a result, Shih 
was promoted rapidly, and by 1973, he became the vice-president for calculator 
operations, managing over 1000 employees. Such a record of accomplishment he1ped him 
win the title of "Ten Most Outstanding Young Persons" in Taiwan in 1976 (Bartlett and 
George, 1998). 
Yet, unfortunate1y, Qualitron ran into a tinancial crisis because family members of the 
owner mismanaged the financial resources. The chairman of Qualitron channeled the 
money that Qualitron borrowed from the bank to other family businesses in the textile 
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industries. Due to the oil price crises at that time, the synthetic textile business 
encountered trouble. Shih and accountants consulted with key family members in the 
hope they could help solve this problem. However, Shih was told that the company was 
owned by the family and outsiders had no sayon this issue. Qualitron soon went into 
bankruptcy. In retrospect, reflecting on the experience of Qualitron, Shih lamented 
"traditional Chinese family companies often mix up company money and family money. 
Little information is shared with employees" (Kraar, 1995). 
8.1.1. 1976: the Founding of Acer 
Suddenly unemployed, Shih decided to start up Acer (then called Multitech) in Taipei 
with 7 people in 1976. Shih's initiative was the epitome ofTaiwan's entrepreneurial 
culture. Though there was little, if any, formaI entrepreneurship education in the Taiwan 
school system, there was a strong culture of entrepreneurship in Taiwanese society. In 
Taiwan, nicknamed Boss Island (Shieh, 1992), people tend to think that "it is better to be 
the head of a chicken than the tail of an ox." Everybody's ultimate career goal was to be 
an entrepreneur and to become his own boss. 
Upon founding Acer, Shih was not qualified to borrow money from banks due to his lack 
oftrack record. The financial resources to found Acer came from the family. Shih 
borrowed NT $500,000 (USD $14,000) from his mother. Furthermore, in Chine se culture, 
the notion of debt "zhai" has entirely negative connotations, much more so than in the 
West. With such a mindset, in the formative years of Acer, Shih adopted a conservative 
financial strategy and he tended not to fund risky R&D projects with borrowed money. 
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Shih once said: "Borrowing money for business expansion will eventually lead to 
bankruptcy" (Shih, 1996: 91). 
With initial capital of USD $25,000 in total, Shih rented an apartment of about 1,200 
square feet in Taipei for an office. Due to the lack of abundant financial resources, Shih 
installed a poor-man philosophy at Acer: an attitude of cost consciousness and financial 
conservatism. For example, they used recyc1ed paper, and Shih himself drove a modest 
car. At times when Acer's business did not go smoothly, Shih had his salary cut by half, 
his wife was not paid for two years,and the rest of the employees took a 20% reduction in 
order to lower cost and help the company survive longer. Shih once joked that: we will 
sell anything except our wives. In this hard time, two members of the founding teams did 
not believe Shih could make it and left (Shih, 1996). 
Though conscious about cost and financially conservative, Acer was very willing to 
tolerate mistakes as "tuition" for the employees; mistakes were viewed as tuition for 
learning. Shih believed that doing so could help Acer tap into the full potential of the 
company's human resources (Shih, 1996). 
8.1.2. Not a Family Business 
However, probably due to his early experience with Qualitron, Shih managed Acer in a 
way quite different from the vast majority of Taiwanese entrepreneurial family-owned 
firms. Shih was personally against the family-run company model that was common in 
Taiwan. In his opinion, relying on family members to run a business tended to generate 
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biased decisions. Therefore, Shih kept his three children out of management at Acer 
(Zhou, 1996). 
Though not a family enterprise in the conventional sense, Shih tried to build up family-
like relationships among employees. Following the tradition of Taiwanese entrepreneurial 
culture that emphasizes informal teaching through apprenticeship, senior staffs at Acer 
were referred to as shifu, literally meaning "teacher-father." Shih advocated that shifu 
conceal nothing from their pupils. And the development of strong teaching relationships 
between managers and subordinates was encouraged by making it a primary criterion for 
promotion (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2004: 34). 
8.1.3. Corporate Culture: Human Nature is Basically Good 
In addition, Shih also constructed a culture that emphasized, "human nature is basically 
good." For example, on March 18, 1984, Acer's IC inventory worth NT $40 million 
(USD $1.14 million) was found missing, which was valued at about half of Acer' s total 
capital. Sorne suspected that it was Acer management who stole the valuable integrated 
circuits so as to defraud the insurance company; sorne suspected that its was Acer' s 
employees. Without concrete evidence, the police even started investigated Acer' s 
employees with police records (Zhou, 1996). 
Asked whether or not IC was stolen by Acer's employees, Shih felt insulted by the 
question like this and insisted that "1 have full confidence that this incident is not 
committed by any of our staff. Acer's philosophy ofhuman nature is basically good will 
183 
not be altered by this incident" (Shih, 1996: 31). Fortunately, after one month, the police 
caught the thieves and found the lost ICs. No insiders were involved. 
ln 1988, Acer had its initial public offering and introduced a general policy of giving 
Acer's employees stock options. For ordinary operators, ifthey had been with the 
company for three years, they were eligible to buy up to USD $5,000 worth of company 
stock each year at its book value per share. For senior executives, they could become a 
shareholder after they had joined Acer for three months (Roy, 1989). Such a tinancial 
incentive system was innovative in Taiwan then and in many ways was very similar to 
those at many Silicon Valley start-ups. 
Under this incentive pro gram, Shih's personal stake in the ownership of Acer gradually 
declined from 60% to 10%, while Acer's employees increased their share to about 70% 
over the years. Thanks to a spectacular bull stock market in Taiwan at that time, the price 
of Acer stock grew sixfold, rising from NT $25 (USD $0.7) per share to over NT $150 
(USD $4.3). As a result, Acer had produced many middle-class families in Taiwan. 
Furthermore, it created a strong relationship between the management and the workers. 
While there were conflicts between the management and the laborers in other Taiwanese 
tirms, there were few such conflicts at Acer (Shih, 1996). 
8.1.4. Shih's Vision 
Compared to its tiny office and shoestring budget upon founding, Acer had a grand vision. 
Shih wanted to promote the technology of microprocessor machines in the Taiwanese 
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market and create a world-class enterprise for the people in Taiwan. In other words, Shin 
wanted to grow Acer as the Sony of Taiwan, transforming the image that "made in 
Taiwan" is inferior into a symbol of quality (Shih, 1996). 
Shih' s first-time encounter with the microprocessor was in 1972 when Qualitron sent him 
to Los Angeles to buy microprocessors produced by Rockwell. After learning from 
Rockwell that microprocessors could be applied to traffic-light controllers, medical 
instrument and slot machines etc, Shih felt that that microprocessor would be the core 
technology of this new industrial revolution (Zhou, 1996). 
Before Shih's initiative, there was little local development in Taiwan's personal computer 
industry. At that time, though foreign firms like Radio Shack PC, Sord, Commodore, 
Apple and Aim products were imported to Taiwan. Yet, due to the fact that the Taiwanese 
lacked sufficient knowledge of computers and the Taiwanese GNP was low, high-priced 
foreign personal computers did not gain popularity in Taiwan's market. This in tum 
discouraged indigenous firms from entering this highly immature market (No, 2001). 
In order to promote microprocessor technology \Vith limited financial resources, Shih 
placed high importance on technical capabilities. For example, in founding Acer, Shih 
spent 70% of the USD $25,000 initial capital buying microprocessor-related equipment 
for his engineers (Bartlett and George, 1998). Furthermore, Shih promoted the technology 
ofmicroprocessors by giving lectures to enthusiastic young Taiwanese engineers. 
Regarding themselves as "gardeners of microprocessor machines," Shih and his 
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colleagues opened training centers in north, middle and south Taiwan. In the first four 
years, about 3000 engineers participated in the classes on microprocessor-based design 
offered by Acer. Participants learned, for example, how to write computer programs to 
control the microprocessor. Sorne ofthem became the key figures in Taiwan's IT industry 
(Zhou, 1996). 
Shin also published a professionaljournal called "Gardener's Words" to introduce the 
latest technology of microprocessors. At first, the circulation was about 2,000 and later, 
the figure rose to 20,000. In 1982, Acer also held computer exhibitions to promote 
microprocessors in Taiwan's 21 counties. Later in 1986, Acer initiated a campaign called 
"One-Thousand-Computer Classroom" in which people could try the then-expensive 
personal computer in person. This campaign attracted 100,000 people (Zhou, 1996). 
8.2. 1980S: ACER'S CLONING BUSINESS 
8.2.1. 1982: The Government Ban on Game Video Machines 
Like most small personal computer makers in Taiwan, Acer was engaging in the business 
ofmaking video game machines in the early 1980s (Saxenian, 2001). Acer imported the 
microprocessor components and development system from Texas Instruments of USA to 
Taiwan. Thanks to the business of game machines, Acer's operation grew 11.5-fold, 
rising from NT $12 million (USD $400,000) to NT $150 million (USD $4.2 million) 
(Common Wealth, 1982). The total sales of game machine-related industries in Taiwan 
was then USD $130 million with an annual growth rate of 94.3%. 
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At that time, the game machine was so popular that many elementary school students 
were addicted to it. They stole their parents' money and lingered in the commercial game 
machines stores untillate night. Under the social pressure from parents groups, Taiwan's 
Executive Yuan banned game machines officially in March 1982. Shih said the official 
ban "cut off one arm" of Acer. The ban on game machines also put many electronics 
firms into difficulties (Hong, 2003: 113). 
8.2.2. 1982: Turn to Counterfeiting Apple Computer 
Suffering from the government's ban on game machines, Taiwanese electronics firms 
sought ways to take advantage of their stocks of electrical components. Surprisingly they 
found that the heart of the game machines was exactly the same as that of the Apple II 
6502 microprocessor. They started assembling computers modeled on the Apple II. 
Thanks to this c10ning business, the electronics sector became Taiwan's most important 
industrial export sector, reaching USD $2 billion in 1984. It should be noted that at that 
time, Taiwanese firms that c10ned Apple computer c1aimed they knew little about 
copyright law. Most of them were unaware that they were violating the patent of Apple 
Computer. In fact, Apple computer found out that, in Taiwan's culture, "imitation is a 
compliment, not a crime" (Lachica, 1989). 
However, unlike most Taiwanese firms that imitated Apple II, Acer decided to start from 
scratch to design its personal computer, which was called Microprofessor II. Though the 
design of Microprofessor II was based on a concept similar to Apple II, Acer' s 
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Microprofessor II had a completely different appearance because Acer spent a lot of 
effort not only in reducing its size, but also in simplifying the design and structure. 
ln line with Shih's vision, the mission of the Microprofessor II computer was to help 
engineers and students in Taiwan learn the microprocessor technology in an easy way. 
Compared with Apple computer, it was not a breakthrough product. Yet, thanks to its 
cheap price, it became an instant hit in Taiwan (Roy, 1989). Moreover, to Shih's pride, 
the Microprofessor II caught international attention. For example, in Germany, it was 
selected as one of the annual Ten Outstanding Computer Products; in the UK, it was the 
coyer story of Your Computer magazine (Shih, 1996). 
8.2.3. 1983: Suit from Apple Computer 
Soon after, there were more than 100 firms in Taiwan cloning the designs of Apple II 
(Saxenian, 2001). The names of counterfeit Apple II computers went from Pineapple to 
Apollo. It was estimated that 60% of the world's pirated computers come from Taiwan. In 
fact, those cloning businesses would not have prospered without govemment tolerance. 
The last time that Taiwan's copyright laws were amended was in 1964 (Shao, 1984). In a 
1983 govemment document entitled "Intellectual Property Rights Protection, a Republic 
of China Perspective" read: 
The R.O.C govemment has viewed imitation as a necessary process in the 
evolution ofhuman civilization and believes that commercial counterfeiting is an 
inevitable phenomenon in most developing countries. Local officiaIs were 
cognizant of the negative aspects of the counterfeiting although they made little 
effort to accommodate overseas interests or enhance domestic enforcement efforts 
when such aspects were seen to be outweighed by the positive development of the 
industrial base (Wade, 1990: 268-269). 
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However, Apple computer could not tolerate those Taiwanese copycats and started to sue 
them in 1983. Six executives of computer companies in Taiwan were sentenced to eight-
month prison terms for counterfeiting Apple computers (Shao, 1984). Later, six 
individuals and five companies in the USA were charged with smuggling fake Apple 
computers from Taiwan (Inman and Dolan, 1984). Furthermore, Apple computer 
pressured Taiwan's Ministry of Interior to register Apple's computer software though 
Taiwan's copyright law did not include software at that time (Noble, 1998). Consequently, 
the clone market for Apple computers started to wither in TaiWan. 
Apple also targeted Acer' s high-profile Microprofessor II by starting to sue Acer' s 
distributors in the UK and South Africa first, then in Taiwan and finally in the USA. 
Though Acer' s Microprofessor II had a completely different appearance and circuit 
design as mentioned earlier, Apple did find that the technical manual of Microprofessor II 
plagiarized sorne pages of Apple's manual. Under the pressure of Apple, Acer had no 
choice but to discontinue developing its Microprofessor II (Shih, 1996). 
8.2.4.1983: Turn to Cloning IBM-XT 
Meanwhile, IBM pursued a different route than Apple. IBM purchased the 
microprocessor and software operating system from outsiders in the hope that it could 
introduce personal computers more quickly than Apple. Thus, unlike Apple computer, 
IBM's personal computer was non-proprietary, which meant IBM made the specifications 
for linking various components freely available. This measure offered a window of 
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opportunities for Taiwanese computer firms to enter the personal computer business 
(Langlois and Robertson 1992). 
At that time, Shih was attending a computer exhibition, COMDEX in Las Vegas. The 
most impressive computer to Shih was the personal computer introduced by Compaq. It 
outshone the computers of Digital Equipment, Texas Instruments, Wang's Lab and 
Hewlett-Packard because it was the first IBM-compatible computer after IBM introduced 
its personal computer in 1981. 
Inspired by Compaq and sued by Apple, Shih and other Taiwanese computer firms 
decided to promote the development of IBM compatible personal computers (Shih, 1996). 
Lacking required technological capabilities, they turned to Taiwan's ITRI for help. It 
soon organized the Multi-Client Project, in which five Taiwanese firms participated. 
Engineers from ITRI were sent to American Wang Computer for technical training in 
order to transfer system production technology. Then, after acquiring the rights for DOS 
from Seattle Computer Products, ITRI developed its own version of the software 
operating system (Fuller, 2002). In September 1983,25 months after IBM launched its 
XT PC, ITRI successfully introduced Taiwan's IBM-compatible personal computers 
(Hong, 2003). 
In the next year, 1984, based on the technological foundation laid by the ITRI, Acer 
introduced the world's second 80386.:.based personal computer, before IBM did. Acer's 
80386-based personal computer was equipped with an Intel 80386-25 MHZ processor 
190 
and was able to handle 6 million instructions per second. Commenting on the 
development ofthis computer, Shih said: "it was an important development for us. We 
convinced people everywhere that Taiwan is not on1y a copycat. It can also create a 
leading product" (Roy, 1989: 17). 
Soon after, however, in February 1984, Acer's first IBM compatible personal computers 
were detained by the USA customs in Seattle. IBM charged Acer that the BIOS designed 
by ITRI infringed on its copyright. After learning that ITRI was a non-profit research 
institute, IBM allowed Acer' s computer to reenter after modification. At that time, IBM 
just complained about Taiwanese firms cloning its compatible computers, and did not 
take concrete actions to protect its patent. IBM knew that it was benefiting from the 
cloning business through which it could gain more global market share than its main 
contender, Apple (Mc Gregor, 1988a). 
8.2.5.1987: Suit from IBM Computer 
Once the cloning business in Taiwan started to take off, IBM took action. It was 
estimated that IBM-compatible personal computers manufactured in Taiwan had more 
than 25% of the world market with an export value of USD $1.3 billion. In March 1987, 
IBM undertook its patent-licensing campaign in Taiwan and demanded Taiwanese firms 
pay 1 % ofpast and future sales revenue. IBM claimed that it had more than 30,000 
patents on the personal computer and on average, small- and medium-sized Taiwanese 
firms would violate from 70 to 10,000 patents (McGregor, 1988a). 
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Soon after IBM's action, the TaipeiComputer Association (TCA) held many public 
discussions with its members to help them deal with this issue. After the meeting, more 
than 30 firms out of200 decided to sign a three-year licensing contract with IBM. But 
Shih was reluctant to sign because "IBM' s offer was an insulting contract that constituted 
'economic colonialism'." Shih said: 
The signing of the licensing agreement itself was not controversial, but the content 
of the agreement was often one-sided. The scope of the licensing was very narrow 
(license only up to 16-bit computers) and IBM could terminate the agreement at 
any time on its own (1996: 61). 
Due to the Acer's reluctant attitudes, in April 1987, IBM announced that it would raise 
the royalty from 1 % to 5% of sales revenue. Eventually IBM compromised and agreed 
that Acer was given a lead-time between notification of infringement and enforcement of 
penalty, and if Acer could not solve the issue during that period oftime, IBM would take 
legal actions. Business representatives from IBM and other American computer firms also 
pressured the Taiwanese government to undertake a complete overhaul oflaws of 
intellectual property (Wade, 1990). Meanwhile, a report issued by the USA International 
Trade Commission also indicted that Taiwan was the largest source of counterfeit goods. 
In the wake of the multinational's vigorous lawsuit, Taiwan's Interior Ministry proposed 
the Copyright Law. Shih, then-chairman of the TCA, also made efforts to contribute to 
the passage of the Copyright Law. At TCA, Shih organized a task force composed of 
representatives from IBM Taiwan and other Taiwanese computer firms, and law 
prof essors from the National Taiwan University. The task force then compared the 
intellectual property right acts of Japan, the USA and Germany to the proposed version of 
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Interior Ministry, and then made suggestions to the government. In addition, TCA also 
created a Product Registration System and encouraged customers to buy computer-related 
products that were registered in that system (Noble, 1998). 
8.3. 1990S: ACER'S BUSINESS OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT 
MANUFACTURING 
8.3.1. The Trade Conflict between Japan and the USA 
Meanwhile, there was a trade conflict between Japan and the USA in the late 1980s. The 
trade conflict provided Acer and other Taiwanese computers firms with a window of 
opportunity to enter the business of original equipment manufacturing (OEM). Through 
the 1970s, Japanese firms had been the dominant players in the international OEM market. 
Yet things started to change by the end of 1980s. In 1987, Toshiba was found to have sold 
the Soviet Union four computers and a computer pro gram to help the US SR build their 
submarines. In doing so, Toshiba violated the regulations ofCOCOM, an acronym of the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls. 
The COCOM was created in 1950 and headquartered in Paris. Countries of COCOM 
included Japan, Australia, and aIl NATO countries except Iceland. !ts main function was 
to keep strategic weapons out ofreach of communist countries. Because of Toshiba's 
violation, the USA government imposed a 100% punitive tariff on Japanese personal 
computers (The Wall Street Journal, 1987). As a result, it became very costly for the 
USA-established computer companies to outsource key computer components from Japan. 
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During the trade conflict between the USA and Japan, Taiwanese small- and medium-
sized entrepreneurial firms moved quickly to take advantage of this opportunity for OEM 
production and embedded themselves in international production networks. There were 
approximately 5000 small- and medium-sized enterprises in Taiwan's electronics industry 
that were supplying more than half of modems, optical scanners, and local-area-network 
circuit cards used in the world (Engardio, Dawson and Hof, 1996). Despite their size, all 
the se firms shared one characteristic: they were willing to work weekends and holidays 
just to meet the demanding deadlines set by their clients. In one way or another, 
symbiotic relationships started to emerge between Taiwan's entrepreneurial SMEs and 
established high-tech firms in the USA. 
Previously, multinationals had their international purchasing offices located in Japan and 
South Korea, and now IBM, HP, AT&T, Apple Computer, and Compaq were aIl setting 
up their international purchasing offices in Taiwan (LaPedus, 1995b). To secure 
guaranteed access to key components manufactured in Taiwan, most of the multinational 
personal computer corporations behaved like Taiwanese firms, emphasizing guanxi when 
they interacted with Taiwanese firms. Instead of sending their lieutenants, CEOs came to 
Taiwan to cultivate good personal relationships with the OEM manufacturers. By contrast, 
multinationals that operated outside this relationship network sometimes ran into 
problems in manufacturing due to lack of adequate communications (Dedrick and 
Kraemer, 1998). 
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Through such close interactions with industry leaders, Taiwanese computer firms 
received a constant flow of precious feedback information on product design. By sending 
their engineers abroad for training in foreign firms, universities, colleges, and R&D 
institutes, Taiwanese firms could also become informed about the technology evolution 
roadmap and product specifications (Tanzer, 2001). 
8.3.2. Acer and IBM 
Like other Taiwanese computer firms, Acer also benefited from the trade conflict 
between the USA and Japan. In the beginning of 1990s, Acer made 60,000 to 80,000 
notebook personal computers per month for Apple, Hitachi, Fujitsu, and other Japanese 
companies. Acer's OEM business grew dramaticaIly in the mid 1990s, rising from USD 
$642 million in 1994 to USD $1.18 billion in 1995. By the end of the 1990s, OEM 
products accounted for about 40% of Acer's turnover (LaPedus, 1996b). 
The OEM relationship between Acer and IBM was noteworthy. In 1996, IBM provided 
Acer with a USD $1.8 billion contract, under which Acer manufactured and distributed 
up to 80,000 desktop persona! computers a month under the IBM brand name. To 
facilitate the OEM arrangement, IBM also agreed to cross-license aIl patents related to 
manufacturing its personal computers. Under this agreement, Acer could research and 
manufacture personal computers without worrying that it might infringe on IBM' s 
intellectual property. This was the first time IBM signed an agreement like this with a 
Taiwanese firm (The Wall Street Journal, 1996b). 
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Through this cooperative OEM arrangement, IBM reduced its manufacturing costs by 
about 15% while Acer could improve its technology capability. For example, IBM had 
transferred technologies ofhard-disk and large-screen active-matrix LCD technology 
(Moltzen and Raum, 1999). In the case of LCD technology that is widely used in portable 
personal computers, LCD monitor, and other video display products, Taiwanese firms had 
been lagging several generations behind Japan in the LCD market. As a result, Taiwanese 
computer firms needed to import LCD technology worth more than USD $1 billion from 
Japan. Based on the LCD technology transferred from IBM, Acer built a USD $600-
million AM-LCD plant in Hsinchu Taiwan and quickly developed the manufacturing 
capabilities to produce high yields ofLCDs driven by amorphous silicon thin-film 
transistors (Kovar, 1998). 
However, there was a downside for Acer in being an OEM manufacturer for IBM. 
Though their OEM relations were complementary, if symbiotic, there were still "tensions 
and conflicts over power, control, and the sharing of rewards," as typical of the 
interactions between local firms and the multinationals (Becker, 1991: 110). First, Acer 
was subject to IBM's technological regime. For example, On May Il, 1989, IBM 
informed Acer that Acer infringed on the copyright oflBM's software BIOS. Meanwhile, 
a book published by Acer that introduced the IBM BIOS was also found to be violating 
IBM's intellectual property rights. The author of the book, a prof essor at the National 
Taiwan University, included a couple ofpages of IBM BIOS manuals in the appendix 
(Shih, 1996). 
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Acer was surprised at IBM's litigation because Acer had been selling IBM-compatible 
computers for several years and IBM had been keeping silent and did not take any action 
before then. Yet at this time, as Acer was growing bigger and bigger, IBM could no 
longer tolerate the presence of Acer in the market and decided to ask Acer to pay royalties 
retroactively; otherwise IBM would sue Acer for infringement on IBM's intellectual 
property in personal computers. 
One senior manager at Acer said: "1 would have thought that would have indicated they 
[IBM] didn't plan to object." Acer was asked to pay at least 1 % of sales from 1983 to 
1989 and the rate would be higher if Acer refused to do so (Carroll, 1988). Acer had been 
selling about USD $500 million ofIBM-compatible personal computers annually since 
then and IBM representatives asked Acer to pay about USD $30 million. Acer was 
shocked and many key managers suggested Shih turn to government for assistance. 
However, Shih said: "For average companies facing such a situation, most would 
probably seek political channels for resolution. But Acer decided to solve the problem on 
our own and negotiated with IBM on a long-term basis" (1996:63). Acer tried to 
negotiate with IBM over the issues of patents but just ran into an impasse due to IBM' s 
stubbom and aggressive attitude. Eventually, Acer paid IBM USD $9 million, the profit 
ofthat year, to settle this case (Shih, 1996: 62). 
Second, Acer was subject to the contract decision ofIBM because in addition to 
Taiwanese OEM manufactures, there were many large USA OEM electronics 
manufacturers firms that had factories around the world. Due to the fact that Taiwanese 
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firms did not control much of the technology of design or manufacturing, they did not 
have much advantage over their American competitors. For example, in 2000, IBM 
decided to terminate the OEM relationships with Acer and switched to Solectron Corp., a 
USA company. It led to Acer's losing USD $644 million in annual revenue (Clendenin, 
2001). 
In order to break out of this technological dependency relationship with multinational s, 
Acer endeavored to move its technological capability to another level. For example, in 
1991, Acer developed Chipup technology, an innovative design combining a slot with 
self-testing circuitry that could help upgrade a 386 microprocessor to a 486 one without 
changing the entire board (Beckert, 1992). Two years later, Acer licensed Chipup 
technology to Intel and customers of Intel CPU could automatically have the right to use 
it without paying royalties to Acer. In the late 1990s, Acer and Intel signed a patent cross-
license agreement that motherboard-level technology was cross-licensed between Acer 
and Intel without royalty payment (Morris, 1995). 
8.4.19908: ACER'8 IMPERATIVE TO GO INTERNATIONAL 
Thanks to the OEM business, Taiwan emerged as a key producer of information products 
at the beginning of 1990s. More than 5,000 domestic smaIl- and medium-sized 
manufacturers accounted for 25% of aIl IBM-compatible personal computers sold in the 
world.Taiwan gradually transformed itselffrom labor-intensive, low-tech economy to a 
high-tech, capital-intensive one as high technology information industries gradually 
replaced the textile industries. As the East Asian Executive Reports (1996: 22) wrote, 
"Taiwan has passed Germany and moved into third place among the world's leading 
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producers of information technology (IT) products (behind the USA and Japan), and IT 
has become its leading export industry." 
Acer contributed 24% of aIl Taiwan personal computers exports, 2.8% of aIl worldwide 
IBM personal computer-compatible sales and 4.4% of aU 80386-based personal computer 
shipments in the world. In 1989, with 5,500 staff, sales of USD $740 million and a 
distribution network in 76 countries, Acer rolled out its one-millionth personal computer. 
With such performance, Acer gained the reputation ofrole model for Taiwanese firms. 
Taiwanese university students selected Acer as the best company to work for. The 
turnover at Acer had been under 5% per year, which was far less than the Taiwanese 
average (Bartlett and George, 1998). 
At this point, Shih hoped to enhance the level ofinternationalization of Acer. Compared 
with Japanese and Korean firms, Taiwanese firms need more internationalization because 
they have a much smaller domestic market. Shih described his vision as "the Rampaging 
Dragon Goes International." Shih hoped someday Acer could "shake the cheap image of 
goods made in Taiwan" and "become a genuine global brand" (Shao, 1987). 
However, though it was an imperative for Taiwanese firms to go international, the 
govemment still held a conservative view towards international business and therefore its 
policies were not very encouraging. Govemment was afraid that the investment abroad 
might evade tax. As a result, according to Shih, "Taiwan govemment has applied too 
stringent rules on overseas investment." He continued: "When applying for permission 
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for overseas investments, the government has a justified reason to tighten its control in 
order to prevent company capital from flowing overseas" (Shih, 1996: 128). 
8.4.1. Expanding the Capacity 
Nonetheless, to fulfill his vision of intemationalizing Acer, the company first spent USD 
$15 million on doubling capacity ofits manufacturing sites at Hsinchu, Taiwan, in 1989. 
This manufacturing facility had five floors, each the size of two football fields, producing 
about 600,000 personal computers per year (Bartlett and George, 1998). In the same year, 
in Malaysia, Acer also built its first overseas manufacturing plant worth USD $20 million 
to manufacture color monitors and keyboards (Goldstein and Baum, 1990). 
In the 1990s, Ace accelerated its capacity expansion. In the period of 1992-95, it set up 
34 assembly sites in each ofits major markets around the world (Shapiro, 1995). In 1997, 
Acer built its fust manufacturing plant outside Asia in Mexico in order to speed the 
delivery of personal computers and personal computer-based subassemblies for its OEM 
customers in North America. By the end of 1990s, Acer has 39 just-in-time assembly 
plants in 35 countries including, among others, Penang, Malaysia; El Paso, Texas; Tilburg, 
Netherlands; Subic Bay, Philippines; Mexicali and Juarez, Mexico; and Cardiff, South 
Wales (Tsai et al., 1999). By deploying manufacturing sites globally, Acer hoped to 
develop a full product line. Acer had high-end products manufactured in the USA; 
middle-ended products in Taiwan; and had low-ended products in Malaysia and 
Philippines. 
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8.4.2. Vertical Integration 
In addition to globally expanding its manufacturing capacity, Acer also tried to produce 
key components itselfto secure the supply of the raw material. For example, in 1987, 
Acer entered the business of application-specific, integrated circuit by setting up Acer 
Laboratories. As a wholly Acer-owned subsidiary, Acer Laboratories was an IC design 
house specialized in the fields ofpersonal computer chip sets, multimedia ICs, and 
computer input/output chips (Hardie et al., 1996). 
In 1989, Acer joint forces with Texas Instruments (TI) to build a USD $250 million 
memory-chip plant. The product was DRAM chips, the most important computer memory 
used to perform computer programs, and it made up 25% of the cost of a computer. Acer 
had signed agreements with Texas Instruments regarding the intellectual property issue. 
By cooperating with TI, Acer hope to secure the supply ofDRAM, because back in the 
late 1980s, Acer was unable to obtain an adequate supply ofDRAM chips from 
multinational manufacturers (Goldstein and Baum, 1990). Usually Taiwanese firms were 
last in the pecking order ofDRAM manufacturers, far behind the USA, Japan, and 
Europe. At times, Taiwan's computer firms even suffered an average 40% shortage of 
DRAMs (Lammers, 1995). 
The Acer-TI plant occupied about 10 hectares with monthly production of 20,000 pieces 
ofDRAM. Acer owned 58%, Texas Instruments, 26%, and the Taiwanese government, 
through the China Development Bank, owned the rest. Tl also had an option to increase 
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its stake in this joint venture up to 51 % over the next five years. It was TI' s first DRAM 
production capacity on the Pacific Rim outside Japan. About 300 employees in total were 
hired in the first stage with the technical assistance of 30 experts from TI. Acer also sent 
its engineers to TI's subsidiary in Japan for advanced technology training programs 
(Zipser, 1989). 
It should be noted that through the late 1970s, Shih did not support the idea that Taiwan 
should develop semiconductor technology. However, by the end of 1990s, Shih thought 
Taiwan was ready to start DRAM production because in his opinion, Taiwan local 
information industry had reached a technological plateau and needed upgrading. At that 
time, the growth rate of Taiwanese high-tech industry was only 4%, compared with the 
average of 50% in the 1980s. This dec1ine was due to the fact that Taiwanese firms were 
not able to manufacture labor-intensive electronic products after local wages rose. Shih 
thought Taiwanese firms had to switch to develop high-end and innovative products to 
maintain their competitive edge. Now as the large st semiconductor manufacturing plant 
and armed with the most advanced technology in Taiwan, Shih hoped Acer could bec orne 
one of the world's leaders in the high-technology industry (Shih, 1996). 
By the strategy of vertical integration, Acer became the only Taiwanese personal 
computer fimi that made key components itself, and was also one of the most vertically 
integrated manufacturers in the world, with product lines ranging from motherboards, 
monitors, keyboards, CD-ROM drives to bare-bone machines. Gregg Prendergast, a 
former Acer America vice-president, said one of the sources of Acer's competitive 
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advantage was that Acer was very vertically integrated: "we are making a lot of our own 
components. We make our own DRAM, motherboard, and BIOS and that gives us an 
advantage in that we are less reliant on third-party suppliers" (Hulme, 1998). 
8.4.3. Global Brand and Local Touch 
In 1986, Acer entered the European market and established a marketing office in 
Dusseldorf and a warehouse in Amsterdam. In 1992, Acer started up a regional personal 
computer distribution centre in Dubai, United Arab Emirates in 1992. One year after Acer 
set up a Middle East Branch in Dubai, Acer became the No. 1 personal computer brand in 
Bahrain. In 1993, Acer began marketing its computer in Russia where it later became the 
second leading brand-name in personal computer markets (Feller, 1997). In 1994, Acer 
formed a 50-50 joint venture with local firms to market its computer in Latin America. 
With the help oflocal firms, Acer secured the No. 1 spot in Mexico's market with a 32% 
market share (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1994). Sales revenues of Acer Latin 
America grew 10 times in the period of 1990 to 1994 and reached about USD $200 
million. In 1995, Acer formed a joint-venture with New Delhi-based Wipro, which had a 
majority 55% ownership (Huang, 1995a). 
Acer explored global markets by a concept called: "global brand, local touch" (Bartlett 
and George, 2001: 7). Because the vast majority of Acer's managers in Taiwan lacked 
personal knowledge of foreign cultures and thus they were incapable of executing 
international marketing campaigns. Acer tried to involve local partners in foreign 
countries by letting them take a majority interest. Having intimate knowledge of the 
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market, local partners usually had established good relationships with local distribution 
networks. Acer also encouraged local managers' entrepreneurial initiative by providing 
them with stock options so that they could purchase stock at book value (Tsai et al., 1999). 
Acer contributed to its local partners' business by providing Acer brand name and low-
cost manufacturing capabilities. The cost of marketing campaigns to promote Acer's 
brand name was shared equally. Moreover, along the way, Acer gradually replaced 
Taiwanese managers working in the foreign subsidiaries with local ones. By such 
arrangement with its local partners, Shih hoped Acer would become a borderless global 
conglomerate, expanding into overseas markets without consuming too much financial 
resources. 
8.5. ACER'S INTERNATIONALIZATION UNDER LIU 
Given Acer's strong imperative to internationalize its business, Acer thereby relaxed its 
traditional policy of promoting people from existing employees. Acer started to recruit a 
steady stream of retumed Taiwanese managers from abroad, especially from the Silicon 
Valley in the USA. Shih hoped those people with overseas experience could help Acer 
explore international markets. 
Acer's recruiting process was a democratic one. Candidates for a management position 
were interviewed by their future subordinates who were asked to judge whether 
candidates have competence and experience to confront managerial challenges. Many of 
those overseas Taiwanese experts came back to Taiwan because they encountered glass 
ceilings in American companies (Bartlett and George, 1998). Over the years, Acer had 
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brought in about a dozen top-Ievel executives and 100 middle managers and at times 
outsiders made up approximately 30% ofits executives (Mills and Wei, 1994). Among 
those managers recruited from abroad, the most influential one was Leonard Liu. 
Before joining Acer, Liu had been working at IBM for 20 years. With a Ph.D. in electrical 
engineering from Princeton University, he was the Chinese who had the highest position 
at IBM in charge of USD $1 billion business. Shih and Liu met in a Chinese food 
restaurant in New York in the summer of 1988 (Zhou, 1996). Shih was quite impressed 
by Liu's professional knowledge in the computer industry and his international 
management expertise. Shih hoped that Liu could spearhead Acer's intemationalization 
and help confront the intense competition in the computer industry. At that time, Acer's 
gross margins fell from about 35% in 1988 to about 25% in 1989 and computer prices 
dropped about by 30% due to intense competition (Bartlett and George, 2001). 
On April 17, 1989, Liu was appointed as the President of Acer, responsible for the 
personal computer and bilingual systems business unit. Shih still retained the title of CEO 
and was responsible for trading, education businesses as weIl as corporate functions. 
When asked why he joined Acer, Liu said, "Acer has the potential to become the first-rate 
global Chine se computer company." As a twenty-year IBM veteran, Liu felt that his 
challenge was to integrate his international experience with Acer's way of conducting 
business to create a new Acer culture" (Common Wealth, 1998: 175). When asked how he 
would manage Acer, he answered: 
When it cornes to managing a Chine se firm, the core issue is discipline. Chine se 
people are much more into relationships and ignore discipline. Nonetheless, at 
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sorne point when a corporation grows bigger, it will be hard to maintain its growth 
momentum Without adequate discipline" (Common Wealth, 1998: 175). 
8.5.1. Restructuring 
Judging from his more than twenty years of experience at IBM, Liu thought that Acer was 
a loosely organized entrepreneurial organization. Therefore, after taking his position, the 
first thing Liu did was to bring discipline to Acer by restructuring former product 
divisions into strategie business units (SBUs) and regional business units (RBUs). SBUs 
were organized along product lines, like standard personal computers, portable computers, 
peripheral products, and servers, and were responsible for product development and 
manufacturing. RBUs were organized around geographic markets and were responsible 
for product marking and distributing. Operating as a profit center, each unit was asked to 
manage itself as independent entity, to formulate and implement its own strategies to 
meet profit objectives (Bartlett and George, 1998). 
8.5.2. Mergers & Acquisitions 
8.5.2.1. Counterpoint 
Through a series of mergers and acquisitions, Acer hoped to build a diversified 
conglomerate that could compete with Japan's Hitachi and South Korea's Samsung 
Group. In 1987, to have system-developing capability, Acer acquired a small high-tech 
startup, Counterpoint for USD $6 million. Counterpoint was a USA-based manufacturer 
oflow-end minicomputers that had developed its own brand-name minicomputer that 
could serve between 6 and 128 users simultaneously (The Economist, 1992). 
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8.5.2.2. Service Intelligence 
In 1989, in order to promote the Concer mini computer launched by Counterpoint, Acer 
acquired Service Intelligence for USD $500,000, an enterprise that specialized in 
providing services to computer users. However, the internal audit and control system of 
Service Intelligence did not match the sales of the Concer. The inventory management 
and payment collection system were not weIl installed; therefore, payments were not even 
collected after computers were shipped out (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2004). 
Furthermore, it turned out that Concer had a technical flaw in its socket that did not 
connect as designed, and it took a long time to solve this problem. Meanwhile, the fast 
development of the 32-bit personal computers attracted users of minicomputers 
(Montagu-Pollock, 1992.). As a result, the financial performance ofConcer was 
disappointing, and Acer lost USD $10 million. By the end of 1989, Acer shut down most 
ofCounterpoint's factories. The loss was about 40 times Acer's original investment, 
inc1uding inventory cost, operating expenses and severance pay. 
8.5.2.3. Altos 
However, Acer was not discouraged. In 1990, Acer acquired Altos, a USA firm 
specialized in developing multi-user minicomputer employing UNIX, a popular operating 
system. With revenues of more than USD $700 million in 1989, Acer paidUSD $94 
million to acquire the Altos brand, its technology and its distribution network in order to 
advance Acer's development in the USA market. Founded in 1977, Altos had 700 
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employees and marketing distribution channels in 60 countries (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
2004). 
However, again, the emergence of personal computers with more powerful functions 
offered an alternative means to multi-user networking mini computers. As a result, the 
acquisition of Altos led Acer to lose USD $125 million in 1990. Nonetheless, as Shih said, 
through Altos, Acer had acquired UNIX technology and distribution channels of Altos, 
and it also facilitated Acer' s entrance into the high-end product field (The Economist, 
1992). 
This was the first time that a Taiwanese firm undertook a series of acquisitions in USA 
high technology industries. It was reported that cross-cultural management emerged as an 
issue. After acquisitions, Acer usually retained the original top management team of the 
acquired company and just sent a team of junior, inexperienced managers from Taiwan. 
As mentioned earlier, Shih had instilled a philosophy ofpoor man in the formative years 
of Acer, thus from the perspective of Taiwanese managers working in the acquired firms 
in the USA, they felt the managers were extravagant and high-profile, while on the other 
hand, USA managers felt they were monitored by their Taiwanese subordinates. 
8.5.3. Farewell, Liu 
In April 1992, Liu left Acer due to the huge 10ss of USD $24 million in 1991 incurred in 
the series ofmergers and acquisitions. This was Acer's first 10ss in its history. Besides the 
disappointing financial performance, senior managers at Acer felt that Liu' s management 
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style did not fit Acer's culture. In contrast to Shih's supportive, family-oriented 
management style, Liu' s management style was more authoritarian and number-oriented. 
Liu's case was the epitome ofthe outsider manager parachuting into Acer. Like Liu, 
many of them prefer formaI reports to hands-on management. One Acer manager 
complained: "They sit in the office aIl day long and ask us to report to them. After our 
report, they do not make decisions. It seems that everyone is forced to engage in paper 
work, and do not know why." Another employee recaIled: "the manager of the R&D 
department is also requested to do paper work. He is an R&D guy; now instead of doing 
sorne research, he is scratching his head to fiIl the form because superiors ask him to 
propose his top ten goals every week." Shih commented likewise on outside professional 
managers: "Acer has introduced a lot of outside professional managers. However, they 
did not know Acer's culture very weIl ... they came to Acer because we promised to 
provide them with high compensation" (Zhou, 1996: 228-229). 
8.6. ACER'S INTERNATIONALIZATION UNDER SHIH 
8.6.1. Aeer's Response to International Priee War 
Amid the conflict between Liu and Acer, the global personal computer industry was 
undergoing a dramatic change. Previously at the beginning of development of the 
persona! computer industry, the first-tier computer firms, like IBM and Compaq, could 
charge a premium over second and third-tier vendors by offering more reliable and more 
innovative products and services. Now things had changed. In the early 1990s, 
differences in reliability and performance among persona! computers from different 
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vendors gradually diminished as semiconductor firms had tried to integrate more high-
performance functions into fewer chips. Along with the improvement of hardware, 
differences in functionality of software also faded away since programs written for one 
vendor's personal computers could also work on other personal computers. As a result, 
personal computers became more commodity-like and price began to play a dominant 
role in consumers' purchasing decisions. A price war was on its way (Mills and Wei, 
1994). 
In the summer of 1992, Compaq Computer took the lead to cut the prices of its personal 
computers by as much as 30%. Other personal computer companies had no other choices 
but to quickly follow suit. Sorne personal computer vendors, like Dell, responded to the 
Compaq price war by eliminating the middlemen, selling personal computers directly to 
customers over the telephone and the Internet according to customer needs. Other vendors, 
like Gateway, also employed a similar strategy to develop more direct, cost-effective 
relationships with their customers (Mills and Wei, 1994). 
Under the pressure of international competition driven by the price war, many Taiwanese 
computer firms' market share plummeted dramatically and as a result, they were forced to 
focus solely on the OEM business, and gave up developing their brand-name computers. 
Previously it was estimated that roughly 40% (compared to Acer's 70%) of the average 
Taiwanese computer firm's sales were from branded products and they had tried to gain 
recognition of their technological and marketing capabilities by promoting their brand-
name computers (The Economist, 1992). 
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However, compared to their international competitors, their relative small scale limited 
their ability to afford innovative product development and international distribution 
networks. To survive this price war, Shih came up with a strategic idea called Smiling 
Curve. He sensed that in the personal computer industry, high value-added activities were 
shifting away from system design and assembly to manufacturing key components and to 
marketing. 
8.6.2. Fast-Food Business Model 
Shih translated his rather abstract concept of Smiling Curve into a more concrete Fast 
Food Business Model. Shih got the inspiration of Fast Food Business Model while he was 
having a meal in a Chine se restaurant in Mexico. Spending about 40% of the time 
traveling around world, Shih liked eating Chinese food; however, at times, he found that 
the quality ofChinese food varied from one place to another. Shih's first reaction was to 
apply McDonald's ways of cooking fast food in order to have the same standard of 
Chine se food everywhere. 
As a CEO of a computer company, he intuitively linked McDonald' s ways to the business 
of computer. It occurred to him that the nature of the personal computer was very similar 
to that of fast food: the faster, the betler. The product cycle of the personal computer was 
narrowing from approximately one year in the mid 1980s to just three months in the early 
1990s. Based on this observation, Shih concluded that, as is the case with the fast food 
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industry, time 'management was the key to survival and success in the personal computer 
industry (Johnstone, 1994). 
Previously Acer shipped finished computers by sea to their foreign target market. 
However, in doing so, first, it took an average of four to five weeks in total to 
manufacture components and build personal computers in Taiwan. Then it took another 
five to seven weeks to ship by sea to the USA, and then to go through distribution 
channels and finally to reach the customers. When personal computers finally arrived at 
the store shelves, they may have been overpriced due to prices and currency fluctuation 
during this period. 
Moreover, dealers and distributors working for Acer had to be able to accurately forecast 
what configurations, like the type of microprocessor, amount of memory, amount of disk 
storage, etc., that customers would buy in order to prevent the occurrence of a short 
supply or large inventory of personal computers. Furthermore, to differentiate 
commodity-like personal computers among different vendors, Acer's retail channels in 
foreign countries usually asked Acer to provide different configurations of their products 
and requests as such usually tumed out to be a hard task for Acer to accomplish from 
several thousand miles away (Mills and Wei, 1994). 
Now under the Fast-Food Business Model, Acer managed to deliver different components 
accordingly to their varying life cycles to solve the aforementioned logistics problems. 
Acer shipped by sea computer parts and components whose prices did not change very 
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much to more than 20 assembly operations in Asia, Europe, and America from factories 
in Taiwan and Malaysia. Components shipped by sea included monitors, power supplies, 
fans, and keyboards. Acer shipped by air computer parts and components that were 
expensive or time sensitive, like motherboards, to ensure delivering the up-to~date 
technologies. On arrivaI, those components were assembled in local plants with the other 
components, like microprocessors, disk drives, and memory that were sourced locally to 
tailor to customers' needs (Bartlett and George, 1998). 
Furthermore, to realize fully the potential of the Fast-Food Business Model, Acer had 
redesigned its personal computers to have higher flexibility in configuration so that they 
could be assembled more easily and more efficiently. For example, Acer offered four to 
five designs of motherboards and three chassis to its customers. Every motherboard could 
store different Intel microprocessors and fit into any of the three kinds of chassis. 
Through the above approaches, preparation time of an Acer computer could be minimized. 
The turnover of its inventory was seven times higher than before, which helped Acer have 
a 34% return on equity while the industry average was 15% to 20% (Kraar, 1995). 
8.6.3. The Aspire Computer 
By the mid-1990s, Acer had been engaging in USA corporate, government, and customer 
markets. In 1995, in order to exp and its presence in the USA, Acer decid~d to focus on 
thefast-growing home-user segment by developing a multimedia personal computer. At 
that time, it was estimated that one out of every three households in the USA, or 30 
million in total, owned a personal computer (Lohr, 1993). Sales to USA consumers were 
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growing at an annual rate of about 21 %, whereas sales to the corporate market were 
growing at a rate of only 9% (Carlton, 1994). 
Meanwhile, Acer's competitors, including Compaq, IBM, and Packard-Bell were also 
developing home personal computers at the same time (LaPedus, 1995b). Acer outpaced 
its competitors by launching Aspire computer, which fulfilled Shih's vision of Acer as an 
OBM rather than OEM firm. Shih said, "an OEM is not really in control ofhis destiny." 
He insisted that Acer's "goal was to become an OBM-meaning an Original Brand-name 
Manufacturer" (Bartlett and George, 1998: 7-8). 
Aspire Computer was launched in 1995. In the first month, Aspire sold 40,000 units; the 
second month, the volume doubled to 80,000. Shih expected that "this product will make 
Acer a household consumer electronics brand" (Bartlett and George, 2001 :4). Aspire was 
an advanced multimedia home personal computer. It was the first one based on Windows 
and Intel microprocessor that could compete with Apple computer in external design and 
ease-of-use multimedia features. It aimed to exploit the emergence of the World Wide 
Web, the Internet, audio, telecom, and video. However, the volume of sales in the third 
and fourth months decreased to less than 60,000 and 35,000, respectively, due to 
technical flaws in the CD-ROM tray. The rate ofproduct retumed reached 15% and there 
was USD $100 million in losses in the USA market (Bartlett and George, 2001). 
Due to the declining performance in the USA market, Acer was advised to give up the 
USA market. However, Shih only conceded to narrow Acer's focus in the USA to sorne 
214 
niche markets. He "believed even a toehold in America is critical to maintaining a global 
brand." For firms competing in the IT industry, the USA market was the main source of 
new technology, and new marketing tactics because it had the most sophisticated lead 
users in the world that could stimulate innovation. To have a greater presence in the USA 
market may have sounded like a mission impossible; however, Shih said "aH of our 
people are ready to fight for that mission" (Moore and Burrows, 1998: 29). 
Despite the problems in the USA market, by 1998, Acer had grown to 23,000 employees 
in 129 companies with 17 manufacturing plants and 30 assembly facilities in 24 countries. 
Acer sales units were located in 44 countries, with particular strength in the developing 
country markets. Although Acer was only the eighth large st brand for personal computers 
in the world overaH, it was the number-one brand in 12 countries in AsiaIPacific, South 
America, and the Middle East, and in the top five in over 30 countries (Bartlett and 
George, 2001). 
8.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Referring to the trends of the computer industry and their implication for the developing 
countries, Flamm wrote: 
The bottom line is that government plays a central role in investments in computer 
technology around the world ... The practical significance of the ubiquitous role of 
government in technology investments is that such involvement is one of the rules 
of the game everywhere (1988: 10). 
Flamm's observation may be valid in most developing countries (e.g., Brazil, see Evans, 
1986). However, the growth of Acer occurred without direct investment by the 
government; instead, the government even got in the way in its formative years and was 
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not very encouraging about Acer' s intemationalization. In addition to the state, it is 
observed that the social sector and the market also played influential roles regarding the 
growth of the Acer. How each ofthem got involved in the key strategic actions of Acer is 
reviewed here. 
8.7.1. The State 
The founding of Acer was encouraged by Taiwan's economic system that was composed 
of a myriad of small- and medium-sized enterprises competing freely among themselves 
with little govemment intervention and protection. Ferguson and Morris praised Taiwan's 
"strong entrepreneurial tradition," as rankingjust second to that of the USA (1993: 179). 
The origin of such a cultural and economic system could be traced back to the historical 
condition sketched in the Chapter 3. In other words, the state provided an environment "in 
which the private sectors' creativity and responsibility could be maximized" (Kim, 1997: 
39-40). Such a context fostered the "bootstrap strategy" of Acer and other Taiwanese 
small personal computer firms (Levy and Kuo, 1991). Their entrepreneurial orientation 
and propensity to take risk and experiment led to continuous incremental innovations of 
local products. 
Though the national context was friendly to the operations of Acer, due to social pressure, 
the state had a direct yet negative impact on the growth of Acer in its formative years by 
banning the business of game machines, the main source of its revenue. Taiwanese 
govemment could have done something to smooth Acer's exit from that industry. 
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Furthennore, when Acer intemationalized its operations, the state was not very supportive 
either. This rather anns-Iength, if antagonistic, relationship between the state and private 
entrepreneurship could be traced to the Taiwanese government's stance since the WW II 
in discouraging small businesses from growing into big business. This persistent 
government mindset illustrates Schumpeter's observation: "social... attitudes are coins 
that do not readily melt. Once they are fonned they persist" (1942: 12). 
8.7.2. The Social Sector 
Lam and Clark (1994) maintained that, given the lack of direct linkage from Taiwan's 
entrepreneurship to its government, there must be something more than state leadership in 
the economic development of the island. In fact, there were two important social sector 
organizations in Acer's history: the ITRI and the Taipei Computer Association (TCA). 
ITRI transferred technology from Wang Computer in the USA to Acer to help it enter the 
personal computer industry. In other words, not-for-profit research institutes could 
provide nascent entrepreneurs with "access to skills and knowledge" (UN, 2004: 15). As 
Gerschenkron (1962) has pointed out, less developed countries are fortunate to have pools 
of technologies in the developed countries to tap into. 
The Taipei Computer Association (TCA) helped Acer defend itselffrom IBM's lawsuit 
once Acer had entered the personal computer industry. The finding here is contrary to the 
conventional negative view that holds that most of the trade associations are inclined to 
seek rents instead ofpromoting common interest (for example, OIson, 1982). The 
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difference between the finding here and the literature may be due to the fact that the high 
dependence of the Taiwanese computer industry on exports turned its association focus 
into something positive, such as building the competitive advantage of its members 
(Rogowski, 1988). In conclusion, it may be argued that, without help from these two 
social-sector organizations, Acer might have had difficulty entering and securing its place 
in the competitive personal computer market. 
8.7.3. The Market 
Aiso similar to the case ofUMC, multinationals in the market played two contrasting 
roles in the history of Acer. On one hand, they tried to destroy Acer's technologicai 
capability. For example, even though Acer did not copy Apple's computer, and in fact 
came out with its own version of the Microprofessor II computer, Apple still proceeded to 
undertake legal action to drive Acer out ofthe market in that Acer's user manual included 
Apple's copyright material. Another example was IBM, which sued Acer many times to 
protect its intellectual property. Both companies also put pressure on the government to 
take action to wipe out the copycats in the market. 
On the other hand, Acer relied on the multinationals to upgrade its technological 
capabilities. One way to explore the international market for new technology-based 
products was through undertaking a series of acquisitions; and the other approach was 
through cooperative OEM arrangement with the multinationals. In the words ofHobday 
(1995a: 1171), "the OEM and subcontracting system acted as a training school for local 
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firms." Through such relationships, indigenous firms gained knowledge of "export market 
needs," and had access to "foreign technologicallearning." 
The next chapter presents the case of VIS. Like UMC in Chapter 7, VIS was a spin-off 
enterprise from ITRI. Yet as it is shown, the historical context under which ITRI spun off 
VIS was quite different from that ofUMC. Moreover, unlike UMC and Acer which built 
strategie alliances with the multinationals, VIS insisted on going it alone to develop its 
own technology. This search for technology autonomy leads to performance discrepancy 
among UMC, Acer and VIS. 
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CHAPTER9 
VANGUARDINTERNATIONALSEMICONDUCTOR 
This chapter presents the birth, the growth, setback and eventual decline of Vanguard 
International Semiconductor (VIS), based in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Founded in 1995, VIS was 
the ITRI's last spin-offin the semiconductor industry. After a brief description of the 
historical background of 1990s, this chapter tracks the key strategic decisions and their 
contexts throughout the history of VIS. The chapter concludes with sorne remarks about 
how three sectors influenced the development of VIS. 
9.1. 1990: THE SUBMICRON PROJECT 
By the end of the 1980s, ITRI felt that it wanted to move its R&D projects from niche 
ones into core segments in the semiconductor industry. Meanwhile, the Taipei Computer 
Association (TCA) also brought up the issue of the short supply ofDRAM (Meaney, 
1994), an important memory component used in personal computers. There was great 
pressure from the computer industry to secure the source ofDRAM. In the early 1990s, 
employing more than 454,000 people, Taiwanese firms in the computer industries 
manufactured more than 80% of the global motherboard market, 60% of modems, 55% of 
scanners and 50% ofkeyboards and monitors. And there was only one local firm, TI-Acer, 
a joint venture between Texas Instruments and Acer, manufacturing DRAM. As the 
second large st import item next to petroleum, the import value ofDRAM was USD $2.39 
billion, and much of the imports came from Japan (Singer, 1997). 
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At the same time, the Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) also 
recommended to ITRI that DRAM was a critical component for the growth of the IT 
industry. STAG had been criticizing ITRI for its focus on local entrepreneurial initiative 
and small-scale manufacturing instead of engaging in capital-intensive high-technology 
industry. Founded in 1978 under the premier's office to advise and oversee technology 
policy, ST AG was composed of foreign technological experts who previously worked in 
IBM, TI, and other prominent research laboratories. STAG's advice was highly regarded 
by the government because members had no stake in certain industries (Meaney, 1994). 
Furthermore, STAG estimated that when it came to integrated circuit process capabilities, 
there was a significant gap of over 4 years between Taiwan and other advanced countries 
(Meaney, 1994). The concem ofSTAG was that if Taiwan was to build a competitive 
computer industry in the global market, it was inevitable that Taiwan had to develop its 
own DRAM industry. 
ln responding to the concems ofSTAG and TCA, ITRI initiated the Submicron Project in 
1990 to enter the DRAM industry to boost indigenous IC manufacturing capabilities. 
With a budget of USD $275 million, the time frame of the Submicron Project was five 
years. The ultimate goal was that the spin-off ofthis project would rank among the 
world's top five companies in DRAM business within 10 years. It also aimed to provide 
20% of the domestic need to decrease Taiwan's heavy reliance on Japan's imported 
DRAM (Huang, 1995b). 
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This project was monitored by Submicron Advisory Committee, organized by Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. This committee consisted of members from the research institutes, 
independent international experts, industry, govemment agencies and universities. The 
head of Submicron was Dr. Chih-Yuan Lu, an experienced engineer at Bell Labs before 
he joined ITRI. Born in 1950 in southern China, Lu went to Columbia University for his 
master's and Ph.D. degrees after his undergraduate education in Taiwan. When back in 
Taiwan, he served as Deputy General Director ofERSO at ITRI from 1989 to 1994. Lu 
supervised a research team that averaged 200 in the Submicron Project (Lu, 1997). 
It should be noted that though Submicron was the large st research project ever in 
Taiwan's history, it was relatively small compared to its competitors in South Korea. 
After visiting Samsung's R&D department, Lu lamented, the R&D team ofSamsung was 
composed of about 8000 engineers, while the number of Submicron team was less than 
one-tenth oftheirs (Wu, 2002). 
Etron Techno10gy was responsible for the design work of the Submicron Project. Etron 
Technology was founded by Dr. Nicky Lu in 1991, who was Dr. Zhi-yuan Lu's brother. 
Born in 1953, he went to Stanford for his Ph.D. degree after his education in Taiwan. 
After his study, he worked in the Research Division and Techno10gy Products Divisions 
at IBM as researcher and manager from 1982 to 1989. In 1991, he was elected a fellow of 
the Institute ofElectrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Following his brother, he 
retumed to Taiwan to start up Etron (C1endenin, 2005). 
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Unlike previous projects at ITRI, Submicron Project drew solely on the retumee 
professionals. With the growing semiconductor industry in Taiwan, it was observed that 
more and more overseas Chine se professionals were returning to Taiwan to pursue their 
careers. In the period of mid-1950s to the early 1980s, an estimated 50,000 Taiwanese 
students stayed in foreign countries, mostly in USA where they got their advanced 
degrees and less than 10% decided to return to Taiwan (Common Wealth, 1983). 
However, by the end of the 1990s, the retuming figure rose from 10% to 30% (Saxenian, 
1999). 
According to statistics from Taiwan' s National Science Council and National Y outh 
Commission, in the period of 1990 to 1994, there were roughly 23,000 Taiwanese 
professionals, most ofwhom had Ph.D. or master's degrees in engineering, science or 
medicine, who retumed to Taiwan. Returnees chose to come back to Taiwan to advance 
their career in part because they encountered a glass ceiling in North America and in part 
because Taiwan's stock market kept rising after the mid-1980s, which provided strong 
financial incentives for them to retum (Swinbanks, 1995). 
Two kinds of consortia were organized under the Submicron Project. The first one was 
the Working Consortium of the Submicron Project that had two members, UMC and 
TSMC, firms previously associated with ITRI. The fees for each ofthem was NT $129 
million (USD $5 million) and engineers from two companies were sent to work withthe 
ITRI team. The other was Users Consortium, in which six local semiconductor firms 
joined. The participants received the up-to-date design rules developed by the Submicron 
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Project. They also used the laboratories and equipment of the Submicron Project. If they 
decided to commercialize the design mIes, they could turn to TSMC and UMC, 
participants of the Working Consortium, for manufacturing process technology (Choung 
et al., 1999). 
9.2. 1993: CONFRONTATION BETWEEN ITRI AND THE PRIVATE FIRMS 
Soon after in 1993, the research team of the Submicron Project successfully developed 
the first 16-M bit DRAM. This made Taiwan the fifth country in the world that had such 
technological capabilities. As ITRI planned to commercialize the technology by way of a 
spin-off, a confrontation between the ITRI and the local semiconductor firms arose. 
The confrontation arose because some local Taiwanese firms had entered the DRAM 
business at the same time. Since 1989, Acer had beenjoining force with Texas 
Instruments to manufacture DRAM (see Chapter 8). Several other local Taiwanese firms 
were also about to form strategic alliances with USA and Japanese firms to acquire the 
latest submicron technology in order to close the technological gap with large firms in 
developed countries. These local firms did not rely on ITRI as a source of technology as 
they had before. 
The reason that ITRI still wanted to engage in the DRAM business was that TI-Acer was 
not an independent indigenous entity. The technology was transferred from TI and the 
products were sold under the TI logo. In other words, Acer did not gain the technological 
capability to manufacture the DRAM independently. As Morris Chang, chairman ofITRI, 
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said: "We don't have an independent DRAM producer in Taiwan and DRAMs are a very 
important product" (Clifford, 1993a: 71). 
However, sorne senior researchers at the ITRI he1d a different point of view regarding this 
project. As Dr. Chih-tein Hsing, the ex-head ofthe ERSO at ITRI, described the situation 
in detail: 
A new situation arose: the private firms invested huge amounts of capital in R&D, 
international cooperation prevailed recently, and rapidly growing (Taiwanese) IC 
firms possessed the capabilities to negotiate with foreign partners. AIl these 
resulted in a fact: ERSO was no longer the unique local technology supplier for 
the IC industry. What the private sector now requested from us had changed to 
auxiliary research and industry services which were not suitable to be individually 
provided (ERSO 1994:156). 
Furthermore, the social context for a national innovation policy had been changing for the 
past twenty years. At the beginning of the development of Taiwan's semiconductor 
industries, the political system in Taiwan was the one-party (i.e., KMT) system that 
adopted a top-down approach to manage high-technology industries. Insulated from 
society, technocrats were given special status in the decision making process and were 
only accountable to the KMT leadership. As a result, with full support from the 
govemment, ITRI was exempt from social criticism. As Chintay Shih, vice-president of 
ITRI said: 
ln the past, there was no industry ... The govemment and sorne smart guys sat 
together and decided 'here is what we are going to do.' Now there are smart guys 
in each company. There are visionaries in business (Clifford, 1993: 54). 
By the 1990s when ITRI was undertaking the Submicron Project, Taiwan's politica1 
system was transforming from an authoritarian one to a democratic one in which people 
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dared to voice their.criticism of government policy. Martia1law was lifted and opposition 
parties were allowed to form in 1987 and the traditional top-down bureaucratic planning 
approach to implement high-technology policies was no longer acceptable. 
It was the first time in Taiwan that democratization in the political system had a direct 
impact on the development ofthe high-technology industries. For example, UMC, a 
former spin-off created by the ITRI, argued that ITRI should not create a spin-off from 
the Submicron Project in the market. Doing so would constitute unfair competition since 
ITRI had invested at least NT $6.2 billion (USD $230 million) in the Submicron Project. 
UMC even suggested that ERSO should no longer engage in technology projects (Hsu, 
2000). 
During the conflict between ITRI and private sector firms, C.C. Chang, the principal 
architect of the Submicron Project, left the project after 14 years with ITRI because he 
had lost faith in the ITRI's mission. He said, "when we began ... I felt we were doing 
something big and useful for our country and ourselves. But I could no longer convince 
myse1fthat we were doing good" (Science, 1993: 358). He suggested that government 
support for the industry could go directly to the private firms instead ofusing ITRI as an 
intermediary . 
In sum, ITRI was criticized for having monopolized the government grants and highly 
trained human resources that were much needed by the private firms. Private firms were 
questioning how the budget was used and what benefit could they get from this industrial 
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research. Sorne firms were even asking government to divert the financial resources from 
supporting ITRI to subsidizing private firms directly. For example, in forming a joint 
venture with Texas Instruments, Acer had asked government to invest NT $1.2 billion 
(USD $38.7 million) to support the facility expansion (Clifford, 1993b). 
During this protest, private entrepreneurs also pleaded that the budget of the ITRI be cut. 
As a result, ITRI's 1994 annual budget was down from NT $15 billion (USD $456 
million) to NT $8.8 billion (USD $260 million). Researchers at ITRI were disappointed to 
see their effort was not appreciated. Of course, there were still firms that thought ITRI 
was helpful to the semiconductor industry. For example, Tsai Nasa, vice-president of 
Mosel-Vitelic, argued that the project had given indigenous firms valuable experience in 
fabricating chips on 8-inch silicon wafers which differed from the industry' s current 
standard of 6-inch wafers. He said, ITRI "was the first to build an 8-inch [facility] ... The 
project has also given local companies the confidence to invest in their own advanced 
manufacturing technology" (Science, 1993: 359). 
Nicki Lu, chairman of Etron Technology, also said: 
The developed technology is one generation ahead of what the industry is doing 
now ... That technology exercise is very important, because of the experience it 
gives local designers in chip architecture, lithography, and clean-room technology 
(Clifford, 1993b: 54). 
In other words, due to the small scale and limited experience ofTaiwanese semiconductor 
firms, projects initiated by ITRI could provide local engineers, for example, with a variety 
of training in the advanced areas of chip architecture, lithography, and clean-room 
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technology. Moreover, the technology that ITRI was researching was one generation 
ahead of what the industry was doing now. 
ITRI also argued that it was less helpful to have just a few firms in the semiconductor 
industries. T 0 be able to compete in the international market, indigenous firms should 
develop their technological capabilities through intense domestic competition which 
would require more local firms. The spin-off ofthe Submicron Project could enhance the 
intensity of competition. 
Furthermore, Morris Chang, Director of ITRI argued that the DRAM industry was too 
strategically important to leave it to the private sector. Citing the examples of Japanese 
govemment-sponsored chip design consortia, and the USA Sematech project, he 
maintained that ITRI should play a crucial role in upgrading Taiwan's semiconductor 
industry. He said: "1 do think that the way we are doing it benefits the large st segment of 
the industry ... Everybody can have access to the results" (Clifford, 1993b: 54). 
Nonetheless, after this controversy, ITRI declared that it would not spin off new entities 
from its research projects in the semiconductor industry. Instead, its role shifted from 
commercializing research via spin-off to providing industrial services to the private sector. 
T 0 raise enough financial resources, ITRI started accepting R&D proposaIs from private 
firms or actively invited private companies for opportunities to work together (Hong, 
2003). 
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9.3. 1995: THE FOUNDING OF VIS 
By the end of the Submicron Project, the research team had produced 400 technical 
reports, 40 of which were published in international joumals, and more than 100 patents 
had been granted or were pending (Choung, Hwang, and Hwang, 1999). And the 
Submicron pilot DRAM plant was opened for bids in 1994. Many potential firms were 
invited, inc1uding TSMC, TI-Acer, UMC and Formosa Plastics. However, it turned out 
that only TSMC attended the auction, while other private firms announced that they 
preferred to proceed to build their own factories. TI-Acer's profit was about NT $1 billion 
(USD $28.5 million) then; UMC planed to build its own factory; and Formosa Plastics, 
the largest conglomerate in Taiwan, was contacting IBM and Siemens to seekjoint 
ventures. 
A new firm VIS was founded based on the Submicron Project. More than 300 
experienced engineers and operators transferred to VIS from the Submicron Project. The 
total capital was NT $18 billion (USD $514 million) and the govemment took a 32% 
stake, TSMC, 23% and Il other small investors took the rest (Hsu, 1997). Most ofVIS's 
top management had international experience. Its founding president, Bob Evans, had 
spent 33 years working at IBM where he was the President of the System Development 
Division. In 1991, he was awarded a Computer Pioneer Award from the Computing 
Society of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers for his contribution in 
developing mainframe computers in the 1960s (Musil, 2004). 
Its Chairman was Morris Chang. Born in 1931 in Southern China, Chang moved to the 
USA in 1949 when civil war raged between the KMT and the Communist Party. In the 
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USA, Chang received bachelor and master' s degrees in mechanical engineering from 
MIT and his Ph.D. in electrical engineering from Stanford. In 1958, he started his 25-year 
career in Texas Instruments and eventually was promoted to a Group Vice-President 
responsible for TI's semiconductor business in global markets. In 1984, he switched to 
General Instrument Group, serving as President and ChiefOperating Officer. In 1985, he 
came back to Taiwan and worked as the President and Chairman oflTRI (Chen, 1998). 
In 1996, VIS had moved from 4-M bit to 16-M bit DRAM, and planned to advance to 64-
M bit DRAM (LaPedus and Cataldo, 1996). In 1997, VIS was the first indigenous firm to 
develop a fully functional 64-M bit DRAM with 0.25-micron manufacturing process in 
the laboratory (LaPedus, 1996c). VIS's achievement was remarkable in Taiwan's 
semiconductor industry because Taiwan had been trying to catch up with Japanese and 
South Korean semiconductor firms. 
At that time, Acer was joining force with TI to build a 64-M bit DRAM factory. As the 
first local firm to engage in the DRAM business, Acer' s relations with TI could be traced 
back to 1989 when they joined force to manufacture 4-M bit DRAMs. TI-Acer began 
manufacturing 16-M bit DRAM products in 1995 with halfthe production sold to Acer 
Computer and the rest sold in the international markets were under the TI logo (LaPedus, 
1995a). 
Another early local moyer in the DRAM industry was Mosel-Vitelic. In 1993, Mosel-
Vitelic built its DRAM factory with the Japanese firm Oki, based on the latter's 0.45-
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micron technology. Before merging, Mosel and Vitelic were two separate start-ups 
founded by overseas Chine se engineers in Silicon Valley. They shifted most oftheir 
operations to Taiwan in the mid-1980s. In 1995, Mosel-Vitelic received the R&D grant of 
NT $140 million (USD $4 million) for its NT $300 million (USD $8.5 million) 64-M bit 
DRAM project from the Science-based Industrial Park Administration Bureau. By the end 
of the project, Mosel-Vitelic teamed up with German Siemens to form a USD $1.7 billion 
joint venture, ProMOS, to manufacture 64-M bit DRAM. In this joint venture, Mosel-
Vitelic owned a 62% stake while Siemens owned 38% (Carroll and Clarke, 1993). 
ln stark contrast to Acer's and Mosel-Vitelic's approaches, VIS did not form strategic 
alliances with the multinationals; it sought to maintain its autonomy in technological 
capability. Lu, the Director of Submicron, said that "isn't the basic mission of a 
technological project to endow our local industry with technological independence?" (Pan, 
1995) Therefore, VIS relied mainly on published research to conduct its R&D. As one 
researcher described: 
The Japanese and Koreans have tried many different approaches to making 0.25-
micron SDRAM. Here we look at their research and find the most efficacious path 
toward commercial 0.25-micron SDRAM. Since we are a small company, we 
can't afford to be research leaders. We have to build on what has been published 
in the researchjournals (Carroll, 1997: 58). 
At that time, there were also other private firms entering the DRAM business. For 
example, in 1995, Nan Ya Technology transferred 16- and 64-M bit DRAM design, 
process and packaging technologies from Japan's Oki to build a USD $700 million 
fabrication factory (Lammers, 1995). An affiliate of Formosa Plastics, Taiwan's large st 
corporate conglomerate, Nan Ya Technology had more financial resources than its 
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Taiwanese competitors; it built the largest single clean room at 12,600 square meters. In 
1999, Nan Ya turned to IBM Microelectronics for O.2-micron process technology to 
manufacture its 64-M bit DRAM. Unlike sorne other DRAM firms that sold their 
products under the logo oftheir foreign partners, Nan Ya sold its products with its own 
logo to the customers in Taiwan, Hong Kong and China (LaPedus, 1996a). 
Previously those Taiwanese conglomerates had invested in traditional industries, 
inc1uding plastics, textiles, and wire and cable industries and had no interest and were 
reluctant to invest in the earlier stages of development of Taiwan's semiconductor 
industry; yet now, they were lured by the prosperous DRAM business, whose revenue 
jumped from $406 million in 1993 to $1.5 billion in 1996 (LaPedus, 1997b). There were 
plenty of opportunities for potentiallocal DRAM entrants due to the fact that Taiwanese 
computer manufacturers had been suffering from chronic memory shortages and had been 
importing DRAMs from Japanese, Korean, and USA suppliers. 
A widely held view was that Taiwan's industry was last in the customer in the pecking 
order for DRAM suppliers, behind Japan, Europe and the USA. As a result, Taiwan's 
system and motherboard companies suffered an estimated 40% shortage of DRAMs in 
early 1990s. Therefore, firms in personal computer-related industries planned to vertically 
integrate backward. For example, Umax Group, large st scanner maker and second largest 
motherboard manufacturer in Taiwan, teamed up with Japan's Mitsubishi and Kanematsu 
in 1995 to form Power Chip. In building its 16- and 64-M bit DRAM wafer fabrication, 
Power Chip sent a team of 35 engineers to Mitsubishi for six months for training in 
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design and process technology. Halfthe production output was sold to Umax Group and 
the rest was sold on the international market under the Mitsubishi logo (LaPedus, 1995a). 
Although Taiwanese firms had become very active inDRAM businesses in recent years, 
they still did not pose a major threat to the Japanese or Korean memory giants. Their 
products were sold to firms in Taiwan and Southeast Asian nations that manufactured 
computer components and parts. The Taiwanese firms were relatively small compared to 
their Japanese and Korean competitors. For example, Samsung of South Korea, the 
world's large st DRAM maker, had total IC sales of more than $10 billion in the mid-
1990s, which was greater than Taiwan's entire semiconductor industry. Moreover, 
compared with 98,000 units in Japan and 95,000 units in South Korea, only 19,000 8-inch 
IC wafers were manufactured in Taiwan each month (Central News Agency, 1996). 
In the midst of many Taiwanese firms jumping on the DRAM bandwagon, the global 
DRAM industries gradually started suffering overcapacity. Before 1994 in Taiwan, there 
were only two firms in this business, and suddenly there were about more than 10 chip 
plants under construction. At that time, in the global DRAM industry, there were 32 
fabrication factories located in the USA, Japan and Europe, 5 in South Korea and 1 in 
Singapore (Huang, 1995b). 
9.4. LATE 1990S: THE INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION OF VIS 
Due to the increasing number of competitors in the domestic market, VIS entered the 
North American semiconductor market in 1997. It established a USA subsidiary called 
VIS Micro. In 1998, it entered the European market by collaborating with an English 
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distributor to sell VIS's DRAM products in selected markets in northern Europe, 
including Ireland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (LaPedus, 1998). 
In order to back up its international expansion, VIS joined with Taiwan Semiconductor 
Manufacturing to expand its capacity. Together they spent USD $2.1 billion building a 
300-mm fabrication factory in Hsinchu, Taiwan (Dorsch, and Morrison, 1999). In order to 
enhance its technological capabilities, VIS bought an Il % stake in Powerchip 
Semiconductor in 1999 for about USD $83 million. In exchange, Mitsubishi, the main 
shareholder ofPowerchip, transferred 0.2- and O.l8-micron DRAM process technology as 
well as its 64- and 128-M bit DRAM product designs to VIS and outsourced its 
production to VIS (Chen, 1999). 
9.4.1. Competitive Attacks from the Multinationals in the Market 
However, VIS's expansion encountered sorne setbacks in the international market. In 
1997, TI asked sorne of Taiwan's DRAM companies to pay patent royalties of3% to 10% 
retroactively by which TI could collect approximately USD $40 million. Over the past 
decade, TI had collected more than USD $2 billion from patent royalty payment from 
every DRAM maker in Japan and South Korea that had signed a DRAM licensing 
agreement with TI (LaPedus, 1997c). 
VIS was the Taiwanese firm that was most affected by TI' s move because, Acer, for 
example, had formed a strategic alliance with TI. Mosel-Vitelic obtained its DRAM 
technology from Japanese firm Oki that had cross-licensing with TI; its other joint 
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venture with Germany's Siemens AG that had the same agreement with TI. Finally, VIS 
reached a 10-year patent cross-licensing agreement with TI. Under this agreement, VIS 
would pay royalty for 5,000 TI patents (DeTar, 1997). 
Later in 1998 after TI's move, Micron Technology filed a DRAM dumping petition with 
the USA government against VIS and other Taiwanese DRAM firms, arguing that due to 
the dumping practice, the imports ofTaiwan's DRAMsjumped from 6% in 1997 to 10% 
in 1998. Exporting USD $427 million worth ofDRAMs, Taiwanese DRAM 
manufacturers accounted for 6.7% of total USA DRAM imports in 1997 (Central News 
Agency, 1998). 
Micron also cited the fact that Mitsubishi closed its DRAM factory in the USA as 
evidence of Taiwanese firms' predatory price strategy. Micron charged VIS with selling 
chips at 52% below cost and accordingly was to be imposed tariffs of9.56% (Robertson, 
1998). The litigation from Micron signaled that Taiwanese firms should not expand their 
capacities in a much-crowded global DRAM market. 
9.4.2. Competitive Response from Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association 
During the litigation, Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association (TSIA) assisted 
Taiwanese firms on this suit. TSIA sent its Secretary-General to Washington D.C. to 
organize a workshop in which Taiwanese firms involved in this case and Micron were 
invited to attend (Central News Agency, 1999). Furthermore, in response to the case filed 
by Micron, TSIA also filed a lawsuit with the Taiwan's Ministry of Finance in 1999 
235 
claiming that five key DRAM enterprises from Japan, Korea, and USA, including Micron 
and others, had been dumping their products from 1997 to 1998 (Carroll, 1999). Taiwan 
was the first country to respond to the USA firm's antidumping charges by initiating a 
retaliating suit in its own country. 
TSIA hoped that by using such aggressive litigation tactics, it could counteract Micron's 
suit. Genda Hu, President of the TSIA, said "Taiwan is only executing its law within the 
island to protect its industry from being hurt by others' illegal pricing" (Robertson, 1999). 
TSIA maintained that USA manufacturers were dumping their DRAMs products at prices 
more than 46% below the normal market price (Carroll, 1999). Morris Chang, Chairman 
of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing and VIS, supported TSIA, arguing that 
Taiwanese semiconductor firms were forced to take actions like this to protect their own 
stake in the memory business (LaPedus, and Chen, 1999). 
Accordingly, after USA tentatively imposed punitive tariffs up to 31 % on VIS and other 
Taiwanese firms, Taiwan's Trade Investigation Committee issued a report claiming that 
the dumping practice of the USA semiconductor firms had been causing substantial harm 
to local enterprises and Micron was required to pay duties of 66.83% (Dickie, 1999). 
In response to this move, in 1999 the USA International Trade Commission determined 
that Taiwan's DRAM makers did not harm the USA DRAM industry in a significant way 
by exporting to the USA. In retum, officiaIs at Taiwan's Ministry of Economics claimed 
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that they could not find concrete evidence that Micron and other multinationals actually 
harmed local companies (Keliher, 1999). 
9.5.2000: VIS'S STRATEGIe REORIENTATION 
Amid the Micron's antidumping suits, the outlook of global DRAM business was not 
good for VIS. The price ofDRAM in the market was dropping in part due to the slowing 
growth of the global personal computer industry. The price ofa 4-M bit DRAM was 
about USD $12 to USD $13 by the end of 1995 and it was only about USD $3.5 by the 
end of 1996. The global DRAM market was shrinking from USD $19.8 billion in 1997 to 
USD $14 billion in 1998. Established Japanese and South Korean firms were suffering 
too. For example, NEC, Japan's largest semiconductor maker posted its first group loss in 
five years; other key players, Hitachi and Toshiba, were losing money too. Matsushita, 
Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Fujitsu, Samsung and Hyundai also decided to shut down their plants 
either for a period or permanently (Industry Sector Analysis, 1998). 
At that time, VIS just had a 1.9% market share in DRAM manufacturing, while the 
leading firms such as Hyundai, Samsung and Micron had 20% market share. Due to its 
rather small market share, it was hard for VIS to exploit scale economies to compete in 
the commodity-like DRAM business (Murphy, 2000). 
Compared to throat-cutting competition in the DRAM business, the rapidly growing 
foundry business was one of the most profitable segments of Taiwanese semiconductor 
industry. The demand for foundry wafers increased by 20% to 24% a year (Murphy, 
2000). Therefore, in the second half of the 1990s, many Taiwanese DRAM firms were 
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retreating from the DRAM business and entering the foundry business. For example, in 
1997, Powerchip, though still manufacturing DRAMs for Mitsubishi, entered the wafer 
foundry business to offer services for Taiwan's IC design houses with 25% ofits capacity 
(LaPedus, 1997a). In 1998, Nan Ya Technology also followed suit, moving into the 
foundry business at a time when the wafer foundry business was growing 50% annually. 
During that period, the price of a 16-M bit DRAM in the market was below USD $3 with 
manufacturing costs at USD $4.5 (LaPedus and Chen, 1997). As a result, VIS annual 
losses were about USD $136 million (Deveney, 1998). Finally, in 2000, VIS also decided 
to shift its 32,000-wafer-per-month capacity from DRAM manufacturer to foundry 
business. This move marked the end ofindigenous development ofDRAM technology in 
Taiwan. Morris Chang, the godfather of Taiwan's semiconductor industry once 
commented on VIS: "1 cannot help lament the death ofmy dream. As for VIS, 1 achieved 
nothing" (Liu, 2000). 
9.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
ln the early 1980s, Oison once tried to attribute Taiwan's economic development to a 
dearth of the social sector: "Countries with Taiwan's nearly complete absence of special-
interest organizations should be able to maintain something approximating full 
employment and full-capacity production" (1982: 218). With a negative view on the 
special interest organizations, like trade associations, OIson argued that due to their 
relatively narrow interests, they were inc1ined to seek unproductive rents and thus "reduce 
efficiencyand aggregate income" of a nation (1982: 47); and without the existence of 
those organizations, the potential of a nation's economic development could be released. 
238 
As this case shows, one decade after Olson's observation, Taiwanese firms were sued by 
the multinationals at a time when the function of the TSIA was quite positive. In addition 
to the social sector, it is also observed that the state and the market played influential 
roles in the growth of VIS. How each ofthem got involved in the key strategic actions of 
VIS is discussed below. 
9.6.1. The Social Sector 
There were two important social sector organizations engaged in the development of VIS: 
the not-for-profit research institute, ITRI, and the trade association, TSIA. When ITRI 
spun offUMC in the 1970s, there were virtually no indigenous firms in the 
semiconductor industries. Spearheading the course of development of the semiconductor 
industry, ITRI had successfully induced private capital to make investments. 
Therefore, as ITRI was about to spin offthe technical result ofthe Submicron Project by 
creating VIS in 1990s, there were already several private firms in the DRAM industry. 
The privilege of receiving financial support from the Taiwanese government and 
technology transfer from the ITRI bestowed on VIS "dominance by birthright" (Agarwal 
et al., 2004: 517). As David et al. noted (2000), because public1y funded R&D tended to 
crowd out R&D investment in the private sector, conflict erupted between VIS and the 
private firms. 
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Related literature suggests that, in general, social sector organizations should base "their 
sociallegitimacy on the premise that they exist to serve the needs of third parties" 
(Korten, 1990); and, in particular, the raison d'etre of public research institutes is to treat 
private firms as "final customers" to assist their growth (Breznitz, 2005: 157). Since the 
ITRI' s project would have led to indigenous firms being crushed, private firms voiced a 
challenge to the legitimacy oflTRI's engagement in the DRAM industry, arguing that 
ITRI' s strategy of developing Taiwan' s high technology industries by way of spin-offs 
should change to accommodate the level of maturity in the industry. 
However, despite protests from the industry, ITRI still spun off VIS. It is worth noting 
that, VIS' s experience was not a singular one. Surveying the performance of R&D 
institutes in several developing countries, World Bank found that, because "the se 
institutions receive preferential funding," and "some oftheir researchers are perceived to 
be spoiled and arrogant," their contribution to local industries "is consequently hotly 
debated" (1997: 28); and World Bank concluded that the most successful R&D institutes 
are those that "know their clients, [and] understand clients' needs" (1997: 5). 
In contrast to the controversial role of the ITRI, TSIA was more helpful to the industry as 
a who le. When VIS was sued by Micron, TSIA assisted VIS and other Taiwanese 
semiconductor firms fighting against the litigation. TSIA pressured the government and 
filed a lawsuit with Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, accusing multinationals of dumping 
their products in Taiwan' s market. In one way or another, TSIA tried to protect the 
technological capabilities of indigenous entrepreneurial firms. 
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9.6.2. The State 
The Taiwanese government's decision to support the Submicron project was based on the 
fact that it estimated that the technological gap of its semiconductor industry was about 
four years. Regarding the relationship between technology and the state's industrial 
policy, Nelson once wrote: 
There clearly is a new spirit ofwhat might be called "technonationalism" in the air, 
combining a strong beliefthat the technological capabilities of a nation's firms are 
a key source of their competitiveness prowess, with a belief that these capabilities 
are in a sense national, and can be built by a nation (1993:3). 
However, after the private entrepreneurs protested against ITRI's Submicron Project, the 
Taiwanese government cut the budget of the ITRI by half. With shrinking financial 
support from the government, the scale of VIS was small. According to Fuller et al. 
(2003), in 1997 the total IC sales revenue of Hyundai, the world's 14th largest IC 
manufacturer, was larger than the total sales revenue of aIl Taiwanese IC producers. With 
such tiny scale, it became difficult for VIS to ramp up its manufacturing capacity. 
Furthermore, when VIS was losing money in the DRAM industry, the Taiwanese 
government still kept an arm-Iength relationship in order not to provoke any prote st from 
the private entrepreneurs. And without continuing financial support from the government, 
VIS had no choice but to exit from the DRAM industry. In contrast, its South Korean 
counterparts could receive substantial subsidies from the government to expand their 
operations so that they could "accelerate leaming curve effect" based on the economies of 
scale (Cho et al., 1998: 501). 
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9.6.3. The Market 
Unlike UMC and Acer, in its quest for technological autonomy, VIS did not form 
strategic alliances with multinationals in the market to access the latest technology. 
During the Submicron Project, ITRI exclusiveiy drew on the high-caliber overseas 
Taiwanese human resources to conduct R&D. For example, Chih-Yuan Lu, the architect 
of Submicron Project, was a veteran of Bell Labs; and the design work was conducted by 
Etron Technology, which was founded by Dr. Nicky Lu, a former IBM researcher. 
In fact, the technological foundation laid during the period of Submicron period had 
provided VIS with absorptive capacity.40 As this case shows, VIS tried to absorb the 
technological knowledge through published research by Japanese and Koreans firms. 
However, given that it relied only on codified knowledge in published articles, VIS could 
not build up its competitive advantage by tacit knowledge and craftsmanship (Polanyi, 
1964). 
As Veblen pointed out long ago, in the process of technological catch-up 
what had to be borrowed and assimilated was not only a theoretical knowledge and 
practical insight into the industrial arts to be so taken over, but a personal habituation and 
the acquisition ofmanual skill on the part of the workmen employed" (1915: 187; italics 
added). 
40 According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), this notion refers to the capability of identifying, incorporating 
and exploiting external knowledge. 
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In other words, though obtaining explicit knowledge is helpful, it is crucial to acquire 
tacit knowledge through "long-continued training of large numbers of individuals-
apprenticeship" (Veblen, 1915: 187). Without the guidance of the technology expertise 
from the multinational s, it was very hard for VIS to have technological breakthroughs; 
and therefore it was gradually wiped out by competition in the DRAM market. 
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CHAPTERIO 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This final chapter discusses the findings, contributions, and implication ofthis study. It 
starts with laying out the finding of the six cases in terms of the roles of the government, 
the social sector and the market, and then proceeds to discuss the se in relation to the 
literature. It then discusses the contributions to the literature on economic development, 
entrepreneurship as well as international management. The issues of research implications, 
limitations, and future directions are addressed as well. Finally, this chapter ends with the 
author's perspective on economic development which emerged from this study. 
10.1. INDIGENOUS ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE THREE SECTORS 
From the six cases, one could conclude that in one way or another, these six firms were 
fighting an uphill battle, since they and their international competitors were unequal 
adversaries along two dimensions: scale of operations and technological capability. In 
terms of scale of operations, these indigenous firms began life as small and medium-sized 
enterprises: Chen had initial capital ofjust RMB 200 (USD $25) to set up ATSD, Lenovo 
had USD $24,000; and Acer, USD $25,000. Even though Great Wall, UMC, and VIS had 
a larger amount of start-up capital, they were still operating on a much smaller scale than 
their international established counterparts. 
In terms oftechnological capability, the local companies were lagging behind or were 
dominated by their international competitors. Three of the computer firms, Lenovo, Acer 
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and Great Wall, operated in a technological paradigm (Dosi, 1993) constituted by 
Microsoft's Windows and Intel's CPU. UMC had been trying to improve its technologies, 
but its attempts to enter the high-end semiconductor market were stilliess successful than 
expected; neither was VIS's endeavor to enter the DRAM industry a great success. Over 
all, all six cases echo what Hobday wrote, which is that the overall challenge of 
indigenous firms is to devise strategies that "systematically build internaI capabilities" 
(1 995a: 1172). Summing up the experiences ofthese six firms, one may well argue that 
the growth of indigenous firms hinged very much on their entrepreneurship, composed of 
entrepreneuriai intent and entrepreneurial capabilities, both of which were influenced by 
the three sectors (as will be discussed below, see Table 10.1 and Table 10.2). 
The state, the social sector and the market played varying roles in influencing the 
entrepreneurial intent and capabilities of these firms in three growth stages. It should be 
noted that it is somewhat arbitrary to distinguish these stages, and each stage may overlap 
with others. Moreover, each sector seems to be more germane at each stage, as Table 10.3 
shows. 
The following is some dominant patterns in the roles ofthese sectors. Initially, at the 
stage of getting started, where indigenous high-technology entrepreneurs endeavor to 
overcome barriers to start up, the govemment can foster and shape the entrepreneurial 
intent. Then, at the stage of getting there, where indigenous entrepreneurial firms seek a 
momentary safe spot in the market, the social sector can build and protect the capabilities 
offirms. Finally, at the stage of staying there, where the growth ofindigenous firms is a 
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matter of securing their positions amidst constant struggle and fight in the market, their 
capabilities were destroyed as weIl as enhanced by the multinationals. 
Table 10.1: The Roles of Three Sectors in China 
Sectors Impact Area ATSD Lenovo Great Wall 
Context 
The State Entrepreneurial Context Context Builder & 
Intent Builder& Builder& 
Champion & 
Champion Confronter 
Capability 
Builder 
The Social Entrepreneurial Champion & Capabilities Confronter Few Relationships 
Sector 
Capability 
Builder 
Capability Capability 
The Market Entrepreneurial Capability Destroyer & Destroyer & Capabilities Destroyer 
Capability Capability 
Enhancer Enhancer 
10.2. "GETTING STARTED": THE GOVERNMENT 
What kind of roles does the government play when engaging in the economy? 
Developmental state scholars maintain that the government could guide (Johnson, 1982), 
govem (Wade, 1990) and discipline (Amsden, 1989) indigenous firms. They argue that 
the visible hand of the government could allocate resources more effectively than the 
invisible hand of the market. 
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Table 10.2: The Roles of Three Sectors in Taiwan 
Sectors Impact Area UMe Acer VIS 
Context Context Context 
The State Entrepreneurial 
Intent 
Builder& Builder& Builder & 
Champion Confronter Champion 
Capability Capability Capability 
The Social Entrepreneurial Builder& Builder& Builder & 
Capabilities 
Sector 
Capability Capability Capability 
Defender Defender Defender 
Capability Capability 
The Market Entrepreneurial Destroyer & Destroyer& Capability 
Capabilities Destroyer Capability Capability 
Enhancer Enhancer 
The finding here provides a perspective that complements the developmental state 
theories. This study identifies various roles of the state that induce, stimulate and 
constrain the entrepreneurial intent of indigenous firms at the stage of getting started: 
context builder, champion and confronter. It is found that the function of the state lies not 
so much in Adam Smith' s allocation of existing resources as it does in creating new 
resources through Schumpeterian entrepreneurship in the economy. Thus, contrary to the 
top-down approach discussed in the literature, the state has a role in facilitating and 
stimulating bottom-up entrepreneurial intent,.in technology-based industry at least. The 
observation here is similar to Hirschman's argument that the government should induce 
entrepreneurial investment decisions (1958). 
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Table 10.3: Key Sector in Each of the Three Stages 
"Getting Started" "Getting There" "Staying There" 
The Government 
The Social Sector 
The Market 
10.2.1. Government as Context Builder 
10.2.1.1. Building an Enabling Context in the Social Sector 
In the Chinese cases, Deng' s positive message to scientists in the late 1970s encouraged 
Chen of ATSD, and Liu and his colleagues at Lenovo to start up their entrepreneurial 
ventures. Furthermore, under the Decision on the Reform of Science and Technology 
System, China wanted to force its research and development institutes to raise funds for 
themselves rather than relying on the financial support from the government. The 
institutional reform of China' s national innovation system in the early 1980s also 
facilitated the founding ofLenovo. 
In Taiwan, the national innovation system induced the entrepreneurial initiatives ofUMC 
and VIS. After the creation ofITRI, the focus of Taiwan's national innovation system 
turned to channeling technology from abroad and commercializing them by way of spin-
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offs. Such an institutional context encouraged the engineers and researchers at the ITRI to 
pursue opportunities in the high-technology, high-risk industries. 
Though the state in both China and Taiwan built an enabling context, their approaches 
differed. In China, the innovation system and the culture needed to be tumed upside down 
in order to induce entrepreneurial intent. First, Deng tumed Mao's ideology upside down, 
going from looking down upon intellectuals to looking up to them; going from 
disparaging the market to we1coming the market. The Prime Minister at the time, Zhao, 
then turned the Chinese innovation system upside down, going from separating research 
from production to bundling the two together. 
In Taiwan, confronted with political and economic crises, the state was hoping to turn the 
situation around. It was similar to the situation described by Hirschman as "strong 
pressures are felt by public authorities to 'do something'" (1958: 64). Spurred by the 
"needs ofpolitical survival" (Wade, 1990: 33), the Taiwanese govemments, then not 
secure1y legitimated, hoped it could weather the political and economic crisis in the early 
1970s and eventually manufacture an economic miracle. Therefore, among others, it 
attempted to strengthen its national innovation system, and in order to do this, it created 
ITRI. 
Those contextual arrangements went beyond the World Bank' s recipe of "getting the 
fundamentals right" (1993). Hoff and Stiglitz argue that: 
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The most important determinant of actions is one' s environment, including the 
particular institutions in that environment. More important, the se institutions 
cannot be derived from the "fundamentals" ofthe neoclassical model (2000: 427). 
This finding here is in line with Van de Ven's (1993) emphasis on the importance of 
institutional context for entrepreneurship. Mok (2005) also found that the state played a 
key role in fostering entrepreneurship in Hong Kong through building up sound 
educational infrastructure. Entrepreneurs need "an overall enabling environment which 
allows [them] to operate efficiently" (Kennedy and Sarwar, 1999: 5). 
10.2.1.2. Building a Proteetive Context in the Market 
Both governments created not only an enabling context, but also a protective context in 
the domestic market. Once fledging indigenous entrepreneurship started in the 
Zhongguancun area, the Chinese government set up trade barriers to protect it in the 
technology-based industries until it signed a tariff-reducing MOU with the United States 
in 1992. On the other hand, although Taiwan did not set up trade barriers for computer 
industries, the outdated and unenforced intellectual property rights law in the 1980s in a 
sense served to protect the development of the nascent entrepreneurs when they started 
cloning the IBM-compatible personal computers. Such government policy patterns 
support Polanyi's argument (1957: 140) that ''the road to the free market was opened and 
kept open by an enormous increase in continuous, centrally organized and controlled 
interventionism. " 
The differences between China and Taiwan's trade policy in part could be attributed to 
the size of their domestic markets. A large domestic market is a valuable asset to 
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indigenous entrepreneurs because it allows them to establish scale and scope economies 
(Chandler, 1990). In contrast, a relatively small domestic market reduces the economic 
incentives for the multinationals to enter. Therefore, as Amsden maintained, "a larger 
country may be expected to be more protectionist than a smaller country" (2001: 163). 
The development patterns of China and Taiwan may conflict with the market-oriented 
development policy prescriptions advocated by govemments in many developed countries. 
Nevertheless, they bear similarities to the way how these countries developed. Asking the 
question how currently developed countries attained this state of development, Chang 
reviewed their strategies historically and found that, in the early stage, "virtually all of 
today's developed countries did not practice free trade"; instead, they "promoted their 
national industries through tariffs, subsidies, and other measures" (2003: 1). 
Take the United States, for example. In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, the first USA 
Secretary of the Treasury, argued that the infant industries should be protected. 
Maintaining that competition from more mature European firms would only ruin the 
newly emerging industries that had potential to become intemationally competitive, he 
proposed the imposition oftariff on a variety imported goods (Chang, 2003). 
During the period of 1820-1950, the tariffrates of the United States were above 35% and 
were even as high as 48% in 1931. In fact, "in its early stage of development, the United 
States adopted tariffs that were among the world's highest" (Amsden, 2001: 181). It was 
only after the World War II, when the capacities offirms were well deveioped and a 
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policy of free trade was in its national interest, that the United States started to liberalize 
its trade policies. Nonethe1ess, in the 1970s and 1980s, the American govemment still 
took protectionist measures for its labor-intensive textile, apparel, and footwear industries 
(Yoffie, 1983). 
It should be noted that the USA development experience was not singular. "Britain was 
protectionist when it was trying to catch up with Holland. Germany was protectionist 
when it was trying to catch up with Britain" (Wade, 2003: 631). Contrasting the 
experiences of the developed countries with the measures now being prescribed by 
international trade organizations such as WTO and the like, Chang claimed that the 
developed countries have been trying to kick away the ladder that they themselves used to 
climb to prosperity. 
Chang's observation paralle1ed German Economist Friedrich List's 1885 argument. 
Referring to the experience of Britain when facing competition from other countries, he 
wrote: 
It is a very clever common device that when anyone has attained the summit of 
greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to 
deprive others of the means of climbing up after him .... Any nation which by 
me ans of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised her 
manufacturing power and her navigation to such a degree of development that no 
other nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to 
throw away these ladders ofher greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits 
of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the 
paths of error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the truth 
(1966 [1885]: 368). 
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Accordingly, List's policy prescription for catch-up countries was: "In order to allow 
freedom oftrade to operate naturally, the less advanced nations must first be raised by 
artificial measures to that stage of cultivation to which the English nation has been 
artificially elevated" (1966[1885]: 131). One may feel compelled to argue this century-
old suggestion is outdated for today' s situation. Yet, according to Rodrik (2001), who 
researched the economic data of 133 countries in the period of 1990s, there was a positive 
relationship between the import tariffs and economic growth; the trade restrictions were 
dissolved only after they grew richer. 
10.2.2. Government as Champion 
In addition to playing the generic role of context builder, the state also played the much 
more specific role of champion with various industrial policies. The Chinese government 
provided ATSD and Great Wall with legitimacy and financial resources, respectively. In 
Taiwan, the state provided UMC and VIS with necessary financial resources for the 
fledgling enterprises to get off the ground.41 
The Chinese and Taiwanese governments played the role of champion for different 
reasons. For example, ATSD was the first entrepreneurial venture ever seen in China's 
socialist economy. Without the backing of the government, it might not have survived the 
criticism from the Physics Institute to continue its operation.42 As Aldrich and Fiol noted 
(1994), new start-ups are vulnerable to the liabilities ofnewness in that they lack 
41 However, it should be noted that fmus with government as champion (ATSD, Great Wall, UMC and 
VIS), only UMC was a success. In the Great Wall case, the government could also be regarded as playing 
the role of capability builder. For more discussion, see the concluding remarks ofChapter 4,6, and 9. 
42 One may argue that, in this sense, the CAS played the role of confronter for ATSD. 
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legitimacy. In the case of Taiwan, the government's role was very similar to that 
described by Gerschenkron (1962). In studying the late development of Europe with 
special reference to Russia, he argued that the state plays the role of investment banker to 
facilitate the process of industrialization. 
10.2.3. Government as Confronter 
The most interesting and surprising part regarding the roles played by the government in 
this thesis is that both Chinese and Taiwanese governments confronted the two most 
successful firms, Lenovo and Acer, in their formative years. In China, due to a lack of 
faith in private entrepreneurial initiatives,43 the state played the role ofconfronter and 
shaped entrepreneurial intent. In contrast to its favorable attitudes towards A TSD and 
Great Wall, the state prevented Lenovo from building computer-manufacturing facilities 
in its formative years due to Lenovo's status as a non-state-owned enterprise. Yet, it was 
such unfriendly government policy that pushed Lenovo to enter the motherboard business. 
In Taiwan, in contrast to its support for UMC and VIS, the state, facing pressure from 
parents, banned game machines, a business which had been profitable for Acer. It was 
such unfriendly government policy that expedited Acer's entrance into the personal 
computer. 
This thesis finds that the government's involvement in the economy may not always be 
benevolent; nevertheless, its getting in the way of the potential winners does not 
inevitably lead to firms' failure. The Lenovo and Acer cases in particular (and the other 
43For reason why the Chinese government lacked faith in private entrepreneurship, see the concluding 
remark in Chapter 6 of Great Wall. 
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firms in general) indicate that the success or failure of entrepreneurship is not a logical 
necessity of adverse or favorable government policies. Instead, it is contingent on whether 
entrepreneurs could have a "creative response" (Schumpeter, 1947) to policy obstacles, 
and whether entrepreneurs could "see and ... take advantage" of"all of the productive 
possibilities" in the environment (Penrose, 1959: 31). To put it differently, when the state 
industrial policies have "disequilibrating" effects that disturb firms' investment decisions, 
the subsequent growth of the firm hinges on entrepreneurs' "perception of investment 
opportunities and their transformation into actual investments" (Hirschman, 1958: 35). 
10.2.4. Propositions regarding the Roles of the Government at the Stage of "Getting 
Started" 
Based on the above discussion, the following can be suggested (see Figure 10.1): 
Figure 10.1: The Government at the Stage of "Getting Started" 
+Building a 
protective contextin 
the domestic market 
+ Building an 
enabling context in 
the social sector 
The Market 
+Being supportive 
by proving needed resource 
+Being suppressive by 
enacting regulations 
Social Sector 
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Proposition la: At the stage of getting started, the state can influence the growth of 
indigenous entrepreneurial firms broadly as context builder, and specifically as champion 
and confronter. 
Proposition lb: In the beginning of the stage of getting started, the state can broadly 
induce indigenous entrepreneuriai intent by building an enabling context in the social 
sector, and a protective one in the market. 
Proposition lc: The state can influence entrepreneuriai intent through specifie policies in 
the national institutional context. 
Proposition ld: On one hand, the state can act as champion and thus support 
entrepreneurial intent by providing financial resources or by amending regulations. Yet, 
the fact that firms have the state as champion does not inevitably lead to firms' success. 
Though financial capital or legitimacy is necessary, the sufficient factor for firm's success 
in the high-technology industry is technologicai capability. 
Proposition le: On the other hand, the state can act as confronter and thus hinder and 
shape entrepreneurial intent with specifie regulations. Yet the fact that firms have the 
state as confronter does not necessarily lead to firms' failure. When the state plays the 
role of confronter, it might push firms into areas that they would not otherwise have 
explored. 
10.3. "GETTING THERE": THE SOCIAL SECTOR 
10.3.1. Social Sector Organizations as Capability Builder 
Traditionally, Crane (1977) has noted that in many developing countries, there has been a 
c1eavage between the research and development institutes and indigenous entrepreneurial 
256 
firms. After visiting 50 research centers in 13 developing countries, Blackledge (1972) 
found that, in general, the activities of research and development institutes were not 
linked to the problems faced by indigenous firms. Instead, these institutes' research was 
more oriented towards the interests of the international scientific community (Nath and 
Mrinalini, 2000). Reviews of research and development institutes in Ghana, Indonesia, 
Senegal and Sri Lanka (UNCTAD, 1990) and India (Katrak, 1998) also report some 
disappointing performances due to the same syndrome. 
A different picture emerges from the cases in this thesis.44 With linkages to indigenous 
firms, the role of research and development institutes in China and Taiwan is similar to 
university research in the developed countries: they build "the power of R&D done in 
industry, as contrasted with providing a substitute for it" (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994: 
340). In other words, they play the role of capability builder to help indigenous firms in 
the market. 
The CAS transferred 29 technological products to Lenovo at its founding to bolster its 
technological capability. The most important ofthese was the LCIC, for which the 
technology had accumulated at the CAS over a decade. In Taiwan, UMC's core 
technology was first transferred from RCA, then upgraded at the ITRI laboratories, and 
finally transferred to UMC. Acer met with technical difficulties in its attempts to develop 
44 In the early 1980s, the Chinese authorities gradually came to recognize that the weakness ofChina's 
national innovation system had been the lack oflinkage between research and production. In Taiwan, the 
government in the early 1970s intended to build a national innovation system that geared toward 
commercialization ofresearch to upgrade its industries to weather the political and economic crisis. For 
more details, see Chapter 5 and 7. 
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a software operating system for IBM-compatible personal computers. ITRI was able to 
help by transferring technology from Wang Computer in the USA to Acer. As for VIS, 
ITRI probably played the most crucial role in its capability building role in that it 
developed the required DRAM technology for VIS from scratch. 
Technological capabilities built by research and development institutes could provide 
indigenous firms in competitive environments with a "ticket of admission" to work with 
multinationals in the market (Rosenberg, 1990: 170), and thus grow from small to 
medium-sized firms. Without research and development institutes to help build capacity, 
smaU indigenous firms operating in competitive high-technology industries may be either 
unable to engage in the activities of global value chains led by multinationals-as we 
have seen with UMC and Acer-nor are they qualified to be joint venture partners for 
multinational s, as we have seen with Lenovo. 
The absence of linkages between research and development institutes and indigenous 
entrepreneurial firms would lead to the so-caUed "missing middle"-the shortage of 
medium-sized firms-in contrast to the many small firms and handful oflarge 
multinationals in the market (Romijn, 2001). In start contrast to the cases studies here, a 
United Nation study of five multinationals and 36 indigenous firms in Kenya found that 
none of the multinationals' affiliates engaged in local sourcing. Such failure to partnering 
with the multinationals perpetuates the vulnerability of the local smaU firms in the market 
(UN, 2004: 31). 
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Although the CAS and the ITRI all played the role of capability builders, their sources of 
technology were different. China adopted an inside-up approach with Lenovo using 
technology developed domestically. Taiwan, on the other hand, adopted an outside-in 
approach with !TRI transferring technology from American high-technology firms to 
UMC and Acer.45 
Ofparticular interest is Taiwan's outside in approach in the UMC case. Too often, there 
can be pitfalls in the process of international technology transfer: high technology 
multinational enterprises impose technology transfer contracts on local organizations 
without understanding local needs (Juma and Lee, 2004: 51). Therefore, as Kim and 
Nelson argued (2000), successful international technology transfer requires adapting 
technology to the local context. As a social sector organization, the Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) helped Taiwan avoid this pitfall by monitoring carefully every step of 
the technology transfer. In the beginning, it tracked the state-of-the-art semiconductor 
technology in the USA. It then also assessed the development of the electronics industry 
in Taiwan. By the end ofthis project, it supervised the construction of the pilot plant at 
ITRI. 
Thanks to TAC, the technology transferred by RCA matched the local needs in Taiwan, 
and ITRI was able to develop its own indigenous innovative capacity through the pilot 
plant. Such leaming by monitoring (Sabel, 1994; Perez-Aleman, 2000) facilitated the 
process of adapting the technology transferred from outside to fit "local needs and 
45 The discussion here about inside- up versus outside-in approaches is inspired by Mintzberg (2006). 
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conditions" (Dahlman et al., 1987: 762), which is the key to managing technological 
development. To be more specific, ITRI's approach was "outside in, but on insider's 
terms" (Mintzberg, 2006: 12). Thus, it can be argued that successful technology transfer 
is a process of leaming by monitoring. 
10.3.2. Social Sector Organizations as Capability Defender 
Nelson has argued that non-market organizations, such as trade associations, are needed 
in order to grow entrepreneurship in the market: 
Rather than formaI government, or markets, the various structures of civil society 
-families, clans, friendship groups, neighborhoods, voluntary associations of a 
variety of shapes and forms, formaI not-for-profit organizations-provide the core 
goveming structures over a host ofhuman activities (2002: 329). 
How do trade associations assist indigenous firms to get there in the economy? Previous 
research finds that trade associations could either complement the market by undertaking 
tasks such as horizontal and vertical coordination among firms (Doner and Schneider, 
2000), or they could complement the state by providing infrastructure more efficiently 
(Cohen et al., 1981). Corroborating previous research, the evidence from this thesis 
identifies a new role played by the trade associations that is seldom mentioned in the 
literature: they helped indigenous entrepreneurial firms in the IT industries defend their 
technological capabilities against the lawsuits from the multinationals in the market. The 
relative overlooking of this role in the literature could be attributed to the fact that 
scholars have cast their attention more to agricultural industries, such as sugar and coffee, 
and labor-intensive industries, such as plastic shoes and clothing (Doner and Schneider, 
2000: 265), than to high-technology industries. 
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When playing the role of capability defender, the Taiwan Semiconductor Industry 
Association (TSIA) and the Taipei Computer Association (TCA) in fact complemented 
the functions of the market and the state. Once the Taiwanese firms were sued, the 
associations facilitated information exchange among the firms involved in the suits by the 
multinationals. Moreover, due to the fact that "formaI mechanism for business-
govemment interface are aImost entire1y lacking in Taiwan" (the World Bank, 1993: 184-
5), they also aided coordination between the firms and the govemment, planning to 
impose punitive tariffs to curb the business activities of the multinationals in the domestic 
markets. The finding here is consistent with the view that "successful industrial 
development is increasingly collective capitalist development" (Lazonick, 1991: 302). In 
fact, Porter (2000: 16) also maintained that "trade associations can be competitive assets, 
not merely lobbying and social organizations." 
The positive functioning oftrade associations found here is contrary to Olson's work 
(1982). He attributed the main reason for the de cline of nations to the trade associations, 
which engaged in seeking unproductive rents from the govepnnent through favorable 
regulations, tariffs, restrictions on trade, subsidies and the like. The difference between 
this research and Olson's work may be re1ated to differences in the conditions under 
which the trade association are operating. 
OIson noted that a nation that is stable over a long period of time without external 
turbulence will "tend to accumulate more collusions and organizations for collective 
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action over time" (1982: 74). By contrast, the trade associations of semiconductor and 
computer industries in Taiwan were acting under the high pressure from the international 
competition. As Doner and Schneider (2000: 261) argue, "competitive markets ... 
encourage associations ... for productive ends." Perez-Aleman (2003) also found that, 
under the pressure of intensive competition, the association ofChile's agroindustry tumed 
developmental, and emphasized problem solving, helping local enterprises upgrade by 
adopting new technologies and new organizational structures. 
It is worth noting that the assertiveness of the TSIA in the late 1990s was indicative of the 
maturing growth of the social sector in 1990s in Taiwan. This finding is similar to 
McBeath's observation on Taiwan. After the democratization movement in the late 1980s, 
"business associations [hadJ greater autonomy than previously," and were "more able to 
influence state policy" (McBeath, 1998: 303; 319). In contrast, before the 1990s, business 
associations in Taiwan were "govemment's hand-maidens" (Wade, 1990: 282). Many of 
the key staffs were appointed by the govemment so as to avoid the trade associations 
becoming a hub for political resistance. In most cases, they were no more than "paper 
organizations," providing few, if any, inputs to the state industrial policy (Zeigler, 1988: 
180). 
Compared to Taiwan, the trade associations in China at most were "incipient" or 
"embryonic" (White, Howell, and Shang, 1996). Judging from Chapter 5 and 6, it seems 
that the China Computer lndustry Association (CCIA) did not play anY role in the history 
ofLenovo and Great Wall. Similar to most of the trade associations in China, CCIA was 
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created by the government (Foster, 2003). Reminiscent of the development oftrade 
associations in Taiwan, the Chinese government created trade associations deliberately to 
preempt the spontaneous initiatives from entrepreneurs that might be seedbed for any 
political or policy change (Pearson, 2005). 
China's trade associations were organized to resemble non-governmental organizations, 
yet few were truly non-governmental. For example, during the restructuring of the 
Chinese government to facilitate the transition to a market-oriented economy in the 1990s, 
the ministries of textiles and light industry were turned in to the General Association of 
Textiles and the General Association of Light Industry, respectively, both ofwhich 
continued to report to the State Council (Reinganum and Pixley, 1998). China's Ministry 
of Civil Affairs once described the situation well: "many social organizations are state-
organized and have only a small degree ofindependence [from the government]" (Foster, 
2003: 47). Therefore, many were de facto administrative appendages to the government, 
and weak in their autonomy. 
10.3.3. Propositions regarding the Roles of the Social Sector at the Stage of "Getting 
There" 
The above discussion could be summarized in the following formaI propositions (see 
Figure 10.2): 
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Figure 10.2: The Social Sector at the Stage of "Getting There" 
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Proposition 2a: At the stage of getting there, social sector organizations play the role of 
capability builder in transferring technology either from abroad or from their own 
research in order to help indigenous high-technology entrepreneurs achieve 
entrepreneurial intent. 
Proposition 2b: Complementing the role of capability builder, social sector organizations 
also play the role of capability defender when indigenous firms try to get there in the 
international market. Social sector organizations help indigenous entrepreneurial firms by 
fighting the lawsuits from multinationals in the market and by pressuring the state to set 
up tariff barriers. 
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10.4. "STAYING THERE": THE MARKET 
10.4.1. Market as Capability Destroyer 
Neoc1assical economic theories have long advocated opening the underdeveloped 
countries to free market competition. LaI and Rajapatirana wrote: 
It seems to be as firm a stylized fact as any in the economics of developing 
countries: a sustained movement to an outward-oriented trade regime leads to 
faster growth ofboth exports and income (1987: 208). 
When shifting the level of analysis to the firm instead of the economy, a rather different 
picture emerged from sorne of the data of this research. Instead of growing, indigenous 
firms were sometimes severely harmed by competition as they tried to stay in the market. 
For example, in China, Microsoft ruined the market for both Lenovo' s and Great Wall' s 
Chinese personal computer operating systems when it developed its Chinese version of 
Windows in 1995. In Taiwan, the multinationals in the semiconductor and computer 
markets tried to destroy the technological products of Taiwanese firms by way of 
litigation.46 In one way or another, the multinationals in the market can play the role of 
capability destroyer. 
Furthermore, multinational s, such as IBM and Apple, also pressured the Taiwanese 
government to revamp its intellectual property rights laws. The relationship between the 
multinationals and the government in Taiwan is reminiscent of dependency theory, which 
argues that opening the domestic market to the multinatioanls can impede economic 
development since the penetration of foreign capital can weaken the ability of the state to 
46 Litigation, according to Porter, could "force the weaker finn to bear extremely high legal costs" and 
"divert its attention fromcompeting in the markets" (1980: 86). 
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protect indigenous entrepreneurs (Barrett and Whyte, 1982). Compared to the governrnent, 
the social sector was less impacted by the multinationals due to its not-for-profit nature. 
For example, when IBM challenged Acer's ITRI-designed operatingsystem for 
infringing on its copyright, it allowed Acer to redesign its software systems after learning 
that ITRI was a not-for-profit research institute. 
In fact, when the market plays the role of capability destroyer, it is a c1assic example of 
the "perennial gale of creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942: 84). Indigenous 
entrepreneurial enterprises in high-technology industries usually lack the technological 
capabilities to compete with the giant multinationals. Due to premature full exposure to 
the global market, entrepreneurial firrns in developing countries are an too likely to be 
destroyed by the international competition (Park, 2004). 
10.4.2. The Market as Capability Enhancer 
Writing in the sixties, dependency theorist Paul Baran argued that, instead of "expanding 
and deepening the further development of capitalism" throughout the world, the "main 
task" of imperialism was to "slow down and to control the economic development of 
underdeveloped countries" (1968: 197). Y et this research provides sorne evidence that, 
rather than slowing down the growth of the local firrns, multinationals in the market had 
also been trying to build cooperative relationships with them that, in fact, help boost the 
local firrns' capabilities when they tried to "stay there" in the market. In this manner, the 
multinationals are seen to play the role of capability enhancer. 
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From the perspective of Chinese and Taiwanese firms studied here, linkage to the 
multinationals in the market could "provide an efficient channel ... to gain access to 
markets, financing, skills and know how" (UN, 2004: 3). As Ernst and O'Connor (1989) 
have noted, given that there are simultaneous technological developments on many fronts, 
it is beyond indigenous firms' capabilities to understand related technologies well; 
therefore, they need to resort to foreign firms with advanced technologies. Based on the 
experience of Brazil's development, Evans (1979: 290) maintained that the growth of 
indigenous firms hinges on the "multinationals willing to invest," therefore "development 
is viable only if it has support from the larger system of imperialism." 
From their own perspective, the multinationals were motivated by the need to build local 
connections with the Chinese firms. For example, they partnered with Lenovo in the hope 
that they could tap into the scientific community surrounding the CAS. This pattern of 
cooperation between multinationals and local firms is similar to Hounshell's observation 
(1996: 139) that foreign enterprises built laboratories in Europe in order to connect to "the 
work of European researchers who were tied into European university research 
networks." 
Meanwhile, the multinationals formed strategie alliances with Great Wall so as to build a 
relationship with the govemment. For example, thanks to its relationship with Great Wall, 
IBM was able to take part in China's Golden Bridge project and to fine-tune its export 
and import process. The finding that the multinationals emphasized building relations 
(guanxi) with Lenovo and Great Wall is in conformity with the label "network 
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capitalism" that Boisot and Child (1996) used to characterize the distinctive emerging 
economic order in China. ATSD, in contrast to Lenovo and Great Wall, did not have the 
' .. 
multinationals as capability enhancer. Since ATSD no longer had a connection with the 
CAS, and as ATSD was not an SOE, it was not able to attract the multinationals to forge 
strategic alliances with it. 
Un1ike their counterparts in Mainland China, the multinationals built relationships with 
Taiwanese firms to reduce transaction and production costs. In the UMC case, 
semiconductor design firms previously relied solely on vertically integrated chip 
manufacturers to produce their designs, and their production schedules were dependent on 
when these manufacturers had excess capacity for their designs. By building connections 
to UMC, which specialized in manufacturing and did not design its own brand-name 
microchips, semiconductor design firms could get their new designs into production at the 
UMC foundry quickly. In other words, the transaction costs incurred in coordinating and 
negotiating the schedules were reduced. 
In the Acer case, it became clear that outsourcing was very important for lead 
multinational personal computer firms. This was in part because the cost of key 
components had increased from less than 60% of total production costs to more than 80%, 
and in part because the intense competition had driven large established personal 
computer firms to concentrate on R&D and on the marketing of products to the exclusion 
of other value-chain activities (Ernst and O'Connor, 1992). 
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In contrast to UMC and Acer, VIS insisted on building its capability without using the 
multinationals as capability enhancers. This determination to achieve technological 
autonomy negatively affected VIS's growth. Dahlman and his colleagues (1987) made a 
similar observation: many indigenous firms overemphasize the need for technology 
sufficiency and strive to develop through their own efforts at the expense of poor 
productivity, ifnot failure. They suggested that firms should use technology transferred 
from foreign firms as a stepping-stone for developing their own capabilities. For example, 
the pattern of technological capability accumulation among successful Korean firms 
reveals the combination of their own technological efforts with technological knowledge 
from abroad (Kim, 1997). The leaming-by-imitation attitude of Korean firms contrasts 
with the NIH (not invented here) syndrome that has plagued VIS. 
Though the multinationals in the market played the role of capability builder in both the 
Taiwanese and Chinese cases, they had different approaches. Due to their technological 
capability supremacy, the multinationals usually stand at the apex ofthe technological 
pyramid in developing countries and relationships between them and indigenous firms 
tend to be hierarchical (Zhou and Xin, 2003). For example, in the OEM relationships with 
Taiwanese fiims, the multinationals took a top down approach: UMC and Acer were 
required to produce finished products to the multinational s' precise technological 
specifications, and they tended to depend on the multinationals for most of the technology. 
Yet, in contrast, the multinationals in China took a bottom up approach to enhance 
indigenous firms' capability. Because China had an unusually powerful bargaining 
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position due to its vast domestic market, the multinationals wanted to offer technology in 
exchange for the market access (Kraemer and Dedrick, 2002). As a result, such an 
"unusual collaborative approach" was tailored to local firms' technological needs or to 
Chinese customers' needs (Zhou and Xin, 2003: 132). For example, the multinationals 
focused on enhancing Great Wall's manufacturing capabilities in the field of electronic 
hardware, whereas they joined forces with Lenovo in order to develop products that were 
significant to the Chinese market, such as network products. 
10.4.3. Propositions regarding the Roles of the Market at the Stage of "Staying 
There" 
The above discussion leads to the following propositions (see Figure 10.3): 
Figure 10.3: the Market at the Stage of "Staying There" 
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Proposition 3a: Due to their advanced technology, the multinationals in the market can 
play the role of capability destroyers when indigenous entrepreneurial firms try to 
maintain their status in the market. The multinationals destroy the capabilities of 
indigenous firms by competing head-on with them and by suing them; in addition, the 
multinationals pressure the government to revamp intellectual property regulations and 
research and development institutes to redesign allegedly patent-infringing products 
previously transferred to indigenous firms. 
Proposition 3b: The multinationals in the market can also play the role of capability 
enhancer. To stay there in the market, indigenous firms can enhance their capabilities by 
building OEM relationships and strategic alliances with the multinational s, or by 
acquiring and merging with existing multinationals. 
Proposition 3e: The reasons that the multinationals become capability enhancers vary: 
some want to tap into the local research community, some want to build connections to 
the government through indigenous firms, some want access to large market by trading 
technology; and some simply want to outsource to reduce costs and to have vertical 
integration for reduced risks. 
Proposition 3d: Without building relationships with the multinationals to enhance their 
capability, indigenous entrepreneurial firms in high-technology industries are likely to fail 
in the market. 
10.5. THE INFLUENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP ON THE THREE SECTORS 
This research so far has tended to look upon the entrepreneurial firms in developing 
countries as a dormant and passive object, on which the state, the social sector and the 
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market exert their influences, beneficial and harmful. In other words, the relationship 
seems to be unidirectional, from institutions to entrepreneurship.47 However, sorne 
scholars of entrepreneurship suggest the direction of the relation may be the other way 
around. Schoonhoven and Romanelli (2001: 401) maintain that "to stop short of 
addressing the impact ofnew firms on the evolution of industries is to miss ... the most 
important questions ... ofthe entrepreneurship dynamic." Shane and Venkataraman (2001: 
14) suggested, when studying how entrepreneurs pursue opportunities, "outcomes for 
industries and societies should be considered as well." In fact, Schumpeter recognized 
that "creative response changes social and economic situations for good" (1947: 150). 
The important point of the literature of entrepreneurship is that, while institutions 
"facilitate and constraint entrepreneurs, it is the latter who construct and change" the 
institutions (Van de Ven, 1993: 227). 
These can be seen in this study under discussion here. First, as shown in Chapter 4 on 
ATSD, indigenous techno-entrepreneurs influenced state policies in an emergent way. At 
the start of economic reform in the early 1980s, the Chine se government seemed to leave 
the scientists- turned-entrepreneurs in the Zhongguancun area alone. Its focus had been 
on the SOEs in the national economic system rather than research and development 
institutes and their spin-offs in the innovation system (Segal, 2003). 
47 A paper based on a short version of six cases and propositions was presented at Mintzberg Colloquium on 
the Social Sector in 2005. Feedback from the participants led to examination ofthe impact of 
entrepreneurship on the state, the market and the social sector. 
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Constrained by bounded rationality (Simon, 1947), the authorities were not able to pay 
attention to every corner of the economy, especially in a country with such a large 
population. To the Chinese govemment, the grassroots development of innovation in the 
Zhongguancun area was a blind spot. 48 It was not until 1987 that the authorities became 
interested in what was taking place in the Zhongguancun area. Thus, it could be argued 
that the govemment in China, with a blind spot in its economy, behaved as a retro active 
rationalizer rather than a prospective planner in developing indigenous 
entrepreneurship.49 
Second, the VIS case suggests that at sorne point, indigenous entrepreneurs may try to get 
involved in policy formulation ofthe social sector. When ITRI initiated the Submicron 
Project, private firms expressed their concem that this project would crowd them out of 
the industry. 50 In response to their concems, the budget of Submicron was reduced by the 
govemment from NT $15 billion (USD $456 million) to NT $8.8 billion (USD $260 
million). The case here is similar to Becker's observation (1991: 119) that, as local 
entrepreneurs become capable and more self confident, they become "more adept and 
effective in challenging institutions and procedures" in which they have an interest. 
Lastly, it seemed that sorne indigenous firms also started to play the role of capability 
enhancer in limited fields for their foreign partners. For example, Acer developed Chipup, 
48 In the strategie decision making process, blind spots are "where [organizations] will either not see the 
significance of events at all ... or will perceive them very slowly" (Porter, 1980: 59). 
49 The term retroactive rationalizer is originally used in Burgelman (1994). 
50 Breznitz's (2005) research on Taiwan's software industries also found that when R&D institutes 
competed directly with local entrepreneurs, the growth of the industry was hampered. 
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an advanced circuit board technology, which it later licensed to Intel. UMC also 
transferred its semiconductor technology to the German firm Thesys. Though it would be 
hard to generalize from these two occurrences, the Acer and UMC cases nonetheless 
indicate that indigenous entrepreneurship became more technologically independent of 
the multinational s, and started to have technological impact on them. This finding 
parallels Chew and Yeung's research (2001), which shows that in Singapore, there was a 
"reverse transfer" of technical specification and standards from the local firms to the 
multinationals. 
10.5.1. Propositions regarding the Influence of Entrepreneurship on the Three 
Sectors 
The above discussion could be expressed in the following formaI terms (see Figure 1004): 
Figure 10.4: The Influence of Entrepreneurship on the Three Sectors 
The State 
The Market 
+Have impact on 
formulation of state 
industrial poHey 
Social Sector 
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Proposition 4a: When operating in potentially important areas which previously received 
little attention from government, indigenous entrepreneurial firms eventually may 
influence the formulation of state industrial policy in an emergent way. 
Proposition 4b: As indigenous entrepreneurial firms gradually mature in the economy, 
they will engage actively in the policy formulation of social sector organizations where 
they have strategic interests. 
Proposition 4c: In building up their technological capabilities, indigenous entrepreneurial 
firms start to reverse the transfer flow oftechnology, and engage in transferring 
technology to multinationals in the market. 
10.6. CONTRIBUTION TO THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LITERATURE 
This study contributes to the economic development literature by providing a 3-sector by 
3-stage model of the growth of entrepreneurial firms in developing countries. With the 
initial goal of enhancing the understanding of how to grow high-technology 
entrepreneurial firms in developing countries, the intention here is to promote the state, 
the social sector and the market as the three important drivers for economic development. 
It is argued that they are three distinct players with empirically identifiable effects, and 
these effects were of considerable importance in three growth stages of these indigenous 
firms in China and Taiwan. Given that the historical reality of China and Taiwan is so 
complex, this thesis does not cIaim that it has arrived at any complete answer to 
development. The results are tentative and speculative as depicted in Figure 10.5. 
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Figure 10.5: A 3-Sector by 3-Stage Model of the Growth of Entrepreneurial Firms in Developing Countries 
"Getting Started": The State 
+Context Builder 
+Champion 
+Confronter 
"Staying There": The Market 
+Capability Enhancer 
+Capability Destroyer 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurial 
Intent 
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As the figure shows, the growth of indigenous entrepreneurial enterprises generally 
involves the state, the market and the social sector to work in concert instead of alone. It 
implies that no sector can or should dominate the process of the growth of indigenous 
firms. The findings support these scholars who have suggested looking at the issue of 
economic development in light ofthree sectors (e.g., Lindauer and Pritchett, 2002; 
Haggard, 2004; Stiglitz, 1998). 
This study also makes a contribution in j oining the trend of shifting the level of analysis 
in economic development studies (e.g., Gereffi, 1994; Hsu and Cheng, 2002; Amsden and 
Chu, 2003).1t extends the previous research of economic development by adding another 
perspective at the level of entrepreneurial firms, and developing a 3-sector by 3-stage 
model that describes in empirical detail how entrepreneurial intent and entrepreneurial 
capabilities influence indigenous firm's growth. 
10.7. CONTRIBUTION TO THE ENTREPRENEURSHIP LITERATURE 
In addition to the literature of economic development, this study also contributes to the 
entrepreneurial research. In general, this study provides a framework to understand the 
entrepreneurial process as well as the entrepreneurial context in developing countries. In 
particular, it could advance the three theories of entrepreneurship 
First, theories of traits by employing cross-sectional methods have paid insufficient 
attention to the temporal process and contextual factors. Furthermore, they do not explain 
how entrepreneurship cornes into existence and how institutions could stimuIate or hinder 
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the emergence of entrepreneurship. As Gartner (1988) has argued the question 
traditionally addressed in the entrepreneurship lite rature "who is an entrepreneur" is the 
wrong one. Instead, as Sarasvathy (2004) suggests, research should address the question 
of "what barriers to entrepreneurship exist?" In line with arguments made by Gartner and 
Sarasvathy, this study maintains that when the government behaves as context builder, it 
can remove the barriers to entrepreneurship; furthermore, when the government plays the 
roles of champion and/or confronter, it can induce or hinder entrepreneurial intent. 
Second, ecologists explore the evolutionary stages of entrepreneurship at the population 
level, yet their models do not articulate the particular context at the firm level. In addition, 
they emphasize the mortality of the entrepreneurial firms and cast doubt on the volition of 
the entrepreneurial organizations and their learning capability to adapt to the external 
environment. In contrast, this study emphasizes that entrepreneurial intent is crucial to the 
entrepreneurial process, and argues that newly-founded entrepreneurial organizations are 
influenced by social-sector organizations and the multinationals in the market to boost 
their capability to overcome the liability of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). 
Third, scholars researching opportunities-pursuing highlight the process of discovering 
and exploiting opportunity as first-order forces, and treat institutional context as second 
order. Moreover, like the scholars of personality traits, they emphasize the importance of 
the individual entrepreneurs rather than the emergence of entrepreneurial organizations. 
Augmenting this approach, the three sectors in this framework serve as different sources 
of opportunities for entrepreneurs (Shane, 2004): the state provides political and 
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regulatory opportunities; the social sector and the market provide technological 
opportunities. In addition, following Gartner (1988), this study, by shifting level of 
analysis from individual entrepreneurs to entrepreneurial organizations, brings the firms 
back into entrepreneurship research and provides a means-end framework that articulates 
how entrepreneurial organizations work with three sectors to pursue their growth 
opportunities. 
10.8. CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 
LITERATURE 
This study also contribute to a central question in the international business literature: 
"What determines the international success and failure offirms?" (Peng, 2004) This study 
has examined how indigenous entrepreneurial firms establish themselves in the 
international market through the interplay of the three sectors. It thus posits an ontological 
and epistemological break from the existing international management literature. 
Ontologically, instead of either overlooking indigenous firms or treating them as passive, 
this thesis highlights indigenous entrepreneurial firms and regards them as active subjects 
in the global marketplace. Epistemologically, instead of discussing cross-sectional 
characteristics of the multinationals from the West, this thesis highlights the longitudinal 
process of how indigenous entrepreneurial firms deve10p capabilities, by drawing on the 
important, but often overlooked economic development studies literature. 
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10.9. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
10.9.1. Policies Implications regarding the Government 
A few implications can be offered for policies regarding the governrnent, the market, and 
the social sector and indigenous entrepreneurial firrns. This 3-sector by 3-stage model 
implies that the existence of entrepreneurship could not be taken for granted in 
developing countries. As Hirschrnan maintained, the governrnent needs to mobilize 
entrepreneurship that was previously "hidden, scattered, or badly utilized" through 
national institutional rearrangements (1958: 5). The Chinese and Taiwanese governrnents, 
in building an enabling context, either maintained or revised their national innovation 
systems and national cultures to foster entrepreneurship. In one way or another, both 
governrnents endeavored to remove "barriers to entrepreneurship" (Sarasvathy, 2004: 
709). And once entrepreneurship was evoked, governrnents were found in the cases to 
provide financial resources to help overcome entry barri ers to high-technology industries. 
10.9.2. Policies Implications regarding the Social Sector 
This research also has implication for the technology transfer from research and 
development institutes to indigenous firrns. In helping build up the capability of these 
firrns, the experiences of the CAS and the ITRI were similar to Utterback's (1975:672) 
observations that when research and development institutes have "interpersonal contact 
and communication" with firrns, and when they are "developing personnel through 
work," they are more likely to have a positive impact on indigenous firrns' capabilities. 
The finding here also corroborate Branzei and Vertinsky's (2006) argument that hurnan 
resources development is key to developing product innovation capabilities of small and 
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medium sized enterprises, because the technical knowledge is embodied in the 
researchers themselves rather than in machines, blueprints or instructions. 
Meanwhile, at the time of building up capabilities, indigenous entrepreneurs also need 
. trade associations-a protective layer for capitalism (Roelofs, 1995)-to help defend 
them in their formative years, as illustrated in the cases ofUMC, Acer and VIS. Trade 
associations could behave as "institutionalized forms of power" for the industry, which 
"buffer[ ed] the organization and lessen[ ed] the force of the extemal influences" (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1977:274). The suit initiated by the trade associations in Taiwan against the 
multinationals in the market may have also exemplified what Porter (1980: 86) described 
as, "a way of sensitizing the stronger firm so that it will not undertake any aggressive 
actions while the suit is outstanding. If the stronger firm feels itself under legal scrutiny, 
its power may be effectively neutralized." To conc1ude, in order to succeed at the stage of 
getting there, entrepreneurs in developing countries need to work c10sely with not-for-
profit research institutes and to organize trade associations (Peng, 2001). 
10.9.3. Policy Implications regarding the Multinationals in the Market 
This study reveals two contradictory roles of the multinationals in economic development. 
At odds with neoc1assical development theories and dependency theories simultaneously, 
this contradictory set of roles implies that the multinationals in the market cannot be 
regarded as a single good, or evil, entity in economic development. It echoes Becker et 
al.'s proposaI (1987), which calls for discarding views that one-sidedly accept or reject 
the engagement of the multinationals in developing economies. 
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These contradictory roles lead to an important policy implication. Note that the role of 
multinationals in the market becomes more important in the later stage of the growth of 
indigenous firms. Without the government and the social sector first respectively 
providing a protective, enabling context, and establishing a threshold level of 
entrepreneurial capabilities for nascent indigenous firms, it is very likely that the 
multinationals in the market will destroy them early. Such a development pattern 
highlights the caveat provided by Lall for indigenous firms: 
The capability building process means that full exposure to competition from 
mature enterprises can lead to under-investment in 'difficult' technologies by late 
entrants and to the destruction of existing activities that are in the process of 
developing capabilities (2005: 8). 
Lall suggests (2005:8), "it is thus vital to combine protection with ... technological 
leaming." In other words, local firms must be under protection to reach certain capability 
levels before being able to confront and cooperate with international competition. Though 
Romanelli (1989) has reported that competition in the minicomputer industry may not 
have been associated with the mortality of young startups; nevertheless, information-
technology industries in general were usually characterized as invoking brutal 
competition (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). It should be noted that the argument here 
is to emphasize competition brought by the multinationals in the market, and has no 
intention to ignore the domestic competition. In fact, China and Taiwan each had an 
intensely competitive domestic computer market before the multinationals entered 
(Kraemer and Dedrick, 2002; Chang, 1992). 
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Even if the issue of level of competition is put as ide, protection may still be needed in the 
development of firms. "Examples of growth over long periods which can be attributed 
exclusively to ... [market] protection are rare," wrote Penrose, yet, "elements of such 
protection are to be found in ... nearly every ... firm" (1959: 113). Thus, consistent with 
Wade (2003: 634), it would appear that "protection has to be made part of a larger 
industrial strategy to nurture the capabilities of domestic firms." 
10.9.4. Policy Implications regarding High-Technology Entrepreneurs in Developing 
Countries 
The finding here also has an important policy implication for technologicallearning of 
high-techology entrepreneurs in developing countries. According to March (1991), one 
kind of technologicallearning is exploration-oriented, which involves innovation and 
experimentation. Due to its risk-taking nature, its return is unpredictable. The other is 
exploitation-oriented learning, which involves incremental refinement, execution, and 
implementation. Due to its efficient nature, its return is more certain and more speedy. 
Simply put, exploration is high-risk learning for the long run, while exploitation is low-
risk learning for the short run. High-technology entrepreneurs in the developed countries 
usually started by exploring new technological products and then proceeded to focus their 
competitive strategies on the exploitation of new technologies (Choi and Shepherd, 2004). 
In contrast, as this study found, high-technology entrepreneurs in the developing 
countries, started by exploiting the existing technology transferred from the West at the 
stage of getting there. The main benefit of exploitation-oriented learning is time 
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compression (Cho, Kim and Rhee, 1998). Indigenous entrepreneurial firms would need 
less time to build a plant because they could capitalize on the experience from the West. 
Furthermore, indigenous firms could minimize R&D costs through imitation (Kim, 1997). 
In sum, exploitation-oriented learning is less risky because indigenous firms have a model 
to follow, which accelerates their learning. 
Recent empirical studies on developing countries generally support the view that 
indigenous firms should undertake exploitation-oriented learning first. For example, 
Amsden (198~) found that the growth of indigenous firms in South Korea started with the 
exploitation of borrowed technology, rather than the creation of new inventions. Porter 
(1990) also found that nascent indigenous firms in Singapore with little product or 
process technology began by sourcing inexpensive and widely available technology from 
developed countries. 
This research also indicates that, once indigenous entrepreneurial firms gradually secured 
at the stage of getting there by exploitation, they proceeded to explore new technologies 
at the stage of staying there. Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argue that in order to pass the 
test of international competition, perhaps firms need to take a long-term approach and 
offer superior products. Schumpeter also argues that in order to survive the "predatory or 
cutthroat competition," firms need to grow by creating the "new commodity, the new 
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization" (1942: 80,84). 
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Otherwise, just as March (1991) cautions, firms that indulge in exploitation eventually 
find their competitiveness compromised. In the context of international competition, as 
the foreign market sectors in whichindigenous firms engage become more skill and 
capital intensive, indigenous firms' initial advantage based on exploitation may be 
nullified. Furthermore, as comparative advantages shift arnong countries (Kogut, 1985), 
indigenous firms would eventually lose their edge to their counterparts in other 
developing countries. 
Recent research on East Asian indigenous firms in the high technology industries 
highlights the importance of exploration-oriented leaming when indigenous firms move 
from the stage oftechnology users to that oftechnology generators (Choung et al., 2000; 
Kim, 1997; Hobday, 1995a). Wright et al. (2005) found that the overall pattern of 
indigenous firms successfully entering developed economies involves putting emphasis 
on the innovation of the product and process. 
10.10. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
The 3-sector by 3-stage model presented in this thesis should be viewed with sorne 
caution, due to its methodologicallimitations and potential conceptual drawbacks. Since 
the purpose ofthis study was to develop, rather than test, theory, it drew on thick 
descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of a small number of organizations in technology-based 
industries in two regions. Such an approach was thought to be useful for inspiring and 
guiding the development of a new theoretical frarnework. Consequently, the most serious 
limitation of this thesis is the small group of organizations studied. Its generalizability 
may also be limited by the nature and dynarnics of the particular historical-technological 
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context-the study period started when China launched its economic reform in the late 
1970s, and when Taiwan faced a series of political and economic crisis in the early 1970s. 
Moreover, sample firms in this thesis were among the first ones to invest in the computer 
and semiconductor industries. As a result, their relations with the three sectors may be 
unique to them, reflecting their particular growth path through this historical condition. 
Another methodological drawback for theory building in this thesis is the issue of 
triangulation. Access to most of the sample fmns to conduct interviews was limited due 
to difficulties of building up relationships with them. Most of the research was grounded 
in secondary sources of data, including industry reports and internaI documents. Though 
conducting interviews with key figures is generally regarded as a useful approach for the 
qualitative research, Rindova and Kotha (2001) demonstrated that case studies relying 
heavily on secondary sources with rare interviews could provide no less theoretical 
insights. 
As for the conceptual drawbacks, the use of the three sectors may have led us to 
exaggerate the boundaries between the private, public and social sectors (Srinivas, 2001). 
For example, unlike this thesis' approach, sorne studies (Amsden and Chu, 2003; Lu and 
Lazonick, 2001) have regarded the research and development institutes, the ITRI and the 
CAS, as organizations of public sector rather than of the social sector. As Anheier and 
Seibel (1990: 381) maintained, "the designation of organization into sectors may 
ultimately rest on research conventions rather than on strict empirical grounds." Hall 
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(1992: 28) also suggested, at times "the sector is an artificial construct, not an institutional 
reality." . 
Though the CAS and the ITRI were created by the state, the governments in China and 
Taiwan have strived to keep these two organizations independent of politics. In 1954, 
China's State Council decided that the CAS was no longer regarded as a government unit 
under the supervision of State Council so it became an independent entity. 51 When ITRI 
was founded in 1973, the Ministry ofEconomic Affair insisted it be a nongovernmental 
organization so that it would be free of certain laws and regulations (Hong, 2003). Based 
on historical facts, both the CAS and the ITRI, to be more precise, could be regarded as 
GONGOs-"government nongovernmental organizations" (Vakil, 1997). 
10.11. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This thesis suggests at least four directions of future research. First, since the purpose of a 
qualitative study is to guide and inspire new ideas, not to validate existing ones, the extent 
to which this 3-sector by 3-stage model can develop into a more general theory of the 
growth of indigenous firms depends on how weIl it explains similar activities in other 
countries. The extent to which this model generalizes to other countries can be 
determined by hypothesis-testing research in larger, more representative samples of 
indigenous entrepreneurial firms in other countries. 
51 From the website of official history of the CAS: http://www.cas.ac.cn/asp/U/gl.asp?y=1954. 
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A variety of existing cases do, however, suggest some generalizability for this model. For 
example, Perez-Aleman (2000) found that, in Chile's economic development, the state 
took action first to search for innovative production and then redefined the role of the 
social sector associations, turning them from interest groups that used to lobby to get 
something from the government into functional developmental associations. And those 
associations then helped firms update their capabilities. Khanna and Palepu (2005) traced 
the origin of the founding of Ranbaxy, a successful Indian pharmaceutical company, to 
the historical fact that the Indian government revised its patent law, which allowed local 
firms to pay limited royalty rates to the multinationals. 
Second, in addition to researching firms in other developing countries, future research 
might also focus on different level of analysis. For example, Aggarwal (1984) has 
extended Vernon' s (1966) model to explain the evolution of indigenous entrepreneurial 
firms by focusing on the level of products. In the future, researchers can explore how 
indigenous entrepreneurial firms launch innovative products or services to build their 
brand image in order to overcome the liability of their origin in international markets 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2000). 
Third, in this thesis, the multinationals in the market have been regarded as the main 
capability enhancer in the stage of staying there. Future research might consider the 
relationship between domestic big business and domestic small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). In fact, SMEs do turn to large domestic enterprises to enhance their 
capabilities. For example, in tracking the origins of the small enterprises in Taiwan, 
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Amsden (1991) discovered a linkage in the flow of capital and technology from large to 
small firms. Perez-Aleman's (2000) also found that in Chile's agroindustry and footwear 
sectors, indigenous small firms relied on large domestic firms, rather than the 
multinational s, to enhance their capability. 
Fourth and finally, this study draws mainly on economic development literature to depict 
the development of entrepreneurship in emerging economies. Even though economic 
development theories are clearly important and relevant, there are other theories to 
explore and to test. It is likely that some other theories emerging in the fields of 
entrepreneurship will challenge us, such as theories of real options (McGrath, 1999), and 
theories of catastrophe and chaos (Bygrave, 1993). These could lend a framework for 
helping to understand the growth of entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
10.12. PERSPECTIVES EMERGING FROM A RESEARCH PROGRAM 
This work presents the results of the author's research pro gram at McGill University, 
which incorporates the key themes explored in his doctoral studies: cultural differences, 
innovation, economic development, and business history. The author' s first paper 
criticized Hofstede's work (Tzeng, 2002), which addressed national culture as the driver 
of economic development. The second paper tumed to the literature on innovation (Tzeng, 
2005). It found that the main research on innovation focused on how firms in developed 
countries innovate, which may have little bearing on indigenous firms in developing 
countries. Therefore, the third paper (Tzeng, 2004), which tumed to the literature of 
economic development, explored the interaction of the state, the social sector and the 
market in the origin of the IT industry in China and Taiwan. 
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From this research program, a perspective is beginning to take shape that challenges some 
of the traditional thinking about how economies develop. This places crucial importance 
on the emergence of indigenous firms. In the developing countries, economists have 
argued that macro-indicators, such as GNP, are paramount. The view here suggests 
differently that, although macro-indicators are important, the building blocks of the 
economy, indigenous firm, influence profoundly wealth creation, and ultimately, the GNP 
of a country. 
Second, this view emphasizes the balanced perspective on the interplay of the three 
sectors. A market-oriented versus a state-oriented paradigrn has dominated the literature 
on economic development, with the social-sector paradigrn joining the debate more 
recently. The result ofthis research suggests the limitations offocusing on one sector, and 
provides a framework that highlights the division of labor among the three sectors. 
Finally, the emergent perspective highlights entrepreneurship as integral to indigenous 
firms. The innovation paper (Tzeng, 2005) identified grassroots impetuses and 
organizational routines as crucial ideas to entrepreneurship. Similarly, based on six firms, 
this thesis supports that entrepreneurial intent and capabilities emerge as key factors 
influencing the growth of firms. 
The study presented in this thesis is, to the author' s knowledge, one of the few 
longitudinal field studies that attempts to bring together research on economic 
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development and entrepreneurship. It is hoped that this research will inspire others to 
consider the roles ofthree sectors-the state, the market and the social sector-În their 
efforts to develop entrepreneurship in developing countries. 
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